Interrogating national security, surveillance, and terror in Canada and Australia

In this chapter the co-editors introduce the comparative volume and its rationales, provide context about national security, surveillance and terror in both Canada and Australia, describe contributions found in the volume, and conclude with an overview of the volume.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Security Analysis of Randomize-Hash-then-Sign Digital Signatures

At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106. In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War

Jackson, Peter, 'France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War', Journal of Strategic Studies (2006) 29(2) pp.247-280 Special Issue: Enforcing arms limits: Germany post 1919; Iraq post 1991 RAE2008

Health, security and foreign policy

McInnes, C., Lee, K. (2006). Health, security and foreign policy. Review of International Studies, 32 (1), 5-23. RAE2008

Analysis and Assessment of Conclusions in the White Book regarding Threats and Challenges in EU Common Security and Defence Policy

Among the many issues that were raised in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (WBNSRP), there were also those related to the functioning of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Its importance for the security of Poland was indicated, as well as the need on the part of EU Member States to broaden collaboration in the sphere of security and defence. The key problems occurring in the context of CSDP were also emphasised and their causes indicated. The aim of the article is to present the factors responsible for the weakening of CSDP effectiveness, ones taken into account in the White Book, and subsequently to present a Framework for their analysis in the light of further scholarship.

New threats - old routines : bureaucratic adaptability in the security policy environment

Within the framework of state security policy, the focus of this dissertation are the relations between how new security threats are perceived and the policy planning and bureaucratic implementation that are designed to address them. In addition, this thesis explores and studies some of the inertias that might exist in the core of the state apparatus as it addresses new threats and how these could be better managed. The dissertation is built on five thematic and interrelated articles highlighting different aspects of when new significant national security threats are detected by different governments until the threats on the policy planning side translate into protective measures within the society. The timeline differs widely between different countries and some key aspects of this process are also studied. One focus concerns mechanisms for adaptability within the Intelligence Community, another on the policy planning process within the Cabinet Offices/National Security Councils and the third focus is on the planning process and how policy is implemented within the bureaucracy. The issue of policy transfer is also analysed, revealing that there is some imitation of innovation within governmental structures and policies, for example within the field of cyber defence. The main findings of the dissertation are that this context has built-in inertias and bureaucratic seams found in most government bureaucratic machineries. As much of the information and planning measures imply security classification of the transparency and internal debate on these issues, alternative assessments become limited. To remedy this situation, the thesis recommends ways to improve the decision-making system in order to streamline the processes involved in making these decisions. Another special focus of the thesis concerns the role of the public policy think tanks in the United States as an instrument of change in the country’s national security decision-making environment, which is viewed from the perspective as being a possible source of new ideas and innovation. The findings in this part are based on unique interviews data on how think tanks become successful and influence the policy debate in a country such as the United States. It appears clearly that in countries such as the United States think tanks smooth the decision making processes, and that this model with some adaptations also might be transferrable to other democratic countries.

National interest to global reform: patterns of reasoning in British foreign policy discourse

Discussion of the national interest often focuses on how Britain's influence can be maximized, rather than on the goals that influence serves. Yet what gives content to claims about the national interest is the means-ends reasoning which links interests to deeper goals. In ideal-typical terms, this can take two forms. The first, and more common, approach is conservative: it infers national interests and the goals they advance from existing policies and commitments. The second is reformist: it starts by specifying national goals and then asks how they are best advanced under particular conditions. New Labour's foreign policy discourse is notable for its explicit use of a reformist approach. Indeed, Gordon Brown's vision of a 'new global society' not only identifies global reform as a key means of fulfilling national goals, but also thereby extends the concept of the national interest well beyond a narrow concern with national security.

Counter-terrorism and (in)security : Fallout from the Bali bombing

In the wake of the Bali bombing the Australian government has proposed a number of national security measures that pose a real danger to human security in Australia and the region. These measures include renewed and increased military and intelligence exchanges with Indonesia, and laws that allow the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) to detain people without charge or even suspicion in order to gather intelligence. In less emotional times these initiatives would be rejected as contrary to human rights concerns and Australia’s democratic traditions, which include the rule of law and due process protections. In the current climate, however, human rights and civil liberties are apt to be portrayed as unaffordable luxuries.

`Counter-terrorism`, human security and globalisation - from welfare to warfare state?

The continuing erosion of civil liberties in Western democracies, and in particular Australia, as a response to the threat of terrorist attack - the position taken that laws eroding civil liberties will ultimately fail in its attempt to combat terrorist activity while adding to human insecurity and violence - counter-terrorism measures resulting in the militarisation of law enforcement and provoking terrorism - linking counter-terrorism with globalisation.

Preventative detention and the right of personal liberty and security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Preventive detention enables a person to be deprived of liberty, by executive determination, for the purposes of safeguarding national security or public order without that person being charged or brought to trial. This paper examines Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to assess whether preventive detention is prohibited by the phrase 'arbitrary arrest and detention '. To analyse this Article, this paper uses a textual and structural analysis of the Article, as well as reference to the travaux preparatoires and case law of the Human Rights Committee. This paper argues that preventive detention is not explicitly prohibited by Article 9(1) ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. If preventive detention is 'arbitrary', within the wide interpretation of that term as argued in this paper, it will be a permissible deprivation of personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Preventive detention will, however, always be considered 'arbitrary' if sajeguards for those arrested and detained are not complied with, in particular the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.

A comparative analysis of opinions of Americans, Australians and Malaysians on the use of biometric devices in workplaces for security and monitoring of worker productivity

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the use of biometric devices such as fingerprint scans, retina and iris scans and facial recognition in everyday situations for national security and border control, have become commonplace. This has resulted in the biometric industry moving from being a niche technology to one that is ubiquitous. As a result. more and more employers are using biometrics to secure staff access to their facilities as well as for tracking staff work hours, maintaining 'discipline' and carry out surveillance against thefts. detecting work hour abuses and fraud. However, the data thus collected and the technologies themselves are feared of having the potential for and actually being misused - both in terms of the violating staff privacy and discrimination and oppression of targeted workers. This paper examines the issue of using biometric devices in organisational settings their advantages, disadvantages and actual and potential abuses from the point of view of critical theory. From the perspectives of Panoptic surveillance and hegemonic organisational control, the paper examines the issues related to privacy and identification, biometrics and privacy, biometrics and the 'body', and surveillance and modernity. The paper also examines the findings ofa survey carried out in Australia. Malaysia and the USA on respondents' opinions on the use of biometric devices in everyday life including at workplaces. The paper concludes that along with their applications in border control and national security, the use of biometric devices should be covered by relevant laws and regulations. guidelines and codes of practice. in order to balance the rights to privacy and civil liberties of workers with employers' need for improved productivity, reduced costs, safeguards related to occupational health and safety, equal opportunity, and workplace harassment of staff and other matters, that employers are legally responsible for.

Responding to terrorism through networks at sites of critical infrastructure : a case study of Australian airport security networks

The importance of effective multilateral security networks is widely recognised in Australia and internationally as being essential to facilitate the large-scale sharing of information required to respond to the threat of terrorism. Australian national security agencies are currently constructing networks in order to bring the diverse national and international security agencies together to achieve this. This paper examines this process of security network formation in the area of critical infrastructure protection, with particular emphasis on airport security. We address the key issues and factors shaping network formation and the dynamics involved in network practice. These include the need for the networks to extend membership beyond the strictly defined elements of national security; the integration of public and private ‘nodes’ in counter-terrorism ‘networks’; and the broader ‘responsibilisation’ of the private sector and the challenges with ‘enabling’ them in counter-terrorism networks. We argue that the need to integrate public and private agencies in counter-terrorism networks is necessary but faces considerable organisational, cultural, and legal barriers.

The impact of security surveys within Australia and New Zealand

Information security is portrayed as a global problem that impacts all countries that are considered as part of the Information Society. Recent surveys show that there are increased concerns about computer crime. The paper will focus upon recent national security surveys from Australia and New Zealand and the trends that this research shows. Is it fair to assume the security practices are the same all over the world? The paper looks at security practices from a number of different countries perspectives and shows that security practices are not generic and vary from country to country. The paper will also evaluate the worth that National Security Surveys have in the field of Information Security Surveys.