Monetary policy misspecification in VAR models

We examine the effects of extracting monetary policy disturbances with semi-structural and structural VARs, using data generated bya limited participation model under partial accommodative and feedback rules. We find that, in general, misspecification is substantial: short run coefficients often have wrong signs; impulse responses and variance decompositions give misleadingrepresentations of the dynamics. Explanations for the results and suggestions for macroeconomic practice are provided.

Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in the US: Positive vs. negative or big vs. small?

This paper reconsiders the empirical evidence on the asymmetricoutput effects of monetary policy. Asymmetric effects is a common feature ofmany theoretical models, and there are many different versions of suchasymmetries. We concentrate on the distinctions between positive andnegative money-supply changes, big and small changes in money-supply, andpossible combinations of the two asymmetries. Earlier research has foundempirical evidence in favor of the former of these in US data. Using M1 asthe monetary variable we find evidence in favor of neutrality of big shocksand non-neutrality of small shocks. The results may, however, be affected bystructual instability of M1 demand. Thus, we substitute M1 with the federalfunds rate. In these data we find that only small negative shocks affectreal aggregate activity. The results are interpreted in terms of menu-costmodels.

Structural changes in the US economy: is there a role for monetary policy?

This paper investigates the contribution of monetary policy to the changes in outputgrowth and inflation dynamics in the US. We identify a policy shock and a policy rule ina time-varying coefficients VAR using robust sign restrictions. The transmission of policyshocks has been relatively stable. The variance of the policy shock has decreased over time,but policy shocks account for a small fraction of the level and of the variations in inflationand output growth volatility and persistence. We find little evidence of a significant increasein the long run response of the interest rate to inflation. A more aggressive inflation policyin the 1970s would have produced large output growth costs.

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).

Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisisfrom the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standardmonetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through whichmonetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbankmarket. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed,central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted bystandard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did notallow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design newchannels for liquidity injection.

Monetary policy shocks and transmission in Italy: A VAR analysis

This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects of monetary policy in Italy, by using structural VAR analysis. We discuss different empirical approaches that have been used in order to identify monetary policy exogenous shocks. We argue that the data support the view that the Bank of Italy, at least in the recent past, has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how different macroeconomic variables react to such shocks.

Monetary policy in the Euro area: Lessons from 5 years of ECB and implications for Turkey

We examine monetary policy in the Euro area from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We discuss what theory tells us the strategy of Central banks should be and contrasts it with the one employed by the ECB. We review accomplishments (and failures) of monetary policy in the Euro area and suggest changes that would increase the correlation between words and actions; streamline the understanding that markets have of the policy process; and anchor expectation formation more strongly. We examine the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the Euro area and in some potential member countries and try to infer the likely effects occurring when Turkey joins the EU first and the Euro area later. Much of the analysis here warns against having too high expectations of the economic gains that membership to the EU and Euro club will produce.

Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy

We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap. We use the resulting framework to analyze the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inflation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference amongthese regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.

Monetary policy and rational asset price bubbles

I examine the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on arational asset price bubble, through the lens of an overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interestrates in response to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the fluctuations in the latter, through its positive effect on bubble growth. Theoptimal monetary policy seeks to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. The paper'smain findings call into question the theoretical foundations of the casefor "leaning against the wind" monetary policies.

The effects of monetary policy on stock market bubbles: Some evidence

We estimate the response of stock prices to exogenous monetary policy shocks usinga vector-autoregressive model with time-varying parameters. Our evidence points toprotracted episodes in which, after a a short-run decline, stock prices increase persistently in response to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy. That responseis clearly at odds with the "conventional" view on the effects of monetary policy onbubbles, as well as with the predictions of bubbleless models. We also argue that it isunlikely that such evidence be accounted for by an endogenous response of the equitypremium to the monetary policy shocks.

The determination of EONIA rate: The impact of the financial crisis and the effects of the changes in the monetary policy implementation framework

EONIA is a market based overnight interest rate, whose role as the starting point of the yield curve makes it critical from the perspective of the implementation of European Central Bank´s common monetary policy in the euro area. The financial crisis that started in 2007 had a large impact on the determination mechanism of this interest rate, which is considered as the central bank´s operational target. This thesis examines the monetary policy implementation framework of the European Central Bank and changes made to it. Furthermore, we discuss the development of the recent turmoil in the money market. EONIA rate is modelled by means of a regression equation using variables related to liquidity conditions, refinancing need, auction results and calendar effects. Conditional volatility is captured by an EGARCH model, and autocorrelation is taken into account by employing an autoregressive structure. The results highlight how the tensions in the initial stage of the market turmoil were successfully countered by ECB´s liquidity policy. The subsequent response of EONIA to liquidity conditions under the full allotment liquidity provision procedure adopted after the demise of Lehman Brothers is also established. A clear distinction in the behavior of the interest rate between the sub-periods was evident. In the light of the results obtained, some of the challenges posed by the exit-strategy implementation will be addressed.