999 resultados para Hermes, Georg, 1775-1831.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Editors: 1866-81, Emil Hübner; 1882-1901, Georg Kaibel, Karl Robert; 1902-13, Friedrich Leo, Karl Robert; 1914- Karl Robert, Georg Wissowa.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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7. bd., 2 abth., edited by Ludwig Boumann; 16.-17. bd. by Friedrich Förster and Ludwig Boumann; 18. bd. by Karl Rosenkranz.
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Bibliography: p. [593]-[596]
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Georg Calixtus (1586–1656) was a Lutheran theologian, prominent in the German lands during the first half of the seventeenth century. Existing research focuses on Calixtus‘ contributions to religious and theological debates, particularly in regard to his role in the Syncretistic Controversy of the latter half of the seventeenth century, and in regard to his unique position as a Lutheran who aspired to reunion between the different Christian confessions. This thesis problematises this focus on Calixtus by theologians and ecclesiastical historians, and argues that the genesis and transmission of his ideas cannot be fully appreciated without considering his relationship with the broader intellectual milieu of early modern Europe. It does this by exploring Calixtus‘ interaction with the humanist tradition, in particular by reconsidering his relationship with Isaac Casaubon (1559–1614), and by exploring his work in light of intellectual movements that were taking place outside the Christian church. In so doing, this thesis argues that Calixtus made contributions to early modern thought that have been overlooked in the existing literature. It also becomes apparent that much research remains to be done to gain a more accurate picture of his place in the early modern intellectual landscape, and of his legacy to later generations of scholars.
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This article explores the relationship between Georg Calixtus (1586-1656) and Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614). It does this in order to highlight an oversight in the existing literature concerning Calixtus, and to encourage scholars to revisit the work of Early Modern figures who have previously been considered only from modern disciplinary perspectives. By emphasizing the relationship between Calixtus and Casaubon, this article argues that Calixtus was potentially exposed to much broader circles of intellectual debate than has previously been considered, and that a reevaluation of his work in light of these debates is therefore in order.
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This paper explores an early modern application of the Stoic principle of similitudo temporum to the study of history. In so doing, it highlights the tension between historiography and antiquarianism, suggesting that the collection of remains – whether material or immaterial – was understood in at least some early modern circles as an integral part of the historiographic process. It also emphasises the evolving meaning of “history” during this time, drawing attention to the perceived novelty of such antiquarian approaches to the study of the past, and briefly exploring subtle differences between the example at hand and the work and activities of better-known figures such as Nicolas-Claude Fabri de Peiresc and Justus Lipsius. As such, this paper makes a contribution to our evolving understanding of early modern scholarship, and draws attention to the variegated approaches of its practitioners to contemporary issues.
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In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.