Zärtlichkeit [Illustration]

R. Ch. Peyre

Opfer an Venus [Illustration]

R. Ch. Peyre

Mineralogy and geochemistry of altered ash, pelagic clay, and a clay vein in basalt from DSDP Leg 62 Holes

Volcanic ash was recovered from lower Aptian to Albian deposits from DSDP Sites 463, 465, and 466; pelagic clay of the upper Pleistocene to Upper Cretaceous was recovered mainly from Site 464, with minor amounts at Sites 465 and 466. We present X-ray-mineralogy data on pelagic clay and altered volcanic ash recovered from the four Leg 62 sites. In addition, two ash samples from Sites 463 and 465, a pelagic clay from Site 464, and a clay vein from the basaltic basement at Site 464 each were analyzed for major, minor, and trace elements. Our purpose is to describe the mineralogy and chemistry of altered ash and pelagic clays, to determine the sources of their parent material, and to delineate the diagenetic history of these clay-rich deposits. Correlation of chemistry and mineralogy of ash and pelagic clay with volcanic rocks suspected to be their parent material is not always straightforward, because weathering and diagenetic alteration caused depletion or enrichment of many elements.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.

Die Handschriften des Klosters Santa Maria de Ripoll [With facsimiles.].

Mode of access: Internet.

Fundamental studies in automatic vehicle control. Final report.

Federal Highway Administration, Office of Research, Washington, D.C.