Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World

Since Cardoso and during Lula's Administration, the international order has undergone significant changes. These changes have allowed the Brazilian foreign policy to mitigate internal effects of an order established by others and, at the same time, to become an active participant in the formulation of the new order. To democratize globalization became the mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy. In the scope, President Lula has maintained the tradition of formulating and programming foreign policy as a State policy, and also has fostered the logistic strategy of incorporation of Brazil into the international scene.

Globalization and the Symphony of the New (Post-modern) World: From Westphalia to Maastricht…passing by Washington DC

Taking on the challenge of understanding and explaining the Symphony of (today’s) New World in realistic terms (not realist), this essay aims to analyse the Post-Cold war era by devising a multi-conceptual framework that combines different theoretical contributions not yet linked in a fully explanatory way. This paper suggests two inter-related analytical contexts (or background melodies) to understand Dvorak´s "New World”. First, the socio-economic structural context that falls under the controversial category of Globalization and, second, the post-modern political structural context that is built on Robert Cooper’s threefold analysis (Pre-modern, Modern and Post-modern) of today’s world [Cooper, R: 1997, 1999]. Lastly, the closing movement (allegro con fuoco) enters the normative arena to assess American foreign policy options in the light of the theoretical framework devised in the first part of the essay.

Exiles and Constituents: Baltic Refugees and American Cold War Politics, 1948- 1960

This dissertation explores the complicated relations between Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian postwar refugees and American foreign policymakers between 1948 and 1960. There were seemingly shared interests between the parties during the first decade of the Cold War. Generally, Eastern European refugees refused to recognize Soviet hegemony in their homelands, and American policy towards the Soviet bloc during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to undermine the Kremlin’s standing in the region. More specifically, Baltic refugees and State Department officials sought to preserve the 1940 non-recognition policy towards the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. I propose that despite the seemingly natural convergence of interests, the American experiment of constructing a State-Private network revolving around fostering relations with exile groups was fraught with difficulties. These difficulties ultimately undermined any ability that the United States might have had to liberate the Baltic States from the Soviet Union. As this dissertation demonstrates, Baltic exiles were primarily concerned with preserving a high level of political continuity to the interwar republics under the assumption that they would be able to regain their positions in liberated, democratic societies. American policymakers, however, were primarily concerned with maintaining the non-recognition policy, the framework in which all policy considerations were analyzed. I argue that these two motivating factors created unnecessary tensions in American policy towards the Baltic republics in the spheres of psychological warfare as well as exile unity in the United States and Europe. Despite these shortcomings, I argue that out of the exiles’ failings was born a generation of Baltic constituents that blurred the political legitimacy line between exiles who sought to return home and ethnic Americans who were loyal to the United States. These Baltic constituents played an important role in garnering the support of the United States Congress, starting in the 1950s, but became increasingly influential after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, despite the seemingly less important role Eastern Europe played in the Cold War. The actions of the Baltic constituents not only prevented the Baltic question from being forever lost in the memory hole of history, but actually created enough political pressure on the State Department that it was impossible to alter the long-standing policy of not recognizing the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States.

Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030) : inducing consent or relying on compliance?

The most outstanding conceptual challenge of modern crisis management is the principle of consent. It is not a problem only at the operational level - it challenges the entire decision-making structures of crisis management operations. In post-cold war times and especially in the 21st century, there has been a transition from peacekeeping with limited size and scope towards large and complex peace operations. This shift has presented peace operations with a dilemma. How to balance between maintaining consent for peace operations, whilst being able to use military force to coerce those attempting to wreck peace processes? To address such a dilemma, this research aims to promote understanding, on what can be achieved by military crisis management operations (peace support operations) in the next decade. The research concentrates on the focal research question: Should military components induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis management operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)? The focus is on military – political strategic level considerations, and especially on the time before political decisions to commit to a crisis management operation. This study does not focus on which actor or organisation should intervene. The framework of this thesis derives from the so called ‘peacebuilding space’, the scope of peace operations and spoiler theory. Feasibility of both peace enforcement and peacekeeping in countering future risk conditions are analysed in this framework. This future-orientated qualitative research uses the Delphi-method with a panel of national and international experts. Citation analysis supports identification of relevant reference material, which consists of contemporary literature, the Delphi-questionnaires and interviews. The research process followed three main stages. In the first stage, plausible future scenarios and risk conditions were identified with the Delphi-panel. In the second stage, operating environments for peace support operations were described and consequent hypotheses formulated. In the third stage, these hypotheses were tested on the Delphi-panel. The Delphi-panel is sufficiently wide and diverse to produce plausible yet different insights. The research design utilised specifically military crisis management and peace operations theories. This produced various and relevant normative considerations. Therefore, one may argue that this research; which is based on accepted contemporary theory, hypotheses derived thereof and utilising an expert panel, contributes to the realm of peace support operations. This research finds that some degree of peace enforcement will be feasible and necessary in at least the following risk conditions: failed governance; potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces; as well as in territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. In addition, some form of peace enforcement is probably necessary in risk conditions pertaining to: extremism of marginalised groups; potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories; and interstate rivalry. Furthermore, this research finds that peacekeeping measures will be feasible and necessary in at least risk conditions pertaining to: potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; uncontrolled migration; consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes; territorial and extra-territorial border disputes; and potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories. These findings are all subject to both generic and case specific preconditions that must exist for a peace support operation. Some deductions could be derived from the research findings. Although some risk conditions may appear illogical, understanding the underlying logic of a conflict is fundamental to understanding transition in crisis management. Practitioners of crisis management should possess cognizance of such transition. They must understand how transition should occur from threat to safety, from conflict to stability – and so forth. Understanding transition is imperative for managing the dynamic evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset of a peace support operation. Furthermore, it is pertinent that spoilers are defined from a peace process point of view. If spoilers are defined otherwise, it changes the nature of an operation towards war, where the logic is breaking the will of an enemy - and surrender. In peace support operations, the logic is different: actions towards spoilers are intended to cause transition towards consent - not defeat. Notwithstanding future developments, history continues to provide strategic education. However, the distinction is that the risk conditions occur in novel futures. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be fitted to the case at hand. This research shows compelling evidence that swaying between intervention optimism and pessimism is not substantiated. Both peace enforcement and peacekeeping are sine qua non for successful military crisis management in the next decade.

Towards sustainable peace : peace-building and human security

Failed and fragile states that result from intrastate war pose severe threats to the security of both the international system and individual states alike. In the post-Cold War era, the international community has come to recognize the reality of these threats and the difficulty involved in ending violence and building sustainable peace in failed and fragile states. This work focuses upon the development of a comprehensive strategy for sustainable peace-building by incorporating the tenets of the human security doctrine into the peace-building process. Through the use of case studies of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and East Timor, the development and refinement of the doctrine of human security will occur, as well as, an understanding of how and where human security fits into the sustainable peace-building equation. The end result of the analysis is the development of a hierarchical pyramid formation that brings together human security and peace-building into one framework that ultimately creates the foundation and structure of sustainable peace-building. With the development of a sustainable peace-building structure based upon the human security doctrine, the role of Canada in the support of sustainable peace-building is analyzed in relation to the form and level of involvement that Canada undertakes and contributes to in the implementation and support of sustainable peace-building initiatives. Following from this, recommendations are provided regarding what role(s) Canada should undertake in the sustainable peace-building process that take into consideration the present and likely future capabilities of Canada to be involved in various aspects of the peace-building process. ii This paper outlines the need for a peace-building strategy that is designed to be sustainable in order that failed and fragile states resulting from intrastate conflict do not regress or collapse back into a condition of civil war, and subsequently designs such a strategy. The linking of peace-building and human security creates the required framework from which sustainable peace-building is derived. Creating sustainable peace is necessary in order to increase the likelihood that both present and future generations existing in failed and fragile states will be spared from the scourge of intrastate war.

To see and to touch : God, honour, and irony in Shakespeare's English histories /

Failed and fragile states that result from intrastate war pose severe threats to the security of both the international system and individual states alike. In the post-Cold War era, the international community has come to recognize the reality of these threats and the difficulty involved in ending violence and building sustainable peace in failed and fragile states. This work focuses upon the development of a comprehensive strategy for sustainable peace-building by incorporating the tenets of the human security doctrine into the peace-building process. Through the use of case studies of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and East Timor, the development and refinement of the doctrine of human security will occur, as well as, an understanding of how and where human security fits into the sustainable peace-building equation. The end result of the analysis is the development of a hierarchical pyramid formation that brings together human security and peace-building into one framework that ultimately creates the foundation and structure of sustainable peace-building. With the development of a sustainable peace-building structure based upon the human security doctrine, the role of Canada in the support of sustainable peace-building is analyzed in relation to the form and level of involvement that Canada undertakes and contributes to in the implementation and support of sustainable peace-building initiatives. Following from this, recommendations are provided regarding what role(s) Canada should undertake in the sustainable peace-building process that take into consideration the present and likely future capabilities of Canada to be involved in various aspects of the peace-building process. ii This paper outlines the need for a peace-building strategy that is designed to be sustainable in order that failed and fragile states resulting from intrastate conflict do not regress or collapse back into a condition of civil war, and subsequently designs such a strategy. The linking of peace-building and human security creates the required framework from which sustainable peace-building is derived. Creating sustainable peace is necessary in order to increase the likelihood that both present and future generations existing in failed and fragile states will be spared from the scourge of intrastate war.

La responsabilité de protéger et l’intervention humanitaire : de la reconceptualisation de la souveraineté des États à l’individualisme normatif

La recrudescence des conflits internes dans le contexte post-guerre froide a permis de propulser à l’avant-plan la préoccupation pour les individus. Alors que la paix et la sécurité internationales ont historiquement constitué les piliers du système institutionnel international, une porte s’ouvrait pour rendre effectif un régime de protection des droits de l’homme par-delà les frontières. Pour les humanistes, l’intervention humanitaire représentait un mal nécessaire pour pallier aux souffrances humaines souvent causées par des divergences ethniques et religieuses. Pourtant, cette pratique est encore souvent perçue comme une forme de néo-colonialisme et entre en contradiction avec les plus hautes normes régissant les relations internationales, soit les principes de souveraineté des États et de non-intervention. La problématique du présent mémoire s’inscrit précisément dans cette polémique entre la préséance des droits de l’État et la prédilection pour les droits humains universels, deux fins antinomiques que la Commission internationales pour l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) a tenté de concilier en élaborant son concept de responsabilité de protéger. Notre mémoire s’inscrit dans le champ de la science politique en études internationales mais s’articule surtout autour des notions et enjeux propres à la philosophie politique, plus précisément à l’éthique des relations internationales. Le travail se veut une réflexion critique et théorique des conclusions du rapport La responsabilité de protéger, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le critère de la juste cause et, dans une moindre mesure, celui d’autorité appropriée. Notre lecture des conditions de la CIISE à la justification morale du déclenchement d’une intervention humanitaire – critères issues de la doctrine de la guerre juste relativement au jus ad bellum – révèle une position mitoyenne entre une conception progressiste cosmopolitique et une vision conservatrice d’un ordre international composé d’États souverains. D’une part, la commission se dissocie du droit international en faisant valoir un devoir éthique d’outrepasser les frontières dans le but de mettre un terme aux violations massives des droits de l’homme et, d’autre part, elle craint les ingérences à outrance, comme en font foi l’établissement d’un seuil de la juste cause relativement élevé et la désignation d’une autorité multilatérale à titre de légitimateur de l’intervention. Ce travail dialectique vise premièrement à présenter et situer les recommandations de la CIISE dans la tradition de la guerre juste. Ensuite, il s’agit de relever les prémisses philosophiques tacites dans le rapport de la CIISE qui sous-tendent le choix de préserver une règle de non-intervention ferme de laquelle la dérogation n’est exigée qu’en des circonstances exceptionnelles. Nous identifions trois arguments allant en ce sens : la reconnaissance du relativisme moral et culturel; la nécessité de respecter l’autonomie et l’indépendance des communautés politiques en raison d’une conception communautarienne de la légitimité de l’État, des réquisits de la tolérance et des avantages d’une responsabilité assignée; enfin, l’appréhension d’un bouleversement de l’ordre international sur la base de postulats du réalisme classique. Pour finir, nous nuançons chacune de ces thèses en souscrivant à un mode de raisonnement cosmopolitique et conséquentialiste. Notre adhésion au discours individualiste normatif nous amène à inclure dans la juste cause de la CIISE les violations systématiques des droits individuels fondamentaux et à cautionner l’intervention conduite par une coalition ou un État individuel, pourvu qu’elle produise les effets bénéfiques désirés en termes humanitaires.

Les motivations des acteurs étatiques dans les interventions humanitaires : les États-Unis face aux cas du Rwanda (1994), du Kosovo (1999) et du Darfour (2003 à 2008)

Ce mémoire vise à comprendre les motivations des États à intervenir militairement dans un autre État pour mettre fin aux violations graves des droits de l’homme tel que le nettoyage ethnique et le génocide. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre pourquoi il y a eu une variation dans la position américaine face aux cas de génocide au Rwanda en 1994, au Kosovo en 1999 et au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. À partir d’une approche réaliste en Relations Internationales qui met l’accent sur l’intérêt national égoïste comme facteur principal explicatif du comportement des États, nous procédons à l’étude des cas de la position américaine lors de trois crises humanitaires. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre la non intervention des États-Unis lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, l’intervention américaine au Kosovo en 1999, et enfin la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. En somme, nos études de cas démontrent que c’est l’intérêt national qui motive les États d’intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir lors des cas de nettoyage ethnique ou de génocide. D’une part, lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, les États-Unis ne sont pas intervenus car l’intérêt national interprété comme le repli sur les affaires internes américaines ne serait pas maximisé par l’intervention militaire. Ensuite, l’intervention des États-Unis et de l’OTAN au Kosovo en 1999 est expliquée par l’intérêt national américain dans un contexte de l’après guerre froide d’approfondir son engagement sécuritaire en Europe et de préserver sa position hégémonique et son prestige sur la scène internationale, d’assurer la stabilité régionale et de préserver la crédibilité de l’OTAN. Finalement, l’intérêt national défini en termes de sécurité dans un contexte de la guerre au terrorisme explique la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008.

Ambitions stratégiques indiennes et dérives perceptuelles : la rivalité sino-indienne contemporaine

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie.