Experience, Education and Subjectivity: A Comparison of John Dewey's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Conceptions of Experience and Their Implications for Education

This thesis compares John Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and illustrates how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can strengthen and further Dewey’s philosophy of education. I begin by drawing the connection between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and his philosophy of education, and illustrate how Dewey’s understanding of growth, and thinking in education, is rooted in and informed by his detailed philosophy of experience. From there, I give an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with a focus on his descriptions of subjectivity that he presents in the Phenomenology of Perception. Following this, I outline some of the implications Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has on our understanding of rationality, expression and existence. In the final chapter, I make the comparison between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. After demonstrating how these two philosophies are not only similar but also complementary, I then look to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to provide insight into and to advance Dewey’s philosophy of education. I will illustrate how Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of subjectivity helps to support, and reinforce the rationale behind Dewey’s inquiry-based approach to education. Furthermore, I will show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and its implications for rationality, expression and existence support Dewey’s democratic ideal and add a hermeneutical element to Dewey’s philosophy of education.

Is Merleau-Ponty's position in phenomenology of perception a new type of transcendental idealism?

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.

Reprise, acquisition et institution : le corps comme milieu expressif originaire dans la Phénoménologie de la perception de Merleau‐Ponty

Considérée plus manifestement comme une analyse de la perception et du temps et de l’espace vécus, la Phénoménologie de la perception de Merleau-Ponty fait en outre droit à une réflexion naissante – mais aussi peut-être, plus essentielle – sur le phénomène de l’expression et l’horizon englobant de la question du sens. En effet, le problème de l’expression n’est pas à comprendre comme un épiphénomène de l’existence humaine : il témoigne plus holistiquement des liens profonds qui unissent subjectivité et intersubjectivité, rattache notre existence à un passé humain et décrit plus généralement la complicité de notre corps avec le monde. Cette recherche se propose de comprendre intérieurement la toile des liens intimes qui unissent corporéité et expression, afin d’éclairer le rôle constitutif du corps dans la reprise d’intentions de signification et l’institution créative de nouveaux actes expressifs.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.

Reprise, acquisition et institution : le corps comme milieu expressif originaire dans la Phénoménologie de la perception de Merleau‐Ponty

Considérée plus manifestement comme une analyse de la perception et du temps et de l’espace vécus, la Phénoménologie de la perception de Merleau-Ponty fait en outre droit à une réflexion naissante – mais aussi peut-être, plus essentielle – sur le phénomène de l’expression et l’horizon englobant de la question du sens. En effet, le problème de l’expression n’est pas à comprendre comme un épiphénomène de l’existence humaine : il témoigne plus holistiquement des liens profonds qui unissent subjectivité et intersubjectivité, rattache notre existence à un passé humain et décrit plus généralement la complicité de notre corps avec le monde. Cette recherche se propose de comprendre intérieurement la toile des liens intimes qui unissent corporéité et expression, afin d’éclairer le rôle constitutif du corps dans la reprise d’intentions de signification et l’institution créative de nouveaux actes expressifs.

Divergencies of Perception : The Possibilities of Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology in Analyses of Contemporary Art

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) has been known as the philosopher of painting. His interest in the theory of perception intertwined with the questions concerning the artist s perception, the experience of an artwork and the possible interpretations of the artwork. For him, aesthetics was not a sub-field of philosophy, and art was not simply a subject matter for the aesthetic experience, but a form of thinking. This study proposes an opening for a dialogue between Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and contemporary art. The thesis examines his phenomenology through certain works of contemporary art and presents readings of these artworks through his phenomenology. The thesis both shows the potentiality of a method, but also engages in the critical task of finding the possible limitations of his approach. The first part lays out the methodological and conceptual points of departure of Merleau-Ponty s phenomenological approach to perception as well as the features that determined his discussion on encountering art. Merleau-Ponty referred to the experience of perceiving art using the notion of seeing with (voir selon). He stressed a correlative reciprocity described in Eye and Mind (1961) as the switching of the roles of the visible and the painter. The choice of artworks is motivated by certain restrictions in the phenomenological readings of visual arts. The examined works include paintings by Tiina Mielonen, a photographic work by Christian Mayer, a film by Douglas Gordon and Philippe Parreno, and an installation by Monika Sosnowska. These works resonate with, and challenge, his phenomenological approach. The chapters with case studies take up different themes that are central to Merleau-Ponty s phenomenology: space, movement, time, and touch. All of the themes are interlinked with the examined artworks. There are also topics that reappear in the thesis, such as the notion of écart and the question of encountering the other. As Merleau-Ponty argued, the sphere of art has a particular capability to address our being in the world. The thesis presents an interpretation that emphasises the notion of écart, which refers to an experience of divergence or dispossession. The sudden dissociation, surprise or rupture that is needed in order for a meeting between the spectator and the artwork, or between two persons, to be possible. Further, the thesis suggests that through artworks it is possible to take into consideration the écart, the divergence, that defines our subjectivity.

Vers une phénoménologie de la danse : une approche merleau-pontienne

La présente étude vise à dégager les paramètres élémentaires d’une analyse phénoménologique de la danse. D’emblée, la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty s’impose comme cadre privilégié pour révéler l’expérience vécue de cet art qui met en scène un savoir corporel complexe. À partir de sa théorie de la perception, dont découlent les phénomènes relatifs au corps moteur, à l’espace et à l’intersensorialité, notre étude aménage les contours d’une analyse existentielle du geste dansé. Ce faisant, nous nous heurtons à un constat : le phénomène de la danse se présente comme un élément perturbateur de la pensée merleau-pontienne. En effet, il incite à en questionner les aspects fondamentaux, voire à en constater certaines limites. Informée par les études de Rudolf Laban, instigateur de la « danse libre » allemande et par les celles des philosophes contemporains Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Michel Bernard, Laurence Louppe et Renaud Barbaras, notre étude démontre en effet que la thèse merleau-pontienne de la perception empêche de cibler le travail kinesthésique du corps propre dans l’empire du « sentir » qui l’anime et de reconnaitre sa constitution profondément dynamique. Pour combler cette carence, nous invitons à une phénoménologie de la danse qui puisse embrasser sa nature poétique, la sensibilité créatrice qu’elle requiert et le travail sensible qu’elle habilite. Nous envisageons alors, avec le philosophe de la sensation Renaud Barbaras, de nous inspirer d’une heuristique aux traits vitalistes pour réhabiliter certaines notions battues en retraite par la tradition phénoménologique. En nous tournant vers les concepts de force, de désir, d’intensification, nous tentons de retrouver dans la logique de la sensation elle-même un dynamisme fondamental que l’expérience esthétique amplifie. La recherche nous montre que la danse est l’art qui, mieux que nul autre, rend compte de ce phénomène complexe.

Marxismo e filosofia: algumas considerações sobre os textos políticos Merleau-Pontyanos do pós-guerra

A tentativa merleau-pontyana de aproximação do marxismo, empreendida nos idos do pós-guerra, é perpassada por constante ambigüidade. Não obstante o propósito do filósofo de se filiar à teoria de Marx, suas análises políticas revelam-se distantes de suas intenções. Concebendo a história como uma aventura que escapa a qualquer esquema racional, Merleau-Ponty questiona, desde seus primeiros escritos, a dialética marxista entre lógica e contingência na história. A tensão interna que dilacera os textos do autor nos anos 40, anunciando (e preparando) a recusa da teoria da revolução estampada mais tarde nas Aventuras da Dialética, permite indagar se esse desfecho dos anos 50 não teria sido, ao invés de um corte no interior da obra, o resultado necessário dessa tentativa problemática de aproximação do marxismo a partir de categorias que lhe são estranhas (próprias às filosofias da existência e à fenomenologia).

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: transcendental phenomenology, science, and naturalism

In this paper, I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty's work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a "modest" rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty – e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty's work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, I seek to establish that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.

The phenomenology of utopia : reimagining the political

This thesis argues that the end of Soviet Marxism and a bipolar global political imaginary at the dissolution of the short Twentieth Century poses an obstacle for anti-systemic political action. Such a blockage of alternate political imaginaries can be discerned by reading the work of Francis Fukuyama and "Endism" as performative invocations of the closure of political alternatives, and thus as an ideological proclamation which enables and constrains forms of social action. It is contended that the search through dialectical thought for a competing universal to posit against "liberal democracy" is a fruitless one, because it reinscribes the terms of teleological theories of history which work to effect closure. Rather, constructing a phenomenological analytic of the political conjuncture, the thesis suggests that the figure of messianism without a Messiah is central to a deconstructive reframing of the possibilities of political action - a reframing attentive to the rhetorical tone of texts. The project of recovering the political is viewed through a phenomenological lens. An agonistic political distinction must be made so as to memorialise the remainders and ghosts of progress, and thus to gesture towards an indeconstructible justice which would serve as a horizon for the articulation of an empty universal. This project is furthered by a return to a certain phenomenology inspired by Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ernesto Laclau. The thesis provides a reading of Jacques Derrida and Walter Benjamin as thinkers of a minor universalism, a non-prescriptive utopia, and places their work in the context of new understandings of religion and the political as quasi-transcendentals which can be utilised to think through the aporias of political time in order to grasp shards of meaning. Derrida and Chantal Mouffe's deconstructive critique and supplement to Carl Schmitt's concept of the political is read as suggestive of a reframing of political thought which would leave the political question open and thus enable the articulation of social imaginary significations able to inscribe meaning in the field of political action. Thus, the thesis gestures towards a form of thought which enables rather than constrains action under the sign of justice.

De la reconstruction a l’augmentation du corps humain en medecine restaurative et en cybernetique

Aux confluences historiques et conceptuelles de la modernité, de la technologie, et de l’« humain », les textes de notre corpus négocient et interrogent de façon critique les possibilités matérielles et symboliques de la prothèse, ses aspects phénoménologiques et spéculatifs : du côté subjectiviste et conceptualiste avec une philosophie de la conscience, avec Merleau-Ponty ; et de l’autre avec les épistémologues du corps et historiens de la connaissance Canguilhem et Foucault. Le trope prometteur de la prothèse impacte sur les formations discursives et non-discursives concernant la reconstruction des corps, là où la technologie devient le corrélat de l’identité. La technologie s’humanise au contact de l’homme, et, en révélant une hybridité supérieure, elle phagocyte l’humain du même coup. Ce travail de sociologie des sciences (Latour, 1989), ou encore d’anthropologie des sciences (Hakken, 2001) ou d’anthropologie bioculturelle (Andrieu, 1993; Andrieu, 2006; Andrieu, 2007a) se propose en tant qu’exemple de la contribution potentielle que l’anthropologie biologique et culturelle peut rendre à la médecine reconstructrice et que la médecine reconstructrice peut rendre à la plastique de l’homme ; l’anthropologie biologique nous concerne dans la transformation biologique du corps humain, par l’outil de la technologie, tant dans son histoire de la reconstruction mécanique et plastique, que dans son projet d’augmentation bionique. Nous établirons une continuité archéologique, d’une terminologie foucaldienne, entre les deux pratiques. Nous questionnons les postulats au sujet des relations nature/culture, biologie/contexte social, et nous présentons une approche définitionnelle de la technologie, pierre angulaire de notre travail théorique. Le trope de la technologie, en tant qu’outil adaptatif de la culture au service de la nature, opère un glissement sémantique en se plaçant au service d’une biologie à améliorer. Une des clés de notre recherche sur l’augmentation des fonctions et de l’esthétique du corps humain réside dans la redéfinition même de ces relations ; et dans l’impact de l’interpénétration entre réalité et imaginaire dans la construction de l’objet scientifique, dans la transformation du corps humain. Afin de cerner les enjeux du discours au sujet de l’« autoévolution » des corps, les théories évolutionnistes sont abordées, bien que ne représentant pas notre spécialité. Dans le cadre de l’autoévolution, et de l’augmentation bionique de l’homme, la somation culturelle du corps s’exerce par l’usage des biotechnologies, en rupture épistémologique de la pensée darwinienne, bien que l’acte d’hybridation évolutionnaire soit toujours inscrit dans un dessein de maximisation bionique/génétique du corps humain. Nous explorons les courants de la pensée cybernétique dans leurs actions de transformation biologique du corps humain, de la performativité des mutilations. Ainsi technologie et techniques apparaissent-elles indissociables de la science, et de son constructionnisme social.

Poverty in perception : a study of the twentieth-century prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand, as English-speaking nations with dominant white populations, present an ethnic anomaly not only in South East Asia, but also in the Southern Hemisphere. Colonised by predominantly workingclass British immigrants from the late eighteenth century, an ethnic and cultural connection grew between these two countries even though their indigenous populations and ecological environments were otherwise very different. Building a new life in Australia and New Zealand, the colonists shared similar historic perceptions of poverty – perceptions from their homelands that they did not want to see replicated in their new adopted countries. Dreams of a better life shaped their aspirations, self-identity and nationalistic outlook. By the twentieth century, national independence and self-government had replaced British colonial rule. The inveterate occurrence of poverty in Australia and New Zealand had created new local perspectives and different perceptions of, and about, poverty. This study analyses what relationship existed between the political directions adopted by the twentieth-century prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand and their perceptions of poverty. Using the existential phenomenological theory and methodology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the study adds to the body of knowledge about poverty in Australia and New Zealand by revealing the structure and origin of the poverty perceptions of the twentieth-century prime ministers.