Optimal safety incentives in road concession contracts

Changes in the roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of public services along with budget constraints are resulting in an increasing use of the concession approach for financing and managing roads. In the last few years, many of these contracts set up incentives linked to bonuses to encourage the concessionaire to render a better service to the users. Road safety is one the aspects on the basis of which concessionaires can be rewarded according to their performance. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether road safety incentives are being defined in the right way nowadays in different European countries and also identify what incentives would need to be implemented to achieve a socially optimal road safety level. To that end, we develop a specific incentive for road concession contracts that encourages companies to achieve the optimal level. We apply this methodology to three case studies of concessions recently awarded in order to determine to what extend the incentives they set up are closer or farther to the optimum.

Topic selection in industry experiments

This paper shares our experience with initial negotiation and topic elicitation process for conducting industry experiments in six software development organizations in Finland. The process involved interaction with company representatives in the form of both multiple group discussions and separate face-to-face meetings. Fitness criteria developed by researchers were applied to the list of generated topics to decide on a common topic. The challenges we faced include diversity of proposed topics, communication gaps, skepticism about research methods, initial disconnect between research and industry needs, and lack of prior work relationship. Lessons learned include having enough time to establish trust with partners, importance of leveraging the benefits of training and skill development that are inherent in the experimental approach, uniquely positioning the experimental approach within the landscape of other validation approaches more familiar to industrial partners, and introducing the fitness criteria early in the process.

Sex in industry: a plea for the working-girl

by Azel Ames.

Women in industry: a study in American economic history

by Edith Abbott.

Italian women in industry: a study of conditions in New York City

by Louise C. Odencrantz.

Fatigue and efficiency: a study in industry

by Josephine Goldmark ; introduction by Frederic S. Lee ...

A new day for the colored woman worker: a study of colored women in industry in New York City

Joint Committee to Study the Employment of Colored Women in New York City and Brooklyn.

Offshoring of Information-intensive Services: Structural Breaks in Industry Life Cycles. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

The emergence of widespread offshoring of information-intensive services is arguably one of the more impactful phenomena to transform business in the last ten years. A growing body of research has examined the firm-level drivers andlocation factors (i.e., the why's and where's) of services offshoring. However, little empirical research has examined the maturation sequencing (or when's) of services offshoring. Adopting industry life cycle theory as a framework, the key research questions examined in the paper are: when do different categories of offshoring services provision change from being emergent sectors to more mature ones, and how does the timing of this sequence relate to the type of service offshored. Using a database of 1420 offshore services FDI projects, we find that the value-add as well as the information sensitivity of the service category are related to when the service categories progress through the industry life cycle. Implications for future waves of service offshoring are discussed.

On Incentives in Technology Policymaking: What the EU Can Learn from U.S. Developments. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.7, 1997

This paper explores the incentives political and bureaucratic actors face in the institutional setting of EU technology policy. In examining the implications and assumptions of neoclassical and evolutionary theories of technological change, it tries to answer why certain theories do not obtain importance in the political wor1d. By focusing on the positive approach to policymaking, the paper examines why policy learning does not occur m certain institutional settings. In referring to EU technology programs, I show which conceptual and functional shortcomings limit the policies in question. As evaluation and oversight mechanisms have not been sufficiently developed and accepted within the institutional setting, there is much room for inefficiency. I discuss this setting within a simple agency model using two political actors and two firms performing R&D. It is easy to show that when asymmetric information applies, the firms receive positive rents and the political agent gains reputation. The outcome suggests changing the evaluation practices and embedding results in political decision making. Regarding this point, recent U.S. developments seem to have led to more efficiency. Moreover, the paper suggests delegating technology policy to other actors and discussing the empowerment of different principals on the political plane.