Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Fiscal trends and policy issues and implications for the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Fiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2015: Policy space and dilemmas. Executive Summary

The present document provides an up-to-date overview of public debt and fiscal space in the region. The main conclusions show that public debt levels are low in Latin America and high in the Caribbean. Overall, the region has enough fiscal space to apply countercyclical policies and boost production development and the fiscal management of non-renewable natural resources needs to be modernized. It explains that fiscal policy has a very limited impact on the distribution of disposable income and in a volatile macroeconomic environment, reforms should aim to strengthen personal income tax.

Interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in a dynamic nonlinear model

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

How EU Fiscal Norms Will Become a Safety Net for the Failure of National Golden Rules. European Policy Brief No. 6, January 2012

If introduced successfully, national Golden Rules will completely overturn fiscal governance in the eurozone. Golden Rules would almost always be more stringent than EU-level fiscal norms. EU fiscal norms will hence evolve into a safety net in case a Golden Rule fails. The possibility of such a failure is, indeed, not to be dismissed. Because of the severity of the Golden Rules, eurozone leaders should reflect on their design. There is a real risk that they will undercut public investment, which would be at the cost of the EU’s other long-term challenges.

A case for adjusting fiscal consolidation in the eurozone. European Policy Brief No. 14, January 2013

Fiscal consolidation is essential to ensure the sustainability of eurozone countries’ public debt. However, as a principle, consolidation should not be pursued at a pace unnecessarily undermining growth in the short term. Repeated downward revisions of growth call for the use of the flexibility foreseen in the EU fiscal framework. The Commission should adapt the deadlines for fiscal correction to prevent excessive, pro-cyclical adjustment in 2013. In turn, adequate surveillance and coordination must ensure structural adjustments constitute the core of fiscal consolidation plans.

Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step towards a fiscal union. European Policy Brief No. 18, December 2013

‘Contractual arrangements’ were proposed as an initial step towards a fiscal union that would consolidate the EMU. At this stage, the debate should be centred on the cornerstone of these contracts: the solidarity mechanism. The form of the financial support should not be limited to loans, and include the possibility for grants. Only the countries with the greatest adjustment needs should benefit from the financial support of other countries. This solidarity could be justified in principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ they experienced. In this way, contractual arrangement would facilitate the completion of the necessary adjustment in the current crisis – thanks both to more structural reforms and more mutual support within the eurozone.

Which fiscal union for the euro area? Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/05, February 2016

At the current level of political and societal integration, a large federal budget is unrealistic in the euro area. The authors make three recommendations that would lead national fiscal policies to be more stabilising with respect to the economic cycle, while achieving long-term sustainability. They also recommend a move towards a European unemployment insurance scheme targeted at ‘large’ shocks, and a minimum set of labour-market harmonisation criteria.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.

Fiscal imbalances, inflation and sovereign default dynamics

Resumen: La cuestión central que este artículo busca responder es como la política monetaria puede afectar el comportamiento de equilibrio de primas por riesgo soberano y cesación de pagos. El artículo se basa en el modelo de “una-tasa-interés”. La deuda pública se hace riesgosa a causa de una política fiscal activa, como en Uribe (2006), reflejando la habilidad limitada de la autoridad fiscal para controlar el superávit primario. El problema de insolvencia es debido a una oleada de mala suerte (shocks negativos que afectan el superávit primario). Pero en contraste a los resultados de Uribe, a medida que aumenta el costo de la deuda soberana (que resulta de un excedente primario débil), la cesación de pagos se anticipa y es reflejada por una creciente prima de riesgo en el país y una probabilidad de cesación de pagos. La cesación de pagos se define como un incumplimiento de un acuerdo contractual y por ende la decisión es tomada por la autoridad fiscal. Mientras tanto, objetivos conflictivos entre la autoridad monetaria y fiscal juegan un rol importante en llevar a la autoridad fiscal a la cesación de pagos sobre sus pasivos. La característica de la política del gobierno necesaria para restaurar el equilibrio después de la cesación de pagos también es analizada.

Balance de la política fiscal desarrollada en España en época de crisis. ¿Por qué elegir el camino contractivo?

The use of a contractive fiscal policy in times of crisis and austerity can lead to so many different opinion streams which can be, at the same time, very opposite with each other. The high budget deficit in some economies has forced the eurozone to implement austerity policies, meaning that the debate is now more alive than ever. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of the implementation of a contractive policy during a crisis considering the case of Spain. The positive effects in financial markets were noticed due to the decrease of the risk premium and the payment of interests, and also thanks to the increase of trust towards Spain. This way, the reduction of the Spanish deficit was remarkable but in any case there is still a long path until reaching the limit of 3% of the GDP. Also, in the short run it is possible to see that the consolidation had contractive effects in the economic activity but, in the long run, the debate is among the defenders of the fact that austerity is followed by a growing period and the ones opposing to it due to the drowning effect produced by it.

Incidencia redistributiva de la política fiscal en la República Dominicana, 2000-2014

[ES]El trabajo es un análisis de la incidencia de la política fiscal llevada a cabo en la República Dominicana a lo largo del periodo 2000-2014, orientado a evaluar la progresividad o regresividad del sistema tributario y el gasto público así como sus efectos en la distribución del ingreso de la población dominicana. Con objeto de evaluar la acción fiscal se compara la distribución del ingreso antes y después del pago de impuestos y de las actuaciones de gasto, utilizando los indicadores de medidas de desigualdad y concentración tales como el índice de Gini, Kakwani, Concentración y Reybolds-Smolensky. El estudio considera algunas propuestas de política fiscal para lograr una mejora en la distribución del ingreso disponible a partir de las actuaciones de gasto público y un sistema tributario más progresivo.

Fiscal Integration in the European Union : assessment of different proposals

This paper explores the fiscal situation of the European Union as well as the different approaches proposed for achieving fiscal policy coordination among the member states. Furthermore, it works through the need of fiscal integration as a pressing matter in order for the European Union to achieve its aim of functioning as an efficient single market and economic unit. In order to do so, it analyzes the theoretical lines of the Modern Money Theory as a possible framework for further integration, and it evaluates the different proposals made for fiscal integration so that it can give an assessment regarding their compatibility with this theory.

Estímulos fiscais e a interação entre as políticas monetária e fiscal no Brasil

Este trabalho estima, utilizando dados trimestrais de 1999 a 2011, o impacto dinâmico de um estímulo fiscal no Brasil sobre as principais variáveis macroeconômicas Brasileiras. Na estimativa dos impactos permitiu-se que as expectativas dos agentes econômicas fossem afetadas pela existência e probabilidade de alternância de regimes (foram detectados dois regimes) na política monetária do país. Os parâmetros da regra da política monetária, nos dois regimes detectados, foram estimados através de um modelo - composto apenas pela equação da regra da política monetária - que permite uma mudança de regime Markoviana. Os parâmetros do único regime encontrado para a política fiscal foram estimados por um modelo Vetorial de Correção de Erros (Vector Error Correction Model - VEC), composto apenas pelas variáveis pertencentes à regra da política fiscal. Os parâmetros estimados, para os diversos regimes das políticas monetária e fiscal, foram utilizados como auxiliares na calibragem de um modelo de equilíbrio geral estocástico dinâmico (MEGED), com mudanças de regime, com rigidez nominal de preços e concorrência monopolística (como em Davig e Leeper (2011)). Após a calibragem do MEGED os impactos dinâmicos de um estímulo fiscal foram obtidos através de uma rotina numérica (desenvolvida por Davig e Leeper (2006)) que permite obter o equilíbrio dinâmico do modelo resolvendo um sistema de equações de diferenças de primeira ordem expectacionais dinâmicas não lineares. Obtivemos que a política fiscal foi passiva durante todo o período analisado e que a política monetária foi sempre ativa, porém sendo em determinados momentos menos ativa. Em geral, em ambas as combinações de regimes, um choque não antecipado dos gastos do governo leva ao aumento do hiato do produto, aumento dos juros reais, redução do consumo privado e (em contradição com o resultado convencional) redução da taxa de inflação.