A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA)

Australia and South Korea have signed a new free trade agreement - the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA). Is it a fair trade fairytale? Or is it a dirty deal done dirt cheap? Or somewhere in between? It is hard to tell, given the initial secrecy of the negotiations, and the complexity of the texts of the agreement There has been much debate in Parliament over the transparency of the trade agreement; the scope of market access provided under the deal; the impact of the investment chapter, with its investor-state dispute settlement clause; the intellectual property chapter; the environment chapter; its impact upon public health; and the labor rights chapter. KAFTA provides an indication of the approach of the new Conservative Government in Australia to other trade deals – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

A Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth)

The film company, Roadshow, the pay television company Foxtel, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp and News Limited — as well as copyright industries — have been clamouring for new copyright powers and remedies. In the summer break, the Coalition Government has responded to such entreaties from its industry supporters and donors, with a new package of copyright laws and policies. There has been significant debate over the proposals between the odd couple of Attorney-General George Brandis and the Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull. There has been deep, philosophical differences between the two Ministers over the copyright agenda. The Attorney-General George Brandis has supported a model of copyright maximalism, with strong rights and remedies for the copyright empires in film, television, and publishing. He has shown little empathy for the information technology companies of the digital economy. The Attorney-General has been impatient to press ahead with a copyright regime. The Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, has been somewhat more circumspect,recognising that there is a need to ensure that copyright laws do not adversely impact upon competition in the digital economy. The final proposal is a somewhat awkward compromise between the discipline-and-punish regime preferred by Brandis, and the responsive regulation model favoured by Turnbull. In his new book, Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age, Cory Doctorow has some sage advice for copyright owners: Things that don’t make money: * Complaining about piracy. * Calling your customers thieves. * Treating your customers like thieves. In this context, the push by copyright owners and the Coalition Government to have a copyright crackdown may well be counter-productive to their interests. This submission considers a number of key elements of the Coalition Government’s Copyright Crackdown. Part 1 examines the proposals in respect of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth). Part 2 focuses upon the proposed Copyright Code. Part 3 considers the question of safe harbours for intermediaries. Part 4 examines the question of copyright exceptions – particularly looking at the proposal of the Australian Law Reform Commission for the introduction of a defence of fair use. Part 5 highlights the recommendations of the IT Pricing Inquiry and the Harper Competition Policy Review in respect of copyright law, consumer rights, and competition law.

Submission to Senate Economics References Committee, An Inquiry in to Affordable Housing

Developer paid fees or infrastructure charges are a commonly used mechanism for local governments to pay for new infrastructure. However, property developers claim that these costs are merely passed on to home buyers, with adverse effects to housing affordability. Despite numerous government reports and many years of industry advocacy, there remains no empirical evidence in Australia to confirm or quantify this passing on effect to home buyers and the consequent effect on housing affordability. Hence there remains no data from which governments can base policy decision on, and the debate continues. This research examines the question of the impact of infrastructure charges on housing affordability in Australia. It employs hedonic regression methods to estimate the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices and vacant lot prices in Brisbane, Australia during 2005-2011, using a data set of 29,752 house sales, comprising 4,699 new house sales and 25,053 existing house sales and 13,739 lot sales. The regression results for the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices in Brisbane indicated that for every $1.00 of infrastructure charge levied on developers, all house prices increase by $3.69 or a 369% overpassing of these government levies onto home buyers. Thus, this one government levy could be responsible for $877 per month on home owner mortgage repayments in Brisbane, Queensland. This research is consistent with international findings, that support the proposition that developer paid infrastructure charges are passed on to home buyers and are a significant contributor to increasing house prices and reduced housing affordability. Understanding who really pays for urban infrastructure is critical to both the housing affordability and infrastructure funding debates in Australia and this research provides the first empirical data for policy makers to assess their policy objectives and outcomes against.

Submission to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics Inquiry into Home Ownership

This paper empirically examines the effect of current tax policy on home ownership, specifically looking at how developer contributions impact house prices. Developer contributions are a commonly used mechanism for local governments to pay for new urban infrastructure. This research applies a hedonic house price model to 4,699 new and 25,053 existing house sales in Brisbane from 2005 to 2011. The findings of is research are consistent with international studies that support the proposition that developer contributions are over passed. This study has provided evidence that suggest developer contributions are over passed to both new and existing homes in the order of around 400%. These findings suggest that developer contributions are thus a significant contributor to increasing house prices, reduced housing supply and are thus an inefficient and inequitable tax. By testing this effect on both new and existing homes, this research provides evidence in support of the proposition that not only are developer contributions over passed to new home buyers but also to buyers of existing homes. Thus the price inflationary effect of these developer contributions are being felt by all home buyers across the community, resulting in increased mortgage repayments of close to $1,000 per month in Australia. This is the first study to empirically examine the impact of developer contributions on house prices in Australia. These results are important as they inform governments on the outcomes of current tax policy on home ownership, providing the first evidence of its kind in Australia. This is an important contribution to the tax reform agenda in Australia.

Submission to the Senate Economics References Committee Inquiry into affordable housing 20 August 2014: De-risking development of medium density housing to improve housing affordability and boost supply

This submission addresses the problem of housing price inflation, the chronic under-supply of new housing stock, and the resultant decline in housing affordability for low and middle income households. It specifically focusses on the supply of medium density housing (multi-unit development) in Melbourne, although we believe that the observations made about housing in supply in Melbourne are relevant in other urban centres and to other types of housing supply. In terms of medium density housing (MDH) our concern also extends to the poor quality and design. Why the market tends to deliver generic apartments of poor quality and design which are uncompetitive with lower density housing and amenity despite planning objectives, and how this apparently intractable problem can be overcome is the topic of this submission...

Do stakeholders or social obligations drive corporate social and environmental responsibility reporting? Managerial views from a developing country

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explore senior managers’ perception and motivations of corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER) reporting in the context of a developing country, Bangladesh. Design/methodology/approach – In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 senior managers of companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Publicly available annual reports of these companies were also analysed. Findings – The results indicate that senior managers perceive CSER reporting as a social obligation. The study finds that the managers focus mostly on child labour, human resources/rights, responsible products/services, health education, sports and community engagement activities as part of the social obligations. Interviewees identify a lack of a regulatory framework along with socio-cultural and religious factors as contributing to the low level of disclosures. These findings suggest that CSER reporting is not merely stakeholder-driven, but rather country-specific social and environmental issues play an important role in relation to CSER reporting practices. Research limitations/implications – This paper contributes to engagement-based studies by focussing on CSER reporting practices in developing countries and are useful for academics, practitioners and policymakers in understanding the reasons behind CSER reporting in developing countries. Originality/value – This paper addresses a literature “gap” in the empirical study of CSER reporting in a developing country, such as Bangladesh. This study fills a gap in the existing literature to understand managers’ motivations for CSER reporting in a developing country context. Managerial perceptions on CSER issues are largely unexplored in developing countries.

An analysis of risk management disclosures: Australian evidence

- Purpose Communication of risk management practices are a critical component of good corporate governance. Research to date has been of little benefit in informing regulators internationally. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating how listed Australian companies in a setting where disclosures are explicitly required by the ASX corporate governance framework, disclose risk management (RM) information in the corporate governance statements within annual reports. - Design/methodology/approach To address our study’s research questions and related hypotheses, we examine the top 300 ASX-listed companies by market capitalisation at 30 June 2010. For these firms, we identify, code and categorise RM disclosures made in the annual reports according to the disclosure categories specified in Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGPR). The derived data is then examined using a comprehensive approach comprising thematic content analysis and regression analysis. - Findings The results indicate widespread divergence in disclosure practices and low conformance with the Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR. This result suggests that companies are not disclosing all ‘material business risks’ possibly due to ignorance at the board level, or due to the intentional withholding of sensitive information from financial statement users. The findings also show mixed results across the factors expected to influence disclosure behaviour. Notably, the presence of a risk committee (RC) (in particular, a standalone RC) and technology committee (TC) are found to be associated with improved levels of disclosure. we do not find evidence that company risk measures (as proxied by equity beta and the market-to-book ratio) are significantly associated with greater levels of RM disclosure. Also, contrary to common findings in the disclosure literature, factors such as board independence and expertise, audit committee independence, and the usage of a Big-4 auditor do not seem to impact the level of RM disclosure in the Australian context. - Research limitation/implications The study is limited by the sample and study period selection as the RM disclosures of only the largest (top 300) ASX firms are examined for the fiscal year 2010. Thus, the finding may not be generalisable to smaller firms, or earlier/later years. Also, the findings may have limited applicability in other jurisdictions with different regulatory environments. - Practical implications The study’s findings suggest that insufficient attention has been applied to RM disclosures by listed companies in Australia. These results suggest that the RM disclosures practices observed in the Australian setting may not be meeting the objectives of regulators and the needs of stakeholders. - Originality/value Despite the importance of risk management communication, it is unclear whether disclosures in annual financial reports achieve this communication. The Australian setting provides an ideal environment to examine the nature and extent of risk management communication as the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) has recommended risk management disclosures follow Principle 7 of its principle-based governance rules since 2007.

Meeting of the Joint Distribution Committee and the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Relief Committee 1918 in New York

Reproduction of a painting of a meeting of the Joint Distribution Committee (representing the American Jewish Relief Committee, the Central Rellief Committee and the People's Relief Committee) and the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Relief Committee, with chairman Felix Warburg, secretary Albert Lucas, stenographer Mrs. F. Friedman, executive director Boris Bogen, comptroller Harriet Lowenstein, associate treasurer Paul Baerwald and treasurer Arthur Lehman; Office of Mr. Felix M. Warburg, 52 William Street, New York

Rabbi Leo Baeck with Willard Johnson of the World Brotherhood and Rabbi S. Andhil Fineberg of the American Jewish Committee, after a dinner honoring Baeck; World Brotherhood; Bonn Portraits Groups; Men

Digital Image

A taxonomic approach to understanding managerial ethical decision making approaches of clinically and non-clinically trained healthcare managers in Australia

Objective To understand differences in the managerial ethical decision-making styles of Australian healthcare managers through the exploratory use of the Managerial Ethical Profiles (MEP) Scale. Background Healthcare managers (doctors, nurses, allied health practitioners and non-clinically trained professionals) are faced with a raft of variables when making decisions within the workplace. In the absence of clear protocols and policies healthcare managers rely on a range of personal experiences, personal ethical philosophies, personal factors and organizational factors to arrive at a decision. Understanding the dominant approaches to managerial ethical decision-making, particularly for clinically trained healthcare managers, is a fundamental step in both increasing awareness of the importance of how managers make decisions, but also as a basis for ongoing development of healthcare managers. Design Cross-sectional. Methods The study adopts a taxonomic approach that simultaneously considers multiple ethical factors that potentially influence managerial ethical decision-making. These factors are used as inputs into cluster analysis to identify distinct patterns of influence on managerial ethical decision-making. Results Data analysis from the participants (n=441) showed a similar spread of the five managerial ethical profiles (Knights, Guardian Angels, Duty Followers, Defenders and Chameleons) across clinically trained and non-clinically trained healthcare managers. There was no substantial statistical difference between the two manager types (clinical and non-clinical) across the five profiles. Conclusion This paper demonstrated that managers that came from clinical backgrounds have similar ethical decision-making profiles to non-clinically trained managers. This is an important finding in terms of manager development and how organisations understand the various approaches of managerial decision-making across the different ethical profiles.