Manpower programs and planning in economic development. Prepared for the U. S. International Cooperation Administration, Office of Labor Affairs.

Cover title.

Geodetic operations in the United States and in other areas through international cooperation, January 1, 1963 to December 31, 1966.

Mode of access: Internet.

Geodetic operations in the United States and in other areas through international cooperation, January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1962.

Mode of access: Internet.

Terminal report [to the International Cooperation Administration] on the contract concerning public administration in the University of San Andrés.

Mode of access: Internet.

International cooperation and competition in civilian space activities : summary

"OTA-ISC-240"--P. [36]

International cooperation and competition in civilian space activities.

Item 1070-M.

ASPICO: Advanced Scientific Portal for International Cooperation on Digital Cultural Conten

* This research is partially supported by a grant (bourse Lavoisier) from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères).

International cooperation against climate change: institutions, policies and their efficiency

In the 20th century nature of the world economy has started to change significantly, and the former state-centric constellation disappeared. Several development factors that induced the change are still active and nowadays we live in a much different world. The world economy consists of transnational networks; these complicated systems have a great impact on the world of states. The transnational actors’ (multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations etc) influence became very essential as they are able to mobilize the society, have high expertise (think tanks), but it is also important to note their financial strength and moral effects (norm entrepreneurs).

A fenntartható fejlődéssel foglalkozó nemzetközi együttműködés négy évtizede (Four Decades of International Cooperation on Sustainable Development)

Along with the recognition of the increasing environmental and social problems stemming from globalization, the need to address these problems and to develop the relevant international framework has strengthened since the 1970s. The scope of this cooperation gradually broadened and eventually it embraced all issues, which were considered to be critical for sustainable development. The summits on sustainability, namely, the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the “Rio+5” in 1997 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, wished to respond to all unsustainable processes by adopting, reinforcing and expanding a global program. This program is based on a series of important principles and includes various goals and instruments adopted by consensus; however, it also reflects delicate compromises between development related aspirations and environmental barriers, and also between the developed and the developing countries. Actually, there is a serious implementation gap and there are also new challenges. Referring to these problems, the idea of convening an extraordinary summit in 2012 was raised and it was eventually adopted but with a rather narrow mandate and agenda. It turned out that besides the “usual” conflicts between the developed and developing countries e.g. upon the common but differentiated responsibilities or international development financing, there were also diverting views on the green economy and on the ways of institutional strengthening of the international sustainable development and environmental governance. As a consequence, the 2012 Conference concluded with rather modest results.

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

International tax cooperation in the Post-GFC era

Over the last five years we have observed the fallout from the global financial crisis (GFC). International cooperation and jointly adopted policies have dominated many of the solutions to the problems which have arisen. Initially, many nations in response to the GFC, implemented a two pronged short term solution by undertaking fiscal intervention and delivering rescue packages aimed at first, bailing out financial institutions and second, preventing or minimising the impact of a recession. Both programs involved large amounts of domestic spending. It was difficult in early 2007 to foresee the reduction that nations were about the face in domestic revenue collected. Five years on, not only have the first line effects of the GFC reduced the revenue raised by governments around the world, but the consequential costs associated with the rescue packages have also depleted domestic revenue bases. The response by stakeholders has been to attempt to secure domestic revenue bases through fiscally sustainable measures. Domestic sovereignty allows the levying of taxes as a nation chooses. However, rather than raise domestic taxes, revenue may also be increased by stemming the flow of income and capital to low and no-tax jurisdictions. The intervening five-year period since the GFC allows a unique insight into the response by nations and international organisations to tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax competition through the cross border flows of capital and the resulting affect that the GFC has had on international tax cooperation. By investigating the change in the international tax landscape over the last five years, which reveals the work done by stakeholders in developing fiscally responsible responses to the problems that have arisen, it may be possible to predict the trajectory of the international tax landscape over the next five years.

One or two poles of attraction in the international technological cooperation process?

In recent years, international cooperation processes have become a key mechanism for companies to internationalise their innovative activities, par ticularly in the case of small businesses whose size reduces their possibilities of developing internationalisation strategies autonomously in the same way as larger companies. In Spain, the existence of two parallel programmes with similar structures oriented towards Europe (EUREKA) and Latin America (IBEROEKA) raises the question as to whether the fact that companies participate in only one (unipolar) or both (bipolar) of these programmes is the result of a selection process, which, in turn, results in the existence of different collectives with different efficiency parameters. The aim of this study is to provide a comparative analysis based on the final reports of Spanish companies that have participated in the EUREKA programme. Two groups of companies were compared: one comprising companies that have only had international experience in Europe (EUREKA); and another formed by companies that have also carried out IBEROEKA projects. The conclusions confirm that the behaviour of both groups of companies differs substantially and reveal the importance of geographical perspective in the analysis of international cooperation in technology. This disparate behaviour is a relevant aspect that must be taken into account when designing policies to promote international technological cooperation.

The international regulation of transnational mergers

Transnational mergers are mergers involving firms operating in more than one jurisdiction, or which occur in one jurisdiction but have an impact on competition in another. Being of this nature, they have the potential to raise competition law concerns in more than one jurisdiction. When they do, the transaction costs of the merger to the firms involved, and the competition law authorities, are likely to increase significantly and, even where the merger is allowed to proceed, delays are likely to occur in reaping the benefits of the merger. Ultimately, these costs are borne by consumers. This thesis will identify the nature and source of regulatory costs associated with transnational merger review and identify and evaluate possible mechanisms by which these costs might be reduced. It will conclude that there is no single panacea for transnational merger regulation, but that a multi-faceted approach, including the adoption of common filing forms, agreement on filing and review deadlines and continuing efforts toward increasing international cooperation in merger enforcement, is needed to reduce regulatory costs and more successfully improve the welfare outcomes to which merger regulation is directed.