A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

Creating the Gorizia-Goriska euroregion: an European cross-border administrative model for integrated socio-economic development in the upper adriatic. Crossborder co-operation as a tool for trans-national integration and conflict resolution

Contribució al Seminari: "Les Euroregions: Experiències i aprenatges per a l’Euroregió Pirineus-Mediterrània", 15-16 de desembre de 2005

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

A Behavioural Model of Choice in the Presence of Decision Conflict

This paper proposes a model of choice that does not assume completeness of the decision maker’s preferences. The model explains in a natural way, and within a unified framework of choice when preference-incomparable options are present, four behavioural phenomena: the attraction effect, choice deferral, the strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is per-missible, and status quo bias. The key element in the proposed decision rule is that an individual chooses an alternative from a menu if it is worse than no other alternative in that menu and is also better than at least one. Utility-maximising behaviour is included as a special case when preferences are complete. The relevance of the partial dominance idea underlying the proposed choice procedure is illustrated with an intuitive generalisation of weakly dominated strategies and their iterated deletion in games with vector payoffs.

Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.

Sociogenomics of Cooperation and Conflict during Colony Founding in the Fire Ant Solenopsis invicta.

One of the fundamental questions in biology is how cooperative and altruistic behaviors evolved. The majority of studies seeking to identify the genes regulating these behaviors have been performed in systems where behavioral and physiological differences are relatively fixed, such as in the honey bee. During colony founding in the monogyne (one queen per colony) social form of the fire ant Solenopsis invicta, newly-mated queens may start new colonies either individually (haplometrosis) or in groups (pleometrosis). However, only one queen (the "winner") in pleometrotic associations survives and takes the lead of the young colony while the others (the "losers") are executed. Thus, colony founding in fire ants provides an excellent system in which to examine the genes underpinning cooperative behavior and how the social environment shapes the expression of these genes. We developed a new whole genome microarray platform for S. invicta to characterize the gene expression patterns associated with colony founding behavior. First, we compared haplometrotic queens, pleometrotic winners and pleometrotic losers. Second, we manipulated pleometrotic couples in order to switch or maintain the social ranks of the two cofoundresses. Haplometrotic and pleometrotic queens differed in the expression of genes involved in stress response, aging, immunity, reproduction and lipid biosynthesis. Smaller sets of genes were differentially expressed between winners and losers. In the second experiment, switching social rank had a much greater impact on gene expression patterns than the initial/final rank. Expression differences for several candidate genes involved in key biological processes were confirmed using qRT-PCR. Our findings indicate that, in S. invicta, social environment plays a major role in the determination of the patterns of gene expression, while the queen's physiological state is secondary. These results highlight the powerful influence of social environment on regulation of the genomic state, physiology and ultimately, social behavior of animals.

Binding under Conflict Conditions: State-Space Analysis of Multivariate EEG Synchronization.

Real-world objects are often endowed with features that violate Gestalt principles. In our experiment, we examined the neural correlates of binding under conflict conditions in terms of the binding-by-synchronization hypothesis. We presented an ambiguous stimulus ("diamond illusion") to 12 observers. The display consisted of four oblique gratings drifting within circular apertures. Its interpretation fluctuates between bound ("diamond") and unbound (component gratings) percepts. To model a situation in which Gestalt-driven analysis contradicts the perceptually explicit bound interpretation, we modified the original diamond (OD) stimulus by speeding up one grating. Using OD and modified diamond (MD) stimuli, we managed to dissociate the neural correlates of Gestalt-related (OD vs. MD) and perception-related (bound vs. unbound) factors. Their interaction was expected to reveal the neural networks synchronized specifically in the conflict situation. The synchronization topography of EEG was analyzed with the multivariate S-estimator technique. We found that good Gestalt (OD vs. MD) was associated with a higher posterior synchronization in the beta-gamma band. The effect of perception manifested itself as reciprocal modulations over the posterior and anterior regions (theta/beta-gamma bands). Specifically, higher posterior and lower anterior synchronization supported the bound percept, and the opposite was true for the unbound percept. The interaction showed that binding under challenging perceptual conditions is sustained by enhanced parietal synchronization. We argue that this distributed pattern of synchronization relates to the processes of multistage integration ranging from early grouping operations in the visual areas to maintaining representations in the frontal networks of sensory memory.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.