916 resultados para Labor Law and Internships and Apprenticeships
Resumo:
In this paper we explore the accumulation of capital in the presence oflimited insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, borrowing constraintsand endogenous labor supply. As in the exogenous labor supply case(e.g. Aiyagari 1994, Huggett 1997), we find that steady states arecharacterized with an interest rate smaller than the rate of timepreference. However,wealsofind that when labor supply is endogenous thepresence of uncertainty and a borrowing limit are not enough to giverise to aggregate precautionary savings .
Resumo:
We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.
Resumo:
Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.
Resumo:
[cat] Analitzem una economia amb dues característiques principals: la mobilitat dels treballadors implica transferència de coneixement i la productivitat de l’empresa augmenta amb l’intercanvi de coneixement. Cada empresa desenvolupa un tipus de coneixement que serà trasmès a la resta de la indústria mitjançant la mobilitat de treballadors. Estudiem dues estructures de mercat laboral i utilitzant un anàlisi comparatiu derivem les implicacions del model. Els resultats revelen com la mobilitat de treballadors depèn en la varietat i nivell del coneixement, la presència de costos de mobilitat, les institucions, la capacitat d’absorvir coneixement per part de les empreses i la mida de la indústria. Els resultats no depenen de l’estructura del mercat laboral.
Resumo:
The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.
Resumo:
[cat] Analitzem una economia amb dues característiques principals: la mobilitat dels treballadors implica transferència de coneixement i la productivitat de l’empresa augmenta amb l’intercanvi de coneixement. Cada empresa desenvolupa un tipus de coneixement que serà trasmès a la resta de la indústria mitjançant la mobilitat de treballadors. Estudiem dues estructures de mercat laboral i utilitzant un anàlisi comparatiu derivem les implicacions del model. Els resultats revelen com la mobilitat de treballadors depèn en la varietat i nivell del coneixement, la presència de costos de mobilitat, les institucions, la capacitat d’absorvir coneixement per part de les empreses i la mida de la indústria. Els resultats no depenen de l’estructura del mercat laboral.
Resumo:
The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.
Resumo:
Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done. The question then becomes who has the legal authority or responsibility to do what? Are new laws and programs needed or can existing ones be used to implement the recommendations? ... This document is divided into four main parts. The first, “Carrots and Sticks” looks at two basic approaches — regulatory and non-regulatory — that can be, and are, used to carry out water policy. Both have advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. The second, “The powers of federal, state and local governments…,” looks at the constitutional powers the federal government and state and local governments have to carry out water policy. An initial look at the U. S. Constitution might suggest the federal government’s regulatory authority over water is limited but, in fact, its powers are very substantial. States have considerable authority to do a number of things but have to be mindful of any federal efforts that might conflict with those state efforts. And local governments can only do those things the state constitution or state legislature says they can do and must conform to any requirements or limitations on those powers that are contained in the enabling acts. Parts three and four examine in more detail the main programs and agencies at the federal level as well as Iowa’s state and local levels and the roles they play in national and state water policy.
Resumo:
The main purpose of this research project is to analyse the major female figures in Wilkie Collins' work of fiction The Law and the Lady, in relation to the times in which the novel was produced and the situation of women in the Victorian era. After taking into account the major events of the life of the author, as well as the sociohistorical conditions of the Victorian period, I try to reach conclusions about whether the author challenges gender-role expectations, presenting the readers with a new form of femininity, of if, on the contrary, he preserves and maintains a conservative, traditional perspective of femininity and female conventions proper to the established parameters of the times in which he lived. Keywords:
Resumo:
Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done.
Resumo:
[cat] Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota l'economia. En con- seqüència, l'economia presenta economies d'escala creixents i el creixement de la productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins d'un sector. La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral modifiquen l'equilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més, demostrem que d'altres ineficiències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modificar la TFP.
Resumo:
[cat] Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota l'economia. En con- seqüència, l'economia presenta economies d'escala creixents i el creixement de la productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins d'un sector. La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral modifiquen l'equilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més, demostrem que d'altres ineficiències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modificar la TFP.