On Consumer Decision Strategies: New Approaches for Studying and Aiding Preferential Choices

This dissertation focuses on the strategies consumers use when making purchase decisions. It is organized in two main parts, one centering on descriptive and the other on applied decision making research. In the first part, a new process tracing tool called InterActive Process Tracing (IAPT) is pre- sented, which I developed to investigate the nature of consumers' decision strategies. This tool is a combination of several process tracing techniques, namely Active Information Search, Mouselab, and retrospective verbal protocol. To validate IAPT, two experiments on mobile phone purchase de- cisions were conducted where participants first repeatedly chose a mobile phone and then were asked to formalize their decision strategy so that it could be used to make choices for them. The choices made by the identified strategies correctly predicted the observed choices in 73% (Experiment 1) and 67% (Experiment 2) of the cases. Moreover, in Experiment 2, Mouselab and eye tracking were directly compared with respect to their impact on information search and strategy description. Only minor differences were found between these two methods. I conclude that IAPT is a useful research tool to identify choice strategies, and that using eye tracking technology did not increase its validity beyond that gained with Mouselab. In the second part, a prototype of a decision aid is introduced that was developed building in particular on the knowledge about consumers' decision strategies gained in Part I. This decision aid, which is called the InterActive Choice Aid (IACA), systematically assists consumers in their purchase decisions. To evaluate the prototype regarding its perceived utility, an experiment was conducted where IACA was compared to two other prototypes that were based on real-world consumer decision aids. All three prototypes differed in the number and type of tools they provided to facilitate the process of choosing, ranging from low (Amazon) to medium (Sunrise/dpreview) to high functionality (IACA). Overall, participants slightly preferred the prototype of medium functionality and this prototype was also rated best on the dimensions of understandability and ease of use. IACA was rated best regarding the two dimensions of ease of elimination and ease of comparison of alternatives. Moreover, participants choices were more in line with the normatively oriented weighted additive strategy when they used IACA than when they used the medium functionality prototype. The low functionality prototype was the least preferred overall. It is concluded that consumers can and will benefit from highly functional decision aids like IACA, but only when these systems are easy to understand and to use.

Activity assays and immunoassays for plasma Renin and prorenin: information provided and precautions necessary for accurate measurement.

BACKGROUND: Measurement of plasma renin is important for the clinical assessment of hypertensive patients. The most common methods for measuring plasma renin are the plasma renin activity (PRA) assay and the renin immunoassay. The clinical application of renin inhibitor therapy has thrown into focus the differences in information provided by activity assays and immunoassays for renin and prorenin measurement and has drawn attention to the need for precautions to ensure their accurate measurement. CONTENT: Renin activity assays and immunoassays provide related but different information. Whereas activity assays measure only active renin, immunoassays measure both active and inhibited renin. Particular care must be taken in the collection and processing of blood samples and in the performance of these assays to avoid errors in renin measurement. Both activity assays and immunoassays are susceptible to renin overestimation due to prorenin activation. In addition, activity assays performed with peptidase inhibitors may overestimate the degree of inhibition of PRA by renin inhibitor therapy. Moreover, immunoassays may overestimate the reactive increase in plasma renin concentration in response to renin inhibitor therapy, owing to the inhibitor promoting conversion of prorenin to an open conformation that is recognized by renin immunoassays. CONCLUSIONS: The successful application of renin assays to patient care requires that the clinician and the clinical chemist understand the information provided by these assays and of the precautions necessary to ensure their accuracy.

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Information acquisition and entry

Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they havethe opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affectthe profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literatureon endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertaintyabout more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. Whenthe cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as ifthere was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only asmall amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirableequilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate theimportance of assumptions (1) and (2).

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs thatcan be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential searchamong firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. Anoffering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extentto which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathethe product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. Inequilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We performcomparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead tohigher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is relatedto discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the"long tail" phenomenon.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

Job search and asset accumulation under borrowing constraints

In this paper I show how borrowing constraints and job search interact.I fit a dynamic model to data from the National Longitudinal Survey(1979-cohort) and show that borrowing constraints are significant. Agentswith more initial assets and more access to credit attain higher wagesfor several periods after high school graduation. The unemployed maintaintheir consumption by running down their assets, while the employed saveto buffer against future unemployment spells. I also show that, unlikein models with exogenous income streams, unemployment transfers, byallowing agents to attain higher wages do not 'crowd out' but increasesaving.

Information security and the enforcement of secrecy : the practical application of quantum key distribution

There is no doubt about the necessity of protecting digital communication: Citizens are entrusting their most confidential and sensitive data to digital processing and communication, and so do governments, corporations, and armed forces. Digital communication networks are also an integral component of many critical infrastructures we are seriously depending on in our daily lives. Transportation services, financial services, energy grids, food production and distribution networks are only a few examples of such infrastructures. Protecting digital communication means protecting confidentiality and integrity by encrypting and authenticating its contents. But most digital communication is not secure today. Nevertheless, some of the most ardent problems could be solved with a more stringent use of current cryptographic technologies. Quite surprisingly, a new cryptographic primitive emerges from the ap-plication of quantum mechanics to information and communication theory: Quantum Key Distribution. QKD is difficult to understand, it is complex, technically challenging, and costly-yet it enables two parties to share a secret key for use in any subsequent cryptographic task, with an unprecedented long-term security. It is disputed, whether technically and economically fea-sible applications can be found. Our vision is, that despite technical difficulty and inherent limitations, Quantum Key Distribution has a great potential and fits well with other cryptographic primitives, enabling the development of highly secure new applications and services. In this thesis we take a structured approach to analyze the practical applicability of QKD and display several use cases of different complexity, for which it can be a technology of choice, either because of its unique forward security features, or because of its practicability.

Informe sobre la I International Conference on Multidisciplinary Information Sciences and Technologies - InSciT2006 (Mèrida, 25, 26, 27 i 28 d'octubre de 2006)

Podeu consultar la versió en castellà a http://hdl.handle.net/2445/8955

Informe sobre la I International Conference on Multidisciplinary Information Sciences and Technologies - InSciT2006 (Mérida, 25, 26, 27 y 28 de octubre de 2006)

Podeu consultar la versió en català a http://hdl.handle.net/2445/8954