860 resultados para Informative voting
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This chapter presents an analysis of the unprecedented use of electronic voting by expatriates during the French 2012 legislative elections, when they elected their own representatives (referred to here as ‘deputies’), to the National Assembly in Paris for the first time, in 11 newly created overseas constituencies.
The study is presented within the broader perspective of electronic voting in France more generally, and in the historical context of extra-territorial voting by French expatriates. The authors discuss the main issues and controversies that arose during the 2012 elections, and in a final section analyse the results. The authors conclude by drawing attention to recent developments in electronic voting in France since the 2012 elections, which suggest that although there was much criticism expressed by experts of electronic voting as to the security and transparency of the system used, the official discourse that acclaimed the experience as a success, appears to have convinced its target audience.
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BACKGROUND: Molecular typing is integral for identifying Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains that may be shared between patients with cystic fibrosis (CF). We conducted a side-by-side comparison of two P. aeruginosa genotyping methods utilising informative-single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) methods; one targeting 10 P. aeruginosa SNPs and using real-time polymerase chain reaction technology (HRM10SNP) and the other targeting 20 SNPs and based on the Sequenom MassARRAY platform (iPLEX20SNP).
METHODS: An in-silico analysis of the 20 SNPs used for the iPLEX20SNP method was initially conducted using sequence type (ST) data on the P. aeruginosa PubMLST website. A total of 506 clinical isolates collected from patients attending 11 CF centres throughout Australia were then tested by both the HRM10SNP and iPLEX20SNP assays. Type-ability and discriminatory power of the methods, as well as their ability to identify commonly shared P. aeruginosa strains, were compared.
RESULTS: The in-silico analyses showed that the 1401 STs available on the PubMLST website could be divided into 927 different 20-SNP profiles (D-value = 0.999), and that most STs of national or international importance in CF could be distinguished either individually or as belonging to closely related single- or double-locus variant groups. When applied to the 506 clinical isolates, the iPLEX20SNP provided better discrimination over the HRM10SNP method with 147 different 20-SNP and 92 different 10-SNP profiles observed, respectively. For detecting the three most commonly shared Australian P. aeruginosa strains AUST-01, AUST-02 and AUST-06, the two methods were in agreement for 80/81 (98.8%), 48/49 (97.8%) and 11/12 (91.7%) isolates, respectively.
CONCLUSIONS: The iPLEX20SNP is a superior new method for broader SNP-based MLST-style investigations of P. aeruginosa. However, because of convenience and availability, the HRM10SNP method remains better suited for clinical microbiology laboratories that only utilise real-time PCR technology and where the main interest is detection of the most highly-prevalent P. aeruginosa CF strains within Australian clinics.
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There is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behaviour and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions - anger and anxiety. I apply the insights in this literature to the previously unresearched realm of the emotional bases of voting in EU referendums. I hypothesise that anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Focusing on the case of Irish voting in the Fiscal Compact referendum, and using data from a representative sample of voters, I find support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of the emotional conditionality of EU referendum voting.
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I elaborate a model of cross-bloc party support in deeply divided places. The model expects that the variation in the level of electoral support that citizens in Community A have for parties in Community B is a function of citizens' evaluations of the relative ability of parties in Community B to represent the interests of all communities. This 'ethnic catch-all' model of cross-bloc party support is tested in the context of consociational Northern Ireland, using data from a representative survey conducted directly after the 2010 Westminster general election. The findings are asymmetric: the model explains Protestant support for nationalist parties but not Catholic support for unionist parties. The findings, and their implications, are discussed.
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Book Review: Emerson, Peter, Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and
Governance (2nd edn), Springer, London, 2012,
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While studies examining free votes find MPs’ preferences influence their voting behaviour, most studies also show MPs tend to divide along party lines even after the whips have been withdrawn. Recent work offers a possible alternative explanation for this finding: this sustained party cohesion represents the impact of MPs’ party identification similar to party identification effects in the electorate. This argument is tested using a series of free votes on same-sex relations. Even after controlling for preferences using several direct measures, party continues to shape voting behaviour. Although indirect, this provides evidence in favour of the party-asidentification argument.
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A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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To what extent do and could e-tools contribute to a democracy like Switzerland? This paper puts forward experiences and visions concerning the application of e-tools for the most traditional democratic processes- elections and, of special importance in Switzerland, direct-democratic votes.Having the particular voting behaviour of the Swiss electorate in mind (low voter turnout - especially among the youngest age group, low political knowledge, etc.) we believe that e-tools which provide information in the forefront of elections or direct-democratic votes offer an enormous service to the voter. As soon as e-voting will be possible in Switzerland (as planned by the government), those e-tools for gathering information online will become indispensable and will gain power enormously. Therefore political scientists should not only focus on potential effects of e-voting itself but rather on the combination of (connected)e-tools of the pre-voting and the voting sphere. In the case of Switzerland, we argue in this paper, the offer of VAAs such as smartvote for elections and direct-democratic votes can provide the voter with more balanced and qualitatively higher information and thereby make a valuable contribution to the Swiss democracy.
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Letter to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie regarding the printing of voting blanks 1 doublesided page, handwritten), Apr. 3, 1878.
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This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.
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We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.
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We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership in the society by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undersirable to belong to the society as well. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative, but also on the final composition of the society
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Resumen tomado de la publicaci??n. Resumen tambi??n en ingl??s