Relationship banking: does it lower information asymmetry or increase lender monopoly power?

A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Límite de la responsabilidad civil del porteador en el transporte terrestre internacional en América Latina: criterios para su fijación = Limit of civil liability of carriers in international land transport in Latin America: criteria for its establishment

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Health professionals ethical and legal liability on patient’s inadequate clarification in order to obtain free and informed consent

It is required that patients are provided information about therapeutic possibilities, showing the risks, benefits, prognosis and costs of each possible and indicated alternative. This is an ethical and legal resolution. However, health professionals possess the clinical/technical/scientific knowledge and determine what information will be (or not) provided. The patient in question decides to undergo a treatment, providing his/her free and informed consent on the basis of the data presented. Unfortunately, some professionals may not provide all the information necessary for making an informed decision or, after obtaining the consent of the patient, may provide him information that causes the patient to give up on the treatment initially accepted. Such information, if relevant, and not a supervening fact, should have been provided initially. However, the information may not be entirely true, and bring the patient, for instance, to decide based on inadequately presented risks. The craniofacial rehabilitation of the temporomandibular joint (TMJ) by means of TMJ prosthesis, is indicated in many situations. Often, patients in need of such prostheses have aesthetic and functional problems and the rehabilitation expectations run high. This work presents a case and discusses ethical and legal issues, including the liability of partial and inadequate information to a patient.

RP93-395 Liability Insurance and the Family Child Care Provider

Life other small business owners, family child care providers need adequate life, health, and disability insurance to protect their families from the loss of their income. However, child care providers also face unique risks. Perhaps the most important of these risks is the financial loss that would result if the provider were found liable or responsible for the injury or death of a child or a child's parent. If a claim were filed against you as a provider, three different types of financial losses are possible: medical expenses, damages awarded to the victim or his/her family after a lawsuit, and court costs related to your defense. This booklet will help you to: (1) evaluate options for insuring a family child care operation, and (2) evaluate available liability insurance policies.

Ex-post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law

This doctoral thesis examines the use of liability rules to protect patent entitlements, focusing on a specific type of rule named ex-post since it is applied and designed ex-post by a court or an agency. The research starts from the premise that patents are defined by the legal and economic scholarship as exclusive rights but nevertheless, under certain circumstances there are economic as well as other compelling reasons to transform the exclusiveness of patent rights into a right to receive compensation.

The special rights other than shares in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union. A perspective from the Spanish Law

The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.