Responsiveness to change by standard-form contract drafters: A case study of the FIDIC White Book

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on the Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC) White Book standard form of building contract. It tracks the changes to this contract over its four editions, and seeks to identify their underlying causes. Design/methodology/approach – The changes made to the White Book are quantified using a specific type of quantitative content analysis. The amended clauses are then examined to understand the nature of the changes made. Findings – The length of the contract increased by 34 per cent between 1990 and 2006. A large proportion of the overall increase can be attributed to the clauses dealing with “conflict of interest/corruption” and “dispute resolution”. In both instances, the FIDIC drafting committees have responded to international developments to discourage corruption, and to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution. Between 1998 and 2006, the average length of the sentences increased slightly, raising the question of whether long sentences are easily understood by users of contracts. Research limitations/implications – Quantification of text appears to be particularly useful for the analysis of documents which are regularly updated because changes can be clearly identified and the length of sentences can be determined, leading to conclusions about the readability of the text. However, caution is needed because changes of great relevance can be made to contract clauses without actually affecting their length. Practical implications – The paper will be instructive for contract drafters and informative for users of FIDIC's White Book. Originality/value – Quantifying text has been rarely used regarding standard-form contracts in the field of construction.

Regulating vertical relations in the presence of retailer differentiation costs

We discuss public policy towards vertical relations, comparing different types of contracts between a manufacturer and a maximum of two retailers. Together with (potential) price competition between the retailers, we study the role of a (sunk) differentiation cost paid by them in order to relax competition in the retail market and broaden the market potential of the distributed product. This non-price competition element in the downstream market is responsible for our conclusion that, unlike in standard policy guidelines and previous theoretical analysis, restrictions in intra-brand competition may deserve a permissive treatment even in the absence of inter-brand competition, if retailer differentiation is costly.

Rethinking the ontology of the shareholder model of the corporation

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical assumptions lying behind the Anglo American model of corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – Literature review examining the concept of a nexus of contracts underpinning agency theory which, it is argued, act as the platform for neo-liberal corporate governance focusing on shareholder wealth creation. Findings – The paper highlights the unaddressed critical challenge of why eighteenth century ownership structures are readily adopted in the twenty-first century. Social implications – A re-examination of wealth creation and wealth redistribution. Originality/value – The paper is highly original due to the fact that few contributions have been made in the area of rethinking shareholder value.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Social Panorama of Latin America 2002-2003

Includes bibliography

POST-PROJECT ASSESSMENT OF PIT LATRINES IN RURAL PANAMA

In Panama, one of the Environmental Health (EH) Sector’s primary goals is to improve the health of rural Panamanians by helping them to adopt behaviors and practices that improve access to and use of sanitation systems. In complying with this goal, the EH sector has used participatory development models to improve hygiene and increase access to latrines through volunteer managed latrine construction projects. Unfortunately, there is little understanding of the long term sustainability of these interventions after the volunteers have completed their service. With the Peace Corps adapting their Monitoring, Reporting, and Evaluation procedures, it is appropriate to evaluate the sustainability of sanitation interventions offering recommendations for the adaptions of the EH training program, project management, and evaluation procedures. Recognizing the need for evaluation of past latrine projects, the author performed a post project assessment of 19 pit latrine projects using participatory analysis methodologies. First, the author reviewed volunteers’ perspectives of pit latrine projects in a survey. Then, for comparison, the author performed a survey of latrine projects using a benchmarking scoring system to rate solid waste management, drainage, latrine siting, latrine condition, and hygiene. It was observed that the Sanitation WASH matrix created by the author was an effective tool for evaluating the efficacy of sanitation interventions. Overall more than 75%, of latrines constructed were in use. However, there were some areas where improvements could be made for both latrine construction and health and hygiene. The latrines scored poorly on the indicators related to the privacy structure and seat covers. Interestingly those are the two items least likely to be included in project subsidies. Furthermore, scores for hygiene-related indicators were low; particularly those related to hand washing and cleanliness of the kitchen, indicating potential for improvement in hygiene education. Based on these outcomes, the EH sector should consider including subsidies and standardized designs for privacy structures and seat covers for latrines. In addition, the universal adoption of contracts and/or deposits for project beneficiaries is expected to improve the completion of latrines. In order to address the low scores in the health and hygiene indicators, the EH sector should adapt volunteer training, in addition to standardizing health and hygiene intervention procedures. In doing so, the sector should mimic the Community Health Club model that has shown success in improving health and hygiene indicators, as well as use a training session plan format similar to those in the Water Committee Seminar manual. Finally, the sector should have an experienced volunteer dedicated to program oversight and post-project monitoring and evaluation.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Nas–Walras equilibria of a large economy

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash–Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi-concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.

The complete works of Samuel Rowlands, 1598-1628, now first collected ...

v.3. Heavens glory, seeke it, &c., 1628. The famous history of Gvy erle of Warwicke, 1682. Miscellaneous poems. Notes, by Sidney J.H. Herrtage. Glossary, by Sidney J.H. Herrtage.

Reauthorization of GSA and multiple award program : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, on S. 1958 ... and S. 2619 ... June 11, 1992.

"S. 1958, to authorize functions and activities under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, to amend laws relating to federal procurement, and for other purposes and S. 2619, to amend the Federal Property and Amdinistrative Services Act of 1949 to enact provisions governing the negotiation and award of contracts under the multiple award schedule program of the Feneral Services Administration"

The law in business problems; cases and other materials for the study of legal aspects of business,

--Introductory topics.--I. Engaging in business.--II. The law of contracts with special reference to the relation of buyer and seller.--III. The enforcement of contracts with special reference to the relation of debtor and creditor.--IV. The law of business organization.

Modern American law; a systematic and comprehensive commentary on the fundamental principles of American law and procedure, accompanied by leading illustrative cases and legal forms, with a rev. ed. of Blackstone's Commentaries;

v. I. The modern democracy, the citizen and the law - Legal ethics - Law : its origin, nature, development - Courts : federal and state - Law of contracts -- v. 2. Law of torts -- v. 3. Criminal Law - Law of criminal procedure - Law of persons and domestic relations -- v. 4. Personal property and bailments - Law of liens and pledges - Law of agency - Law of sales of personal property -- v. 5. Law of real property -- v. 6. Law of descent and distribution, wills and administration, guardian and ward - Law of landlord and tenant - Law of irrigation and water rights - Law of mines and mining -- v. 7. Equity - Law of trusts - Law of quasi-contacts - Law of estoppel -- v. 8. Law of negotiable instruments - Law of suretyship and guaranty - Law of mortgages : real and chattel - Interpretation of statutes -- v. 9. Law of private corporations - Law of partnership - law of banks, banking and trust companies - Law of receivers -- v. 10. Pleadings in civil actions at common law and under modern statutes - Practice in civil actions - Law of equity pleading - Law of evidence - Laws of attachment and garnishments - Law of judgments and executions - Law of extraordinary remedies - Law of habeas corpus -- v. 11. Constitutional law : definitions and general principles - Organization and powers of the United States Government - Constitutional guaranties of fundamental rights - Eminent domain - Taxation - Naturalization -- v. 12. Conflict of laws - International law - Law of interstate commerce - Law of bankruptcy - Law of patents - Law of copyright - Law of trademarks - Unfair competition and good-will -- v. 13. Law of public service companies, especially common carriers - Law of municipal corporations - Law of public officers and elections - Parliamentary law -- v. 14. Law of damages - Law of insurance - Admiralty law - Medical jurisprudence - Forms -- v. 15. Blackstone's Commentaries.

Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.