988 resultados para Nash (automerkki)


Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

In the past, mining wastes were left wherever they might lie in the surroundings of the mine area. Unfortunately, inactive and abandoned mines continue to pollute our environment, reason why these sites should be restored with minimum impact. Phytoextraction is an environmental-friendly and cost-effective technology less harmful than traditional methods that uses metal hyperaccumulator or at least tolerant plants to extract heavy metals from polluted soils. One disadvantage of hyperaccumulator species is their slow growth rate and low biomass production. Vetiveria zizanioides (L.) Nash, perennial species adapted to Mediterranean climate has a strong root system which can reach up to 3 m deep, is fast growing, and can survive in sites with high metal levels (Chen et al., 2004). Due to the fact that metals in abandoned mine tailings become strongly bonded to soil solids, humic acids used as chelating agents could increase metal bioavailability (Evangelou et al., 2004; Wilde et al., 2005) and thereby promote higher accumulation in the harvestable parts of the plant. The objective of this study was to examine the performance of humic acid assisted phytoextraction using Vetiveria zizanioides (L.) Nash in heavy metals contaminated soils.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Vita.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Mode of access: Internet.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Attributed to Karl Schönhals. The editorship of F. Heller von Hellwald has been established. of. Wurzbach, C. von. Biographisches Lexikon des kaisert. Oesterreich. 1862. v. 8.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Thesis (doctoral)--Konigl. Universitat Breslau.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined with every possible tie breaking rule. It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the "cyclically nested permutation domains" which are obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriately specified recursive way. ------ *We thank József Mala for posing the question of Nash implementability on restricted domains that led to this research. We are very grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) through the Bolyai János research fellowship.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.