Revue de science et de législation financières.

Vol. 38, no. 2 dated Apr. 1940-June 1946.

Mémoires de G.-J. Ouvrard, sur sa vie et ses diverses opérations financières.

Includes bibliographical references.

Munkapiac keresési súrlódásokkal (Job seeking on the labour market, with frictions)

A munkapiac különleges piac, jellegzetességeinek köszönhetően számos modell elemzi. Ezek közül a legismertebbek a keresési-párosítási modellek, amelyek több egymáshoz kapcsolódó kérdéskör vizsgálatára is alkalmasak. A modellcsalád által megmagyarázható munkapiaci jelenségek széles köre, a belőlük levonható következtetések, a modellek magyarázóképességéről folytatott vita egyaránt hozzájárult, hogy a modellek kidolgozói 2010-ben közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíjban részesültek. Modelljük kiterjeszti a munkanélküliség természetes rátájának elméletét, képes a jóléti intézkedések és intézményrendszer beépítésére. A szerző e modellek elméleti előzményei, valamint egy alapmodell ismertetése után felvázolja az újabb generációs modellek alapvonásait, a hatékonyságelemzések tanulságait, az állami intézkedések vizsgálatának lehetőségeit, valamint a Shimer-kritika alapjait. / === / The labor market is a specialized market with characteristics that have produced several different models for analysing it. One of the best known is the search and matching model, which is suitable for analysis of several related issues. The broad range of labour market phenomena that can be described by this family of models, the conclusions to be drawn from them, and the debate on their explanatory capability have all contributed to the fact that three economists who made important contributions to developing them - P. A. Diamond, D. T. Mortensen and C. A. Pissar-ides - were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2010. The DMP model named after them expands the theory of the natural rate of unemployment and is capable of integrating the analysis of welfare measures and institutions. This paper follows up on the contribution of the Nobel Prize winners by examining the theoretical preliminaries of these models, a basic search and matching model, and by looking at the typical characteristics of a new generation of models, the lessons of efficiency analyses, the possibility of investigating the role of policy measures, and the foundations of Shimer's critique.

La bancarisation des tontine : une alternative de développement économique et social et une réponse à la crise de nos institutions financières

Face aux difficultés auxquelles sont confrontées pratiquement toutes les économies mondiales, ce mémoire propose dans le cas spécifique du Cameroun une modeste solution visant à résorber l'état de crise qui traverse l'ensemble de notre système financier. La crise des institutions financières camerounaises est caractérisée à la fois par la défaillance et la dégradation du secteur bancaire moderne, ainsi que par l'insuffisance de mécanismes adaptés à la collecte de l'épargne intérieure. Compte tenu de cette situation on ne peut plus alarmante, il apparaît inévitable et propice en raison même du caractère concret des problèmes de dysfonctionnement, qu'il faille réorganiser en profondeur les mécanismes de gestion et de collecte de l'épargne traditionnelle en les adaptant plus sainement non seulement aux exigences réelles de développement, mais surtout aux mentalités et aux habitudes de la population camerounaise. En d'autres termes, il est temps que les autorités camerounaises, de concert avec les autres agents économiques songent à une nouvelle pratique bancaire qui corresponde véritablement à la majorité des préoccupations socio-économiques de la population. Dans cette perspective, la ligne directrice de notre sujet de recherche repose sur un processus de recyclage local de l'épargne privée, dans le but de créer un cadre monétaire et financier optimal pour l'épargne et le crédit. Comme c'est le cas dans les économies en voie de développement, nous pensons que les comportements d'épargne au Cameroun demandent aussi à être développés et surtout orientés, pour que nos décisions individuelles d'investissement correspondent aux objectifs globaux de la production nationale. C'est dans ce sens que les institutions monétaires et financières se doivent de jouer un rôle déterminant. Les pays membres de la zone BEAC ont cette particularité qu'ils coexistent dans leurs économies des secteurs financiers formels et informels, dualistes ou complémentaires. Au Cameroun en l'occurrence, le système financier formel comprend outre la Banque Centrale, des banques commerciales, des banques de développement, ainsi que des institutions financières non monétaires. En marge à ces systèmes formels, existent des systèmes financiers informels caractérisés principalement par les tontines. Les deux types d'organisations concourent à leur manière et suivant leurs pratiques de fonctionnement au financement de l'économie, tant au niveau de la mobilisation des ressources (collecte de l'épargne) que de la distribution des liquidités (octroi de crédit). Le défi de ce mémoire consiste à présenter une approche plausible de développement économique et social basée sur une liaison effective entre les deux systèmes financiers.

Essays on Information Frictions, Prices and Unemployment

I investigate the effects of information frictions in price setting decisions. I show that firms' output prices and wages are less sensitive to aggregate economic conditions when firms and workers cannot perfectly understand (or know) the aggregate state of the economy. Prices and wages respond with a lag to aggregate innovations because agents learn slowly about those changes, and this delayed adjustment in prices makes output and unemployment more sensitive to aggregate shocks. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I show that workers' noisy information about the state of the economy help us to explain why real wages are sluggish. In the context of a search and matching model, wages do not immediately respond to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. This increases firms' incentives to post more vacancies, and it makes unemployment volatile and sensitive to aggregate shocks. This mechanism is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile unemployment: the flexibility of wages for new hires and the cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment. Calibrated to U.S. data, the model explains 60% of the overall unemployment volatility. Consistent with empirical evidence, the response of unemployment to TFP shocks predicted by my model is large, hump-shaped, and peaks one year after the TFP shock, while the response of the aggregate wage is weak and delayed, peaking after two years. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I study the role of information frictions and inventories in firms' price setting decisions in the context of a monetary model. In this model, intermediate goods firms accumulate output inventories, observe aggregate variables with one period lag, and observe their nominal input prices and demand at all times. Firms face idiosyncratic shocks and cannot perfectly infer the state of nature. After a contractionary nominal shock, nominal input prices go down, and firms accumulate inventories because they perceive some positive probability that the nominal price decline is due to a good productivity shock. This prevents firms' prices from decreasing and makes current profits, households' income, and aggregate demand go down. According to my model simulations, a 1% decrease in the money growth rate causes output to decline 0.17% in the first quarter and 0.38% in the second followed by a slow recovery to the steady state. Contractionary nominal shocks also have significant effects on total investment, which remains 1% below the steady state for the first 6 quarters.

Essays on Market Frictions and Securitization

This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk assets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and low risk. Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed. First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic setting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guarantees reduces the dependence of banks' ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.