Digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice

This article discusses the use of digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The absence of specific Court rules and procedures for digital evidence (with the exception of Practice Direction IX bis) is not necessarily an obstacle to its production and evaluation before the ICJ, as the general evidentiary rules can also be applied to digital evidence. The article first looks at the rules on the production of documentary evidence and then examines the specific issues related to audiovisual evidence. Finally, it examines the admissibility of digital evidence unlawfully obtained by a litigant through unilateral transborder access to data. The article concludes that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the specific way in which authenticity and accuracy of digital evidence are to be established, the particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.

Plato and Levinas : the problem of justice

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In search of the Holy Grail : how viable is John Rawls' purely political conception of justice?

Please consult the paper edition of this thesis to read. It is available on the 5th Floor of the Library at Call Number: Z 9999 P65 Y68 1995

Ethic of Care versus Ethic of Justice? The Gender- Corruption Nexus: Testing the New Conventional Wisdom

Ce papier utilise des données empiriques sur le Ghana afin d’examiner comment, le genre, en tant que système social, génère des dilemmes moraux dans le secteur public. Les hommes et les femmes se sentent obligées de choisir des conditions privées de moralité dans le secteur de l’éthique publique. Ce papier démontre que les références qui délimitent les personnalités comportementales sexuées et qui sont utilisées pour justifier le plus haut degré de standard éthique des femmes peut aussi être potentiellement source de corruption, si les femmes essaient de respecter les attentes en matière de genre dans la conduite des obligations publiques. Fondamentalement, le papier argumente que l’éthique sexuée- supposant la division entre éthique de la compassion et éthique de la justice- pourrait perpétuer des comportements qui nient l’éthique du secteur public, mais se conforme à l’éthique sociale. En utilisant les travaux de Carol Gilligan (1982) sur la théorie du développement moral, il conclut, inter alia, que le recrutement des femmes dans le secteur public devrait être promu en tant que droit plutôt qu’à partir de leur probité morale présumée supérieure. Promouvoir les femmes dans le services publics sur la base de leur éthique supérieure pourrait s’avérer contre-productif si les espoirs étaient déçus.

New Standards of Justice: Uncovering Motivations for Mexico’s Recent Judicial Reforms amid a Security Crisis

From the introduction: Mexico is in a state of siege. In recent years, organized crime and drug-related violence have escalated dramatically, taking innocent lives and leaving the country mired in bloodshed. The Mexican government, under the leadership of President Felipe Calderón, has responded in part by significantly extending the reach of its security operations, deploying thousands of federal police officers and military troops to combat the activities of drug cartels, and collaborating with the United States on an extensive regional security plan known as the Mérida Initiative. In the midst of the security crisis, however, the government has somewhat paradoxically adopted judicial reforms that protect human rights and civil liberties rather than erode them, specifically the presumption of innocence standard in criminal proceedings and the implementation of oral trials. Assuming that the new laws on the books will be applied in practice, these reforms represent an important commitment on the part of the government to uphold human rights and civil liberties. This is in stark contrast to the infamous judicial reforms in Colombia—the institutionalization of anonymous or “faceless” prosecutions in special courts—implemented after a surge in leftist and cartel brutality, and the murders of several prominent public and judicial officials in the 1980s.

Translation of the Decision of the International Court of Justice related to the Case concerning the dispute regarding navigational and related rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Judgment

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The justification of illegal anti-ecological behavior

Resumen tomado de la publicación

The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.