The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The internet in Russia: the cradle of civil society. OSW Commentary No. 72, 2012-03-21

In the last decade, along with economic and technological growth, Russia has seen a dynamic development of the internet. Today the net is an everyday tool of work, information and entertainment for 40% of Russians – the most educated, active and affluent part of the society. The spread of the internet (known in Russia as the Runet) has, in turn, brought about significant political and social consequences. With the political and social sphere in Russia strictly controlled by the government, most of this activity has moved to cyberspace. The internet has become an alternative to the state-controlled media, a site for the free exchange of views and a home to numerous social initiatives. In this way, it has become a school of citizenship for Russians, and a kind of ‘test tube’ that has spawned social and political activity. This activity went beyond cyberspace in the election period in 2011/2012, and turned into massive street protests. The potential of the internet has also been used by the Russian government, both to shape public opinion (via loyal online media) and to monitor civil initiatives, especially opposition ones. The state has many instruments of technical control and supervision of the internet and its users’ activity. This control was used in the election period 2011/2012, when selected sites were blocked and pressure exerted on independent websites. These actions were a warning sign from the government, aimed at discouraging internet users from any opposition activity. However, it does not seem feasible that any restriction of such activity can be effective. The scale of this activity is now enormous, and attempts to censor the net and resorting to repression against internet users on a wider scale would only fuel resentment towards the government.

Demographic situation in Russia. OSW Study 24/2006

Throughout the history of Russia, periods of deep chaos have been accompanied by demographic crises. This was the case during the Time of Troubles, or Smutnoye Vremya, in the seventeenth century, and during the period of wars and revolutions in the early twentieth century, which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Similarly, the break-up of the USSR also coincided with a demographic crisis. However, while the previous crises had been caused by factors such as war, famine, epidemics or repressive policies, and were followed by periods of rapid population growth once these factors had ceased to operate, the current crisis is systemic and structural. To a large extent, it has been occasioned by cultural factors such as changing family models and the roles of women in today's society. In Russia, the effect of these factors on population increase is exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption, an culture of inadequate working conditions which leads to many accidents at work, and healthcare deficiencies (only c. 3% of the GDP is spent on healthcare annually).

The economic and financial crisis in Russia – background, symptoms and prospects for the future. OSW Report 02/2015

The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.

Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and their (new) Mobilizations in Russia. EDAP 2/2015

Issues concerning indigenous peoples (IPs) in Russia have become a “hot topic” despite the fact that they represent only 0.2 percent of the population. Constant amendments to the laws affecting the life of IPs and lawsuits filed before local Courts denouncing the violations of IPs’ rights are signs of the struggle surrounding these indigenous peoples. Moreover, between 2012 and 2013, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), the umbrella organization of IPs in the country, was ordered to shut down and subsequently given the permission to reopen by the Russian Ministry of Justice within the course of less than six months. This article aims to gain a deeper understanding of the recent developments vis-à-vis indigenous peoples’ legal protection and IPs’ increasing efforts to exercise their rights.

Strangers among us. Non-governmental organisations in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY 2015-09-29

The situation of the third sector in Russia, i.e. the civil society structures independent from the state, is worsening on a regular basis. The Kremlin’s actions aimed at paralysing and destroying the independent non-governmental sector seen over the past four years have been presented as part of a struggle for the country’s sovereignty. This is above all a consequence of the Russian government’s efforts to take full control of the socio-political situation in the country while it also needs to deal with the geopolitical confrontation with the West and the worsening economic crisis. The policy aimed against non-governmental organisations is depriving the public of structures for self-organisation, protection of civil rights and the means of controlling the ever more authoritarian government. At the same time, the Kremlin has been depriving itself of channels of co-operation and communication with the public and antagonising the most active citizens. The restrictive measures the Kremlin has taken over the past few years with regard to NGOs prove that Russian decision-makers believe that any social initiative independent of the government may give rise to unrest, which is dangerous for the regime, and – given the economic slump – any unrest brings unnecessary political risk.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia. OSW STUDIES 54, 2016-01-04

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

Business under supervision – pathologies serving the system of power in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 212 | 31.05.2016

The relations between Russia’s authorities and business circles are subordinated not so much to rational economic calculations as to the interests of political elites. The key interest in this case is maintaining the current model of government. The formal and informal supervision of business by law enforcement agencies is an important element of Russia’s economic reality. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, intended to suggest that the state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, it is evident that there is no will to devise a systemic solution to the most urgent problems, including the state institutions’ disrespect for the rights of ownership.