Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg Pricing.

New Keynesian models rely heavily on two workhorse models of nominal inertia - price contracts of random duration (Calvo, 1983) and price adjustment costs (Rotemberg, 1982) - to generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These alternative descriptions of price stickiness are often used interchangeably since, to a first order of approximation they imply an isomorphic Phillips curve and, if the steady-state is efficient, identical objectives for the policy maker and as a result in an LQ framework, the same policy conclusions. In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in bench-mark New Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness. Using global solution techniques we find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the former typically significant exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The rates of inflation observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider the response to cost push shocks across both models and find these can also be significantly different. The choice of which form of nominal inertia to adopt is not innocuous.

Measuring intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain: a selection-bias-free approach

This paper analyses intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain correcting for different selection biases. We address the co-residence selection problem by combining information from two samples and using the two-sample two-stage least square estimator. We find a small decrease in elasticity when we move to younger cohorts. Furthermore, we find a higher correlation in the case of daughters than in the case of sons; however, when we consider the employment selection in the case of daughters, by adopting a Heckman-type correction method, the diference between sons and daughters disappears. By decomposing the sources of earnings elasticity across generations, we find that the correlation between child's and father's occupation is the most important component. Finally, quantile regressions estimates show that the influence of the father's earnings is greater when we move to the lower tail of the offspring's earnings distribution, especially in the case of daughters' earnings.

Education and the local equity bias around the world

Using a panel of 38 economies, over the period 2001 to 2010, we analyse the link between different facets of education and diversification in international portfolios. We find that university education, mathematical numeracy, in addition to financial skill, play an important role in reducing home bias. After separating countries according to their level of financial development, we find that less developed economies with more university graduates, or with higher level of mathematical numeracy, have lower level of local equity bias compared to more developed countries. We also find that the beneficial effect of education is more pronounced during the most recent financial crisis, especially for economies with less developed financial markets.

Selection bias and unobservable heterogeneity applied at the wage equation of European married women

This paper utilizes a panel data sample selection model to correct the selection in the analysis of longitudinal labor market data for married women in European countries. We estimate the female wage equation in a framework of unbalanced panel data models with sample selection. The wage equations of females have several potential sources of.

General Practitioners' willingness to pay for continuing medical education in a fee-for-service universal coverage health care system

Background: Sponsoring of physicians meetings by life science companies has led to reduced participation fees but might influence physician's prescription practices. A ban on such sponsoring may increase participation fees. We aimed to evaluate factors associated with physicians' willingness to pay for medical meetings, their position on the sponsoring of medical meetings and their opinion on alternative financing options. Methods: An anonymous web-based questionnaire was sent to 447 general practitioners in one state in Switzerland, identified through their affiliation to a medical association. The questionnaire evaluated physicians' willingness to pay for medical meetings, their perception of a bias in prescription practices induced by commercial support, their opinion on the introduction of a binding legislation and alternative financing options, their frequency of exchange with sales representatives and other relevant socioeconomic factors. We built a multivariate predictor logistic regression model to identify determinants of willingness to pay. Results: Of the 115 physicians who responded (response rate 26%), 48% were willing to pay more than what they currently pay for congresses, 79% disagreed that commercial support introduced a bias in their prescription practices and 61% disagreed that it introduced a bias in their colleagues' prescription practices. Based on the multivariate logistic regression, perception of a bias in peers prescription practices (OR=7.47, 95% CI 1.65-38.18) and group practice structure (OR=4.62, 95% CI 1.34-22.29) were significantly associated with an increase in willingness to pay. Two thirds (76%) of physicians did not support the introduction of a binding legislation and 53% were in favour of creating a general fund administered by an independent body. Conclusion: Our results suggest that almost half of physicians surveyed are willing to pay more than what they currently pay for congresses. Predictors of an increase in physicians' willingness to pay were perception of the influence of bias in peers prescription practices and group practice structure. Most responders did not agree that sponsoring introduced prescribing bias nor did they support the 2 introduction of a binding legislation prohibiting sponsoring but a majority did agree to an independent body that would centrally administer a general fund.

Sex-dependent selection on an autosomal melanic female ornament promotes the evolution of sex ratio bias.

Sex-dependent selection often leads to spectacularly different phenotypes in males and females. In species in which sexual dimorphism is not complete, it is unclear which benefits females and males derive from displaying a trait that is typical of the other sex. In barn owls (Tyto alba), females exhibit on average larger black eumelanic spots than males but members of the two sexes display this trait in the same range of possible values. In a 12-year study, we show that selection exerted on spot size directly or on genetically correlated traits strongly favoured females with large spots and weakly favoured males with small spots. Intense directional selection on females caused an increase in spot diameter in the population over the study period. This increase is due to a change in the autosomal genes underlying the expression of eumelanic spots but not of sex-linked genes. Female-like males produced more daughters than sons, while male-like females produced more sons than daughters when mated to a small-spotted male. These sex ratio biases appear adaptive because sons of male-like females and daughters of female-like males had above-average survival. This demonstrates that selection exerted against individuals displaying a trait that is typical of the other sex promoted the evolution of specific life history strategies that enhance their fitness. This may explain why in many organisms sexual dimorphism is often not complete.

Characterization of a Plasmodium falciparum mutant that has deleted the majority of the gametocyte-specific Pf11-1 locus

We identified a gametocyte-specific protein of Plasmodium falciparum called Pf11-1 and provide experimental evidence that this molecule is involved in the emergence of gametes of the infected erythrocyte (gametogenesis). A mutant parasite clone, which has deleted over 90% of the PF11-1 gene locus, was an important control to establish the gametocyte-specific expression of the Pf11-1. Molecular analysis of the Pf11-1 deletion indicates that it is presumably due a chromosome breakage with subsequent "healing" by the addition of telomeric heptanucleotides. Moreover, similar DNA rearrangements are observed in most of the laboratory isolates during asexual propagation in vitro.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

How to avoid gender bias in classroom interaction? A cooperative learning experience

This project aims to analyse the kind of questions the teacher asks students in order to encourage them to participate in her classes. Consequently, the researcher has read relevant literature and has analysed a short excerpt of a video recorded during her first practicum. She has also analysed a number of activities carried out during her second practicum in order to find out if she had improved her questioning skills in the classroom

Ethnic minority-majority asymmetry in national attitudes around the world: A multilevel analysis

Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, this research investigated asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities towards their country and explored the impact of human development, ethnic diversity, and social inequality as country-level moderators of national attitudes. In line with the general hypothesis of ethnic asymmetry, we found that ethnic, linguistic, and religious majorities were more identified with the nation and more strongly endorsed nationalist ideology than minorities (H1, 33 countries). Multilevel analyses revealed that this pattern of asymmetry was moderated by country-level characteristics: the difference between minorities and majorities was greatest in ethnically diverse countries and in egalitarian, low inequality contexts. We also observed a larger positive correlation between ethnic subgroup identification and both national identification and nationalism for majorities than for minorities (H2, 20 countries). A stronger overall relationship between ethnic and national identification was observed in countries with a low level of human development. The greatest minority-majority differences in the relationship between ethnic identification and national attitudes were found in egalitarian countries with a strong welfare state tradition.