Ex occulto carpere agmen: la guerriglia antiromana in Britannia e in Giudea

Scopo di questo lavoro è quello di analizzare le componenti tattiche, strategiche e sociali della guerriglia antiromana in Britannia e in Giudea, in un periodo che va dal I secolo a. C. al III secolo d. C., con l'obiettivo di mettere in luce la differente efficacia delle tattiche non ortodosse rispetto a quelle convenzionali; e di analizzare le risposte teoriche ed empiriche concepite dai Romani per affrontare questa forma di lotta. La tesi è stata articolata nel modo seguente: una prima parte analizza gli aspetti tattici, strategici e sociali della guerriglia e della controguerriglia, anche attraverso il metodo comparativo, mettendo cioè a confronto alcuni dei principali testi sulla guerra non convenzionale redatti in epoche e contesti diversi, dai quali si è cercato di delle costanti potenzialmente applicabili a qualsiasi periodo storico e a qualsiasi area geografica. Nella seconda parte si cerca di applicare tali costanti alla realtà storico – sociale dell'impero romano. Particolare attenzione è stata riservata al rapporto tra la mentalità romana, basata sul concetto di bellum iustum, e le tattiche non ortodosse. La terza e la quarta parte analizzano la resistenza antiromana in Britannia e in Giudea, mettendone in luce tutti gli aspetti, in particolare quelli legati alla guerriglia rurale, a quella urbana, al terrorismo, all'evoluzione della guerriglia da guerra per bande a guerra convenzionale e alla controguerriglia. La scelta di queste due province non è casuale. In province così lontane e diverse tra loro, Roma inviò spesso gli stessi generali esperti di controguerriglia. Questo particolare permette di notare la presenza, a Roma, di una grand strategy che, consapevole del fenomeno della guerriglia, ne affidò la repressione agli stessi generali, specialisti della controguerriglia, non esitando a spostarli, in caso di necessità, da un capo all'altro dell'impero.

Review of Complete Crime and Punishment Series

Some examples of topics covered include undocumented immigrants, guns, and terrorism within Crime and Criminal Behavior, vigilantes, Miranda warnings, and zero-tolerance policing within Police and Law Enforcement; insanity laws, DNA evidence, and victims' rights within Courts, Law, and Justice; gangs and prison violence, capital punishment, and prison privatization within Corrections; and school violence, violent juvenile offenders, and age of responsibility within Juvenile Crime and Justice. Note that Sage offers numerous reference works that provide focused analysis of key topics in the field of criminal justice, such as the Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment (2002), the Encyclopedia of Race and Crime (2009), the Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention (2010), the Encyclopedia of White Collar & Corporate Crime (2004), and the Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence (2008), available in print or as e-books via Sage Reference online.

“Facebook Style”: The Use of Emoticons and Graphic Signs by Users in the Cape Flats

Over the last few years Facebook has become a widespread and continuously expanding medium of communication in Africa and worldwide. Being a new medium of social interaction, Facebook produces its own communication style. It is a style conditioned by the medium and the community of users. My focus of analysis is how Facebook users from the city of Cape Town create this style by means of emoticons and other graphic signs in order to reflect the reality of living in Cape Town’s underprivileged areas. This study is based on a theoretical framework which combines sociolinguistics with Computer-Mediated-Communication to study the emergence of a style peculiar of the online social networks. In a corpus of Coloured Facebook users from the Cape Flats, I have analysed the emergence of emoticons and other graphic signs related to Capetonian gang culture and then tracked the spread of these features to the extensive use by users not related to gangs. It can be deduced that in this process the analysed features amplify their meaning and are employed in a much broader context as their original use. Due to the development and spread of these features we can consider the peculiar electronic communication of Facebook as a style constrained by the electronic medium and its users. It is a style which serves the users to create social meaning and to express their linguistic identities.

"Gangsterism," HIV, and "tik:" An exploration of Cape Town youth

Since early 2000, the Western Cape of South Africa has been documented as an area for monitoring the spread of HIV. The majority of HIV cases occur within individuals between the ages of 15-49 years, and the epidemic is believed to be complicated by the increased use of crystal methamphetamine (CM), or “tik.” Eighty percent of current CM users in Cape Town are under the age of 21 years, and almost 18% of current HIV cases are in individuals under the age of 24 years. Gang membership in youth may also be complicating the HIV problem as gangs feed the social acceptability of “tik” and encourage sexual violence. With almost half the population of Cape Town in their mid-twenties, the threat of a new HIV epidemic complicated by CM use has become a concern in the young adults of the city. Research into the relationships between gang membership and drugs/violence has been extensively studied in the Cape Flats. Yet, few have examined the role of gangs in the perpetuation of HIV. Therefore, the purpose of this investigation was exploratory in nature. Key informant interviews from Cape Town youth were used as case illustrations to generate potential hypotheses on the interrelationships between “gangsterism,” “tik” use, and HIV. Such awareness is important if effective efforts to reduce HIV incidence in Cape Town (and Sub-Saharan Africa) are to transpire. If the problem of CM is not addressed quickly, the Cape Flats may find itself with a higher rate of an already uncontrollable HIV epidemic. ^

Identity construction through phonetic crossing among young Capetonian gang members

Uncountable gangs operate in post-Apartheid South Africa, particularly in greater Cape Town, competing over turf and controlling the drug trade. Consequently, gang violence is rife in Western Cape and especially widespread in urban areas. In this paper young Capetonians’ narratives of gang violence are analyzed. In the narratives of attacks on Black or White South Africans by Coloured gang members, the Coloured narrators make use of their victims’ varieties of English, more precisely, of phonetic features. Hence, the aggressors do language crossing towards their targets when narrating their feats. Rampton (1995a:485) considers language crossing a ‘code alternation by people who are not accepted members of the group associated with the second language that they are using (code switching into varieties that are not generally thought to belong to them)’. This switching involves a transgression of social or ethnic boundaries that allows the young gangsters to construct, negotiate, uphold and manage their social identities, as language still functions as an utterly important identity marker in post-Apartheid South Africa.

The pragmatics of computer-mediated communication between South African and Mexican drug traffickers

South Africa and Mexico are ripe with drug trafficking. The gangs and syndicates running the drug businesses in these two countries collaborate occasionally. Communication between these international drug business partners takes place on social media. Their main language of communication is English, mixed with some limited use of Spanish and Afrikaans. The key purpose of the interactions between the South African and Mexican parties is the organisation of their business activities. This study aims at examining how the drug traffickers position each other and themselves regarding their common business interest and how their relationship evolves throughout their interactions. Moreover, it is of interest to look at how these people make use of different social media and their affordances. For this a qualitative analysis of the interaction between two drug traffickers (one South African and one Mexican) on Facebook, Threema and PlayStation 4 was performed. Computer-mediated communication between these two main informants was studied at various stages of their relationship. Results show that at first the interaction between the South African and Mexican drug traffickers consists of interpersonal negotiations of power. The high risk of the drug business and gang/syndicate membership paired with intercultural frictions causes the two interlocutors to be extremely cautious and at the same time to mark their position. As their relationship develops and they gain trust in each other a shift to interpersonal negotiations of solidarity takes place. In these discursive practices diverse linguistic strategies are employed for creating relational effects and for positioning the other and the self. The discursive activities of the interactants are also identity practices. Thus, the two drug traffickers construct identities through these social practices, positioning and their interpersonal relationship.

Asian organized crime : the new international criminal : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, June 18 and August 4, 1992.

Shipping list no. 93-0162-P.

Plenary papers of the 1999 Conference on Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation--enhancing policy and practice through research.

"Sept. 2000" (v. 3).

Photographer with alleged gang members, Detroit, Mich.

On verso: Detroit Street Gangs. Photo: Jan Prezzalo

Towards the social inclusion of youth: Tools for analysis and policy design

The integration of youth into development processes is crucial in order to advance towards more egalitarian societies. Over the past few years, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has regarded equality as the horizon for development, structural change as the way to achieve it, and policy as the instrument to reach that horizon. Equality is viewed as going beyond the distribution of means, such as monetary income, to include equal opportunities and capacities. This implies understanding equality as the full exercise of citizenship, with dignity and the reciprocal recognition of actors. Progress in this direction requires policies that promote the autonomy of subjects and pay attention to their vulnerabilities.

“Tell Me Who You Hang with and I’ll Tell You What You Are:” Gang Identity, Organization, and Desistance

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Guatemala: A Failing State?

 Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Although the state currently fails to provide adequate security to its citizens or an appropriate range of effective social programs, it does supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound economic management, and a promising new antipoverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO).  Guatemala is a weak state. The principal security threats represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the under-resourced and compromised criminal justice system. The UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has demonstrated that progress against organized crime is possible.  The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on short-term interests. Guatemala lacks a strong, policyoriented, mass-based political party that could develop a coherent national reform program and mobilize public support around it.  The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan state by expanding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.