957 resultados para Moral rights
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Sabin
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The increase of buyer-driven supply chains, outsourcing and other forms of non-traditional employment has resulted in challenges for labour market regulation. One business model which has created substantial regulatory challenges is supply chains. The supply chain model involves retailers purchasing products from brand corporations who then outsource the manufacturing of the work to traders who contract with factories or outworkers who actually manufacture the clothing and textiles. This business model results in time and cost pressures being pushed down the supply chain which has resulted in sweatshops where workers systematically have their labour rights violated. Literally millions of workers work in dangerous workplaces where thousands are killed or permanently disabled every year. This thesis has analysed possible regulatory responses to provide workers a right to safety and health in supply chains which provide products for Australian retailers. This thesis will use a human rights standard to determine whether Australia is discharging its human rights obligations in its approach to combating domestic and foreign labour abuses. It is beyond this thesis to analyse Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) laws in every jurisdiction. Accordingly, this thesis will focus upon Australian domestic laws and laws in one of Australia’s major trading partners, the Peoples’ Republic of China (China). It is hypothesised that Australia is currently breaching its human rights obligations through failing to adequately regulate employees’ safety at work in Australian-based supply chains. To prove this hypothesis, this thesis will adopt a three- phase approach to analysing Australia’s regulatory responses. Phase 1 will identify the standard by which Australia’s regulatory approach to employees’ health and safety in supply chains can be judged. This phase will focus on analysing how workers’ rights to safety as a human right imposes a moral obligation on Australia to take reasonablely practicable steps regulate Australian-based supply chains. This will form a human rights standard against which Australia’s conduct can be judged. Phase 2 focuses upon the current regulatory environment. If existing regulatory vehicles adequately protect the health and safety of employees, then Australia will have discharged its obligations through simply maintaining the status quo. Australia currently regulates OHS through a combination of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ regulatory vehicles. The first part of phase 2 analyses the effectiveness of traditional OHS laws in Australia and in China. The final part of phase 2 then analyses the effectiveness of the major soft law vehicle ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR). The fact that employees are working in unsafe working conditions does not mean Australia is breaching its human rights obligations. Australia is only required to take reasonably practicable steps to ensure human rights are realized. Phase 3 identifies four regulatory vehicles to determine whether they would assist Australia in discharging its human rights obligations. Phase 3 then analyses whether Australia could unilaterally introduce supply chain regulation to regulate domestic and extraterritorial supply chains. Phase 3 also analyses three public international law regulatory vehicles. This chapter considers the ability of the United Nations Global Compact, the ILO’s Better Factory Project and a bilateral agreement to improve the detection and enforcement of workers’ right to safety and health.
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Schools have long been seen as institutions for preparing children for life, both academically and as moral agents in society. In order to become capable, moral citizens, children need to be provided with opportunities to learn moral values. However, little is known about how teachers enact social and moral values programs in the classroom. The aim of this paper is to investigate the practices that Australian early years teachers describe as important for teaching moral values. To investigate early years teachers’ understandings of moral pedagogy, 379 Australian teachers with experience teaching children in the early years were invited to participate in an on-line survey. This paper focuses on responses provided to an open-ended question relating to teaching practices for moral values. The responses were analysed using an interpretive methodology. The results indicate that the most prominent approaches to teaching moral values described by this group of Australian early years teachers were engaging children in moral activities. This was closely followed by teaching practices for transmitting moral values. Engaging children in building meaning and participatory learning for moral values were least often described.
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There is a lack of writing on the issue of the education rights of people with disabilities by authors of any theoretical persuasion. While the deficiency of theory may be explained by a variety of historical, philosophical and practical considerations, it is a deficiency which must be addressed. Otherwise, any statement of rights rings out as hollow rhetoric unsupported by sound reason and moral rectitude. This paper attempts to address this deficiency in education rights theory by postulating a communitarian theory of the education rights of people with disabilities. The theory is developed from communitarian writings on the role of education in democratic society. The communitarian school, like the community within which it nests, is inclusive. Schools both reflect and model the shape of communitarian society and have primary responsibility for teaching the knowledge and virtues which will allow citizens to belong to and function within society. Communitarians emphasise responsibilities, however, as the corollary of rights and require the individual good to yield to community good when the hard cases arise. The article not only explains the basis of the right to an inclusive education, therefore, but also engages with the difficult issue of when such a right may not be enforceable.
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This book offers a unique insight into the moral politics behind the making of human trafficking policy in Australia and the United States of America. As governments around the world rush to meet their international obligations to combat human trafficking, a heated debate has emerged over the rights, wrongs, and harms of prostitution, and its relationship to sex trafficking. The Politics of Sex Trafficking identifies and challenges intrinsic notions of moral harm that have pervaded trafficking discourse and resulted in a distinctly anti-prostitution agenda in trafficking policy in recent decades. Including rare interviews with key political actors, this book charts the competing perspectives of feminist, faith-based, and sex-worker activists, and their efforts to influence policy-makers. This critical account of the creation of anti-trafficking policy challenges the sex trafficking narrative dominant in US Congressional and Australian Parliamentary hearings, and demonstrates the power of a moral politics in shaping policy. This book will appeal to academics across the fields of criminology, criminal justice, law, human rights and gender studies, as well as policy-makers.
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This book examines the interface between religion, charity law and human rights. It does so by treating the Church of England and its current circumstances as a timely case study providing an opportunity to examine the tensions that have now become such a characteristic feature of that interface. Firstly, it suggests that the Church is the primary source of canon law principles that have played a formative role in shaping civic morality throughout the common law jurisdictions: the history of their emergence and enforcement by the State in post-Reformation England is recorded and assessed. Secondly, it reveals that of such principles those of greatest weight were associated with matters of sexuality: in particular, for centuries, family law was formulated and applied with regard for the sanctity of the heterosexual marital family which provided the only legally permissible context for any form of sexual relationship. Thirdly, given that history, it identifies and assesses the particular implications that now arise for the Church as a consequence of recent charity law reform outcomes and human rights case law developments: a comparative analysis of religion related case law is provided. Finally, following an outline of the structure and organizational functions of the Church, a detailed analysis is undertaken of its success in engaging with these issues in the context of the Lambeth Conferences, the wider Anglican Communion and in the ill-fated Covenant initiative. From the perspective of the dilemmas currently challenging the moral authority of the Church of England, this book identifies and explores the contemporary ‘moral imperatives’ or red line issues that now threaten the coherence of Christian religions in most leading common law nations. Gay marriage and abortion are among the host of morally charged and deeply divisive topics demanding a reasoned response and leadership from religious bodies. Attention is given to the judicial interpretation and evaluation of these and other issues that now undermine the traditional role of the Church of England. As the interface between religion, charity law and human rights becomes steadily more fractious, with religious fundamentalism and discrimination acquiring a higher profile, there is now a pressing need for a more balanced relationship between those with and those without religious beliefs. This book will be an invaluable aid in starting the process of achieving a triangulated relationship between the principles of canon law, charity law and human rights law.
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For the first time in 400 years a number of leading common law nations have, fairly simultaneously, embarked on charity law reform leading to an encoding of key definitional matters in charity legislation. This book provides an analysis of international case law developments on the ever growing range of issues now being generated by clashes between human rights, religion and charity law. Kerry O'Halloran identifies and assesses the agenda of 'moral imperatives', such as abortion and gay marriage that delineate the legal interface and considers their significance for those with and those without religious belief. By assessing jurisdictional differences in the law relating to religion/human rights/charity the author provides a picture of the evolving 'culture wars' that now typify and differentiates societies in western nations including the USA, England and Wales, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
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Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.
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The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.
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In the post-World War II era human rights have emerged as an enormous global phenomenon. In Finland human rights have particularly in the 1990s moved from the periphery to the center of public policy making and political rhetoric. Human rights education is commonly viewed as the decisive vehicle for emancipating individuals of oppressive societal structures and rendering them conscious of the equal value of others; both core ideals of the abstract discourse. Yet little empirical research has been conducted on how these goals are realized in practice. These factors provide the background for the present study which, by combining anthropological insights with critical legal theory, has analyzed the educational activities of a Scandinavian and Nordic network of human rights experts and PhD students in 2002-2005. This material has been complemented by data from the proceedings of UN human rights treaty bodies, hearings organized by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the analysis of different human rights documents as well as the manner human rights are talked of in the Finnish media. As the human rights phenomenon has expanded, human rights experts have acquired widespread societal influence. The content of human rights remains, nevertheless, ambiguous: on the one hand they are law, on the other, part of a moral discourse. By educating laymen on what human rights are, experts act both as intermediaries and activists who expand the scope of rights and simultaneously exert increasing political influence. In the educational activities of the analyzed network these roles were visible in the rhetorics of legality and legitimacy . Among experts both of these rhetorics are subject to ongoing professional controversy, yet in the network they are presented as undisputable facts. This contributes to the impression that human rights knowledge is uncontested. This study demonstrates how the network s activities embody and strengthen a conception of expertise as located in specific, structurally determined individuals. Simultaneously its conception of learning emphasizes the adoption of knowledge by students, emphasizing the power of experts over them. The majority of the network s experts are Nordic males, whereas its students are predominantly Nordic females and males from East-European and developing countries. Contrary to the ideals of the discourse the network s activities do not create dialogue, but instead repeat power structures which are themselves problematic.
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A presente tese tem por objetivo principal estudar a legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal. Trata-se de tema de grande relevância e extrema atualidade em decorrência de dois fatores. Por um lado, desde o fenômeno da virada kantiana e da retomada da preocupação com o estabelecimento de uma teoria da justiça, tornou-se necessária a análise de justificação jurídico-moral de toda e qualquer instituição político-jurídica positivada. Por outro lado, entre as inúmeras instituições político-jurídicas positivadas, cresce cada vez mais a utilização das medidas jurídicas regulatórias, através das quais o Poder Público direciona ou controla a conduta dos agentes com o intuito de atingir determinada finalidade. Instituto econômico que é, ao interferir na alocação de riquezas, bens e serviços no mercado, a regulação estatal há tempos já vem sendo objeto de análise em uma perspectiva de legitimação econômica. Tradicionalmente, ainda dentro do paradigma da racionalidade, os economistas sempre apontaram as falhas de mercado como as razões a justificar as regulações estatais em um viés econômico. Mais recentemente, por sua vez, os adeptos da economia comportamental, rompendo ou relativizando as lições da Rational Choice Theory, têm apontado também as ações irracionais em heurística como razões a justificar as regulações estatais em um viés econômico. Ocorre, entretanto, que a regulação estatal é um instituto interdisciplinar. Ao direcionar ou controlar a conduta dos indivíduos, limitando ou implementando direitos e liberdades, a regulação constitui instituto simultaneamente jurídico e moral. A presente tese, portanto, buscará apresentar as razões a servir de justificação para a regulação estatal em uma perspectiva jurídico-moral. Neste ponto, adotar-se-á como paradigma de aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral das instituições político-jurídicas positivadas (entre as quais as regulações estatais) um liberalismo-republicano, consistente na compatibilização do liberalismo-igualitário com um republicanismo moderado. Desta forma, o estudo buscará defender a possibilidade de a legitimação jurídico-moral das diversas regulações estatais encontrar fundamento em um ou alguns de três valores jurídico-morais: a autonomia individual privada, as condições igualitárias e a autonomia pública. No que diz respeito à implementação da autonomia individual privada e das condições igualitárias, primeiramente, a tese defenderá a possibilidade de ser realizada uma nova leitura jurídico-moral dos institutos econômicos das falhas de mercado e das ações irracionais em heurística. Neste sentido, o conceito de falhas de mercado e o conceito de ações irracionais em heurística, em uma leitura jurídico-moral como razões a justificar a legitimação das regulações estatais, devem ser entendidos como situações em que o atuar livre dos agentes no mercado viole ou deixe de implementar os valores jurídico-morais fundamentais da autonomia individual privada e das condições igualitárias. Ainda no que diz respeito às influências liberal-igualitárias, a tese sustentará que, mesmo na inexistência de falhas de mercado ou de ações irracionais em heurística, será possível o estabelecimento de regulações estatais que encontrem justificação no valor jurídico-moral fundamental da igualdade, desde que tais regulações estejam destinadas a implementar as condições igualitárias mínimas necessárias à manutenção da própria autonomia individual privada e da dignidade humana. Por outro lado, no que diz respeito às influências republicanas, será exposto que as regulações estatais podem encontrar legitimação jurídico-moral também no valor jurídico-moral fundamental da autonomia pública. A saber, as regulações podem se encontrar legitimadas jurídico-moralmente quando da implementação dos projetos e políticas deliberados pelos cidadãos e pela sociedade no exercício da soberania popular, desde que tais projetos coletivos não violem os requisitos mínimos de dignidade humana dos indivíduos. A tese defenderá que os princípios da proporcionalidade e da igualdade podem exercer um papel de destaque na análise de legitimação jurídico-moral das regulações estatais. O princípio da proporcionalidade, neste ponto, será útil instrumental metodológico na aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral de uma medida regulatória em uma perspectiva interna, quando da aferição da relação estabelecida entre os meios e os fins da regulação. O princípio da igualdade, por sua vez, será útil instrumental metodológico na aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral de uma medida regulatória em uma perspectiva comparativa entre as diversas medidas regulatórias existentes. Por fim, uma vez enfrentados os pontos mais sensíveis pertinentes à justificação de toda e qualquer medida regulatória bem como estabelecida uma teoria geral acerca da legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal, a presente tese realizará um estudo de caso acerca da legitimação jurídico-moral especificamente das regulações que utilizam argumentos de natureza paternalista. Trata-se de regulações que, ao direcionar a conduta de agentes com o intuito de zelar por bens, direitos e interesses destes próprios indivíduos cuja liberdade é restringida, apresentam-se extremamente controversas. Será exposto que, desde a clássica obra On Liberty de JONH STUART MILL, o paternalismo jurídico vem sendo tradicionalmente associado a uma conotação pejorativa de violação aos valores jurídico-morais fundamentais. A tese, porém, adotará posição segundo a qual as regulações paternalistas podem eventualmente encontrar legitimação jurídico-moral na promoção ou proteção dos valores jurídico-morais fundamentais da autonomia individual privada e da igualdade. Além disto, defenderá o estudo que os institutos econômicos das falhas de mercado da assimetria de informações e dos problemas de coordenação bem como os institutos econômicos das ações irracionais em heurística, adotados na nova leitura jurídico-moral proposta, servirão de instrumental útil na identificação das situações em que tais regulações paternalistas se encontram legitimadas jurídico-moralmente diante da premissa liberal-republicana.
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This chapter is concerned with exploring the dynamics of contemporary debate on women’s reproductive choices and rights in the somewhat transformed social, political and economic context of the Republic of Ireland. News coverage of the events of April and May 2007 provide the focus of attention, as the case of ‘D’, a 17 year old in the temporary care of the state, seeking to terminate her pregnancy after a diagnosis of severe foetal abnormality, became yet again a focus of public debate on abortion access within the state. The analysis explores how the issues this case raised were framed in the public domain, in order to consider the shifting moral grammar shaping the debate. The paper explores the ways in which this case illustrates the ongoing tensions between changing characterisations of Irishness, and the social dynamics of access to reproductive rights, particularly for national minors in the care of the state.