Theory of reasoned action for continuous improvement capabilities: a behavioral approach

The importance of interaction between Operations Management (OM) and Human Behavior has been recently re-addressed. This paper introduced the Reasoned Action Theory suggested by Froehle and Roth (2004) to analyze Operational Capabilities exploring the suitability of this model in the context of OM. It also seeks to discuss the behavioral aspects of operational capabilities from the perspective of organizational routines. This theory was operationalized using Fishbein and Ajzen (F/A) behavioral model and a multi-case strategy was employed to analyze the Continuous Improvement (CI) capability. The results posit that the model explains partially the CI behavior in an operational context and some contingency variables might influence the general relations among the variables involved in the F/A model. Thus intention might not be the determinant variable of behavior in this context.

Equilibrium self-assembly of colloids with distinct interaction sites: Thermodynamics, percolation, and cluster distribution functions

We calculate the equilibrium thermodynamic properties, percolation threshold, and cluster distribution functions for a model of associating colloids, which consists of hard spherical particles having on their surfaces three short-ranged attractive sites (sticky spots) of two different types, A and B. The thermodynamic properties are calculated using Wertheim's perturbation theory of associating fluids. This also allows us to find the onset of self-assembly, which can be quantified by the maxima of the specific heat at constant volume. The percolation threshold is derived, under the no-loop assumption, for the correlated bond model: In all cases it is two percolated phases that become identical at a critical point, when one exists. Finally, the cluster size distributions are calculated by mapping the model onto an effective model, characterized by a-state-dependent-functionality (f) over bar and unique bonding probability (p) over bar. The mapping is based on the asymptotic limit of the cluster distributions functions of the generic model and the effective parameters are defined through the requirement that the equilibrium cluster distributions of the true and effective models have the same number-averaged and weight-averaged sizes at all densities and temperatures. We also study the model numerically in the case where BB interactions are missing. In this limit, AB bonds either provide branching between A-chains (Y-junctions) if epsilon(AB)/epsilon(AA) is small, or drive the formation of a hyperbranched polymer if epsilon(AB)/epsilon(AA) is large. We find that the theoretical predictions describe quite accurately the numerical data, especially in the region where Y-junctions are present. There is fairly good agreement between theoretical and numerical results both for the thermodynamic (number of bonds and phase coexistence) and the connectivity properties of the model (cluster size distributions and percolation locus).

Percolation of colloids with distinct interaction sites

We generalize the Flory-Stockmayer theory of percolation to a model of associating (patchy) colloids, which consists of hard spherical particles, having on their surfaces f short-ranged-attractive sites of m different types. These sites can form bonds between particles and thus promote self-assembly. It is shown that the percolation threshold is given in terms of the eigenvalues of a m x m matrix, which describes the recursive relations for the number of bonded particles on the ith level of a cluster with no loops; percolation occurs when the largest of these eigenvalues equals unity. Expressions for the probability that a particle is not bonded to the giant cluster, for the average cluster size and the average size of a cluster to which a randomly chosen particle belongs, are also derived. Explicit results for these quantities are computed for the case f = 3 and m = 2. We show how these structural properties are related to the thermodynamics of the associating system by regarding bond formation as a (equilibrium) chemical reaction. This solution of the percolation problem, combined with Wertheim's thermodynamic first-order perturbation theory, allows the investigation of the interplay between phase behavior and cluster formation for general models of patchy colloids.

Criticality of colloids with distinct interaction patches: The limits of linear chains, hyperbranched polymers, and dimers

We use a simple model of associating fluids which consists of spherical particles having a hard-core repulsion, complemented by three short-ranged attractive sites on the surface (sticky spots). Two of the spots are of type A and one is of type B; the bonding interactions between each pair of spots have strengths epsilon(AA), epsilon(BB), and epsilon(AB). The theory is applied over the whole range of bonding strengths and the results are interpreted in terms of the equilibrium cluster structures of the phases. In addition to our numerical results, we derive asymptotic expansions for the free energy in the limits for which there is no liquid-vapor critical point: linear chains (epsilon(AA)not equal 0, epsilon(AB)=epsilon(BB)=0), hyperbranched polymers (epsilon(AB)not equal 0, epsilon(AA)=epsilon(BB)=0), and dimers (epsilon(BB)not equal 0, epsilon(AA)=epsilon(AB)=0). These expansions also allow us to calculate the structure of the critical fluid by perturbing around the above limits, yielding three different types of condensation: of linear chains (AA clusters connected by a few AB or BB bonds); of hyperbranched polymers (AB clusters connected by AA bonds); or of dimers (BB clusters connected by AA bonds). Interestingly, there is no critical point when epsilon(AA) vanishes despite the fact that AA bonds alone cannot drive condensation.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Spillovers and growth in a local interaction model

In this paper we aim at studying to what extent spillovers between firms may foster economic growth. The attention is addressed to the spillovers connected with the R&D activity that improves the quality of the goods firms supply. Our model develops a growth theory framework and we assume that firms spread around a circle. Our study assesses that spillovers between neighbors affect the probability of successful research for each of them. In particular, spillovers are the forces fuelling growth when, on the whole, firms turn out to be net receivers with respect to their neighbors.

Regional productivity variation and the impact of public capital stock: an analysis with spatial interaction, with reference to Spain

In this paper we examine whether variations in the level of public capital across Spain‟s Provinces affected productivity levels over the period 1996-2005. The analysis is motivated by contemporary urban economics theory, involving a production function for the competitive sector of the economy („industry‟) which includes the level of composite services derived from „service‟ firms under monopolistic competition. The outcome is potentially increasing returns to scale resulting from pecuniary externalities deriving from internal increasing returns in the monopolistic competition sector. We extend the production function by also making (log) labour efficiency a function of (log) total public capital stock and (log) human capital stock, leading to a simple and empirically tractable reduced form linking productivity level to density of employment, human capital and public capital stock. The model is further extended to include technological externalities or spillovers across provinces. Using panel data methodology, we find significant elasticities for total capital stock and for human capital stock, and a significant impact for employment density. The finding that the effect of public capital is significantly different from zero, indicating that it has a direct effect even after controlling for employment density, is contrary to some of the earlier research findings which leave the question of the impact of public capital unresolved.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Social Interaction Effects on Fertility: Intentions and Behaviors

The existing literature shows that social interactions in individuals' networks affect their reproductive attitudes and behaviors through three mechanisms: social influence, social learning, and social support. In this paper, we discuss to what extent the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), an individual based theorization of intentions and behavior used to model fertility, takes these social mechanisms into account. We argue that the TPB already integrates social influence and that it could easily accommodate the two other social network mechanisms. By doing so, the theory would be enriched in two respects. First, it will explain more completely how macro level changes eventually ends in micro level changes in behavioral intentions. Indeed, mechanisms of social influence may explain why changes in representations of parenthood and ideal family size can be slower than changes in socio-economic conditions and institutions. Social learning mechanisms should also be considered, since they are crucial to distinguish who adopts new behavioral beliefs and practices, when change at the macro level finally sinks in. Secondly, relationships are a capital of services that can complement institutional offering (informal child care) as well as a capital of knowledge which help individuals navigate in a complex institutional reality, providing a crucial element to explain heterogeneity in the successful realization of fertility intentions across individuals. We develop specific hypotheses concerning the effect of social interactions on fertility intentions and their realization to conclude with a critical review of the existing surveys suitable to test them and their limits.

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

Documenting a time-bound, circular view of hierarchies: a microanalysis of parent-infant dyadic interaction.

This article presents a new theory that separates the levels of communication and relates them circularly, namely, by separating time from space/meaning variables. Documenting this proposition requires sequential microdescriptions--a far-out project in the field of family therapy. In an extensive study of clinical and nonclinical families, starting with available microanalytic data on nonverbal parent-infant dialogue, distinct time organizations have been found to modify the degree of circularity between the levels of interaction according to the observed types of engagement, that is, consensual, conflictual, and paradoxical. The double description of the dyad as a totality versus the dyad as a framing/developing organization imparts crucial information on how development proceeds in dyadic, co-evolutive systems, and presumably in larger ones too. In this perspective, a model is elaborated and then applied to a case description in our therapeutic consultation.

The genetical theory of social behaviour.

We survey the population genetic basis of social evolution, using a logically consistent set of arguments to cover a wide range of biological scenarios. We start by reconsidering Hamilton's (Hamilton 1964 J. Theoret. Biol. 7, 1-16 (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)) results for selection on a social trait under the assumptions of additive gene action, weak selection and constant environment and demography. This yields a prediction for the direction of allele frequency change in terms of phenotypic costs and benefits and genealogical concepts of relatedness, which holds for any frequency of the trait in the population, and provides the foundation for further developments and extensions. We then allow for any type of gene interaction within and between individuals, strong selection and fluctuating environments and demography, which may depend on the evolving trait itself. We reach three conclusions pertaining to selection on social behaviours under broad conditions. (i) Selection can be understood by focusing on a one-generation change in mean allele frequency, a computation which underpins the utility of reproductive value weights; (ii) in large populations under the assumptions of additive gene action and weak selection, this change is of constant sign for any allele frequency and is predicted by a phenotypic selection gradient; (iii) under the assumptions of trait substitution sequences, such phenotypic selection gradients suffice to characterize long-term multi-dimensional stochastic evolution, with almost no knowledge about the genetic details underlying the coevolving traits. Having such simple results about the effect of selection regardless of population structure and type of social interactions can help to delineate the common features of distinct biological processes. Finally, we clarify some persistent divergences within social evolution theory, with respect to exactness, synergies, maximization, dynamic sufficiency and the role of genetic arguments.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Vertically coupled quantum dots in the local spin-density functional theory

We have investigated the structure of double quantum dots vertically coupled at zero magnetic field within local-spin-density functional theory. The dots are identical and have a finite width, and the whole system is axially symmetric. We first discuss the effect of thickness on the addition spectrum of one single dot. Next we describe the structure of coupled dots as a function of the interdot distance for different electron numbers. Addition spectra, Hund's rule, and molecular-type configurations are discussed. It is shown that self-interaction corrections to the density-functional results do not play a very important role in the calculated addition spectra