922 resultados para Lisbon Treaty
Resumo:
The power of the European Parliament in EU trade policy has increased significantly with the Lisbon Treaty. Even though it had already acquired a greater informal role, the codification of its involvement enables the EP to have a stronger say in trade policy. Against the background of increased legal competences granted by the Treaty of Lisbon to the European Parliament in EU trade policy, this Policy Brief addresses two important questions. The first concerns the extent to which the EP’s power in trade policy has increased: Has the EP effectively played a bigger role since the end of 2009? The second relates to the substance of the EP’s trade policy preferences: Does the EP attempt to push EU trade relations into a more or less normative and/or protectionist direction? Its main argument is that the Lisbon Treaty not only heralds a major leap forward in legal terms, but that the current EP legislature has also managed to increase its political clout in trade policy-making. Nevertheless, a major challenge for the new EP legislature 2014-2019 will be to turn this into effective influence.
Resumo:
On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.
Resumo:
In its Conclusions of 26-27 June 2014, the European Council has adopted the new “Strategic Guidelines for Legislative and Operational Planning for the coming years within the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)”. These Guidelines reveal a pre-Lisbon Treaty mindset among the EU member states and the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This essay argues that the Guidelines are mainly driven by the interests and agendas of national Ministries of Interior and Justice and are only “strategic” to the extent that they aim at first, re-injecting ‘intergovernmentalism’ or bringing back the old EU Third Pillar ways of working to the new EU institutional setting of the AFSJ and second, at sidelining the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and rule of law in the AFSJ. The paper argues that the European Council Guidelines seek to prevent the advances in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly its emphasis on supranational democratic, legal and judicial accountability. As a consequence of this move to ‘de-Lisbonise’ JHA cooperation, fundamental rights and rule of law-related initiatives will be neglected and the interest of the individual will be displaced from the centre of gravity in the coming AFSJ 2020 policy agenda.
Resumo:
The role of national parliaments in the EU has been at the centre of a long debate. Since the Maastricht treaty, new powers to the EU level have been accompanied not only by an increasing role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process, but also by a number of declarations and protocols to ensure that national parliaments received the information and documents required to effectively monitor their governments in EU affairs. The Lisbon Treaty extended the guarantees and also included new modes of direct participation. The proper use of the mechanisms in place, namely, the subsidiarity checks, the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament, has become of vital importance in view of recent developments in EU economic policy and beyond. The choice for increasing inter-governmentalism in decision-making and the centralisation of the implementing and supervisory powers in the Commission and the Central Bank have raised questions about political accountability and the appropriate involvement of parliaments. However, the extent to which national parliaments should be more involved is also rather controversial. This essay examines the difficulty of defining and addressing the question of the democratic legitimacy in the EU. It examines the role of the national parliaments in the treaties and explores ways in which they can contribute to improving that legitimacy.
Resumo:
The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.
Resumo:
The changing nature of diplomacy poses new challenges for diplomatic actors in the 21st century, who have to adapt their structures in order to remain relevant on the international stage. The growing interdependence and complexity of issues necessitate a more networked approach to diplomacy, while states retain their predominance in diplomacy. The main underlying challenge of modern diplomacy therefore requires finding a balance between traditional and new elements. This paper examines to what extent the European External Action Service (EEAS) meets the new challenges of modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the other stakeholders involved, namely the institutions and Member States of the European Union (EU). On the basis of a conceptual framework of modern diplomacy and an analysis of the different aspects of the EEAS’ structures, the paper argues that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of the other stakeholders put constraints on its free development. The latter therefore have to choose between irrelevance and integration with regard to EU foreign policy and the future of the EEAS.
Resumo:
On the 1st of November, the double majority system established by the Lisbon Treaty for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council entered into force. The shift in the balance of power, however, will not be effective before April 2017, given the possibility for member states to invoke the Nice rules until that date. While acknowledging that the new voting system in the Council promises to do away with the difficult negotiations of the past among member states to reallocate voting weights, this commentary finds that it is questionable whether it will achieve its ultimate aim to substantially improve democratic legitimacy and efficiency.
Resumo:
The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?
Resumo:
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through the examination of the specific innovations in this area.
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to analyse the proposed Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (COM(2011)654 final), which represents the first exercise of the European Union competence provided for by Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposal aims at harmonising the sanctioning regimes provided by the Member States for market abuse, imposing the introduction of criminal sanctions and providing an opportunity to critically reflect on the position taken by the Commission towards the use of criminal law. The paper will discuss briefly the evolution of the EU’s criminal law competence, focusing on the Lisbon Treaty. It will analyse the ‘essentiality standard’ for the harmonisation of criminal law included in Article 83(2) TFEU, concluding that this standard encompasses both the subsidiarity and the ultima ratio principles and implies important practical consequences for the Union’s legislator. The research will then focus on the proposed Directive, trying to assess if the Union’s legislator, notwithstanding the ‘symbolic’ function of this proposal in the financial crisis, provides consistent arguments on the respect of the ‘essentiality standard’. The paper will note that the proposal raises some concerns, because of the lack of a clear reliance on empirical data regarding the essential need for the introduction of criminal law provisions. It will be stressed that only the assessment of the essential need of an EU action, according to the standard set in Article 83(2) TFEU, can guarantee a coherent choice of the areas interested by the harmonisation process, preventing the legislator to choose on the basis of other grounds.
Resumo:
This paper examines the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, which will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. It argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism responses raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is posed to the freedom of movement, Schengen and EU citizenship. Priority is being given to the expanded use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens, which stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for the adoption of measures such as the EU Passenger Name Record challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model that is firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities. Instead, it would pursue better and more accurate use of data meeting the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.
Resumo:
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship. All citizens of the 28 EU member states are also EU citizens through the very fact that their countries are members of the EU. Acquired EU citizenship gives them the right to free movement, settlement and employment across the EU, the right to vote in European elections, and also on paper the right to consular protection from other EU states' embassies when abroad. The concept of citizenship in Europe – and indeed anywhere in the world – has been evolving over the years, and continues to evolve. Against this time scale, the concept of modern citizenship as attached to the nation-state would seem ephemeral. The idea of EU citizenship therefore does not need to be regarded as a revolutionary phenomenon that is bound to mitigate against the natural inclination of European citizens towards national identities, especially in times of economic and financial crises. In fact, the idea of EU citizenship has even been criticised by some scholars as being of little substantive value in addition to whatever rights and freedoms European citizens already have. Nonetheless the ‘constitutional moment’ that the Maastricht Treaty achieved for the idea of EU citizenship has served more than just symbolic value – the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, for instance. The idea of EU citizenship also put pressure on the Union and its leaders to address the perceived democratic deficit that the EU is often accused of. In attempts to cement the political rights of EU citizens, the citizens’ initiative was included in Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to directly lobby the European Commission for new policy initiatives or changes.
Resumo:
Especially after the entry into force and subsequent implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the traditional distinction (and opposition) between the so-called 'community' and 'inter-governmental' methods in EU policy-making is less and less relevant. Most common policies entail a 'mix' between them and different degrees of mutual contamination. Even the 'Union method' recently proposed by Chancellor Angela Merkel raises more questions than it solves – although it may trigger a constructive debate on how best to address today's policy challenges.
Resumo:
In this Policy Brief, Belgian diplomat Willem Van de Voorde offers his hands-on view on the Belgian EU-Presidency in 2010; including the key lessons of this post-Lisbon Treaty “new style” rotating presidency. He argues that despite the major implications of the Lisbon Treaty, notably the new permanent President of the European Council, the rotating presidency can still play a central role in the EU decision-making process.
Resumo:
Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.