An analysis of UI trust fund adequacy : final report /

Prepared by Burt Barnow and Wayne Vroman.

Seasonality of employment and experience rating /

Mode of access: Internet.

Internet initial claims evaluation : final report /

Evaluation of the Internet Initial Claim process based on data collected during the first quarter of calendar year 2002 in Colorado, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Utah.

California employment and payrolls in ... /

At head of title: California. Department of Employment affiliated with [U.S.] Social Security Board ...

Institutional specifics and unemployment insurance eligibility in Canada : how sensitive are employment duration effects?

The paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance on the duration of employment spells in Canada using the 1988–90 Labour Market Activity Survey. The primary focus of the paper is to evaluate whether estimated UI effects are sensitive to the degree to which institutional rules and regulations governing UI eligibility and entitlement are explicitly modelled. The key result of the paper is that it is indeed important to allow for institutional detail when estimating unemployment insurance effects. Estimates using simple proxies for eligibility indicate small, often insignificant UI effects. The size and significance of the effects rise as more realistic versions of the variables are adopted. The estimates using the eligibility variables incorporating the greatest level of institutional detail suggest that a jump in the hazard rate by a factor of 2.3 may not be an unreasonable estimate of the effect.

How Does the Unemployment Insurance System Shape the Time Profile of Jobless Duration?

This paper updates a sparse literature on the effects of unemployment benefits (UB) on the time profile of escape rates from unemployment. These effects, as well as those of other regressors, are found to vary profoundly over the course of unemployment.

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.

Essays on Unemployment Insurance

Can the potential availability of unemployment insurance (UI) affect the behavior of employed workers and the duration of their employment spells? After discussing few straightforward reasons why UI may affect employment duration, I apply a regression kink design (RKD) to address this question using linked employer-employee data from the Brazilian labor market. Exploiting the UI schedule, I find that potential benefit level significantly affects the duration of employment spells. This effect is local to low skilled workers and, surprisingly, indicates that a 1\% increase in unemployment benefits increases job duration by around 0.3\%. Such result is driven by the fact that higher UI decreases the probability of job quits, which are not covered by UI in Brazil. These estimates are robust to permutation tests and a number of falsification tests. I develop a reduced-form welfare formula to assess the economic relevance of this result. Based on that, I show that the positive effect on employment duration implies in a higher optimal benefit level. Moreover, the formula shows that the elasticity of employment duration impacts welfare just with the same weight as the well-known elasticity of unemployment duration to benefit level.