Equity offerings, stock price crash risk, and the impact of securities regulation: international evidence

We examine whether earnings manipulation around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a stock price crash post-issue and test whether the enactment of securities regulations attenuate the relation between SEOs and crash risk. Empirical evidence documents that managerial tendency to conceal bad news increases the likelihood of a stock price crash (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009). We test this hypothesis using a sample of firms from 29 EU countries that enacted the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that equity issuers that engage in earnings management experience a significant increase in crash risk post-SEO relative to control groups of non-issuers; this effect is stronger for equity issuers with poor information environments. In addition, our findings show a significant decline in crash risk post-issue after the enactment of MAD that is stronger for firms that actively manage earnings. This decline in post-issue crash risk is more effective in countries with high ex-ante institutional quality and enforcement. These results suggest that the implementation of MAD helps to mitigate managers’ ability to manipulate earnings around SEOs.

Validação da versão em português do Minnesota Living with Heart Failure Questionnaire

FUNDAMENTO: O Minnesota Living with Heart Failure Questionnaire (MLHFQ) é uma importante ferramenta de avaliação da qualidade de vida em pacientes com insuficiência cardíaca. Apesar de amplamente usado em nosso meio, não contávamos com a sua tradução e validação em língua portuguesa. OBJETIVO: Este estudo pretendeu traduzir e validar a versão em português do MLHFQ em pacientes com insuficiência cardíaca. MÉTODOS: Quarenta pacientes com insuficiência cardíaca (30 homens, FEVE 30±6%, 55% de etiologia isquêmica, NYHA I a III) com estabilidade clínica e terapia medicamentosa otimizada realizaram teste cardiopulmonar máximo para avaliação da capacidade física. Logo após, o MLHFQ, devidamente traduzido, foi aplicado por um mesmo pesquisador. A classe funcional NYHA foi encaminhada pela equipe medica. RESULTADOS: A versão em português do MLHFQ apresentou-se com a mesma estrutura e métrica da versão original. Não houve dificuldade na aplicação e compreensão do questionário por parte dos pacientes. A versão em português do MLHFQ mostrou-se concordante com o pico de VO2, o tempo de exercício do teste cardiopulmonar e com a classificação funcional da NYHA. Não houve diferença da média do escore do questionário entre os grupos de etiologia isquêmica e não-isquêmica. CONCLUSÃO: A versão em língua portuguesa da MLHFQ, proposta no presente estudo, demonstrou ser válida em pacientes com insuficiência cardíaca, constituindo uma nova e importante ferramenta para avaliar a qualidade de

Chicago winter birds / by Colin C. Sanborn, Asst., Division of Birds.

no.2(1922)

Fishery statistics of the United States / prepared by Data Management and Statistics Division.

1975

Science policy : USA/USSR / [report prepared for National Science Foundation, Directorate for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs, Division of International Programs].

2

Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary final environmental impact statement/management plan / Sanctuaries and Reserves Division.

1

Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary final environmental impact statement/management plan / Sanctuaries and Reserves Division.

2

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.