Supply management capabilities, routine bundles and their impact on firm performance

Despite the generally positive contribution of supply management capabilities to firm performance their respective routines require more depth of assessment. Using the resource-based view we examine four routines bundles comprising ostensive and performative aspects of supply management capability – supply management integration, coordinated sourcing, collaboration management and performance assessment. Using structural equation modelling we measure supply management capability empirically as a second-order latent variable and estimate its effect on a series of financial and operational performance measures. The routines-based approach allows us to demonstrate a different, more fine-grained approach for assessing consistent bundles of homogeneous patterns of activity across firms. The results suggest supply management capability is formed of internally consistent routine bundles, which are significantly related to financial performance, mediated by operational performance. Our results confirm an indirect effect of firm performance for ‘core’ routines forming the architecture of a supply management capability. Supply management capability primarily improves the operational performance of the business, which is subsequently translated into improved financial performance. The study is significant for practice as it offers a different view about the face-valid rationale of supply management directly influencing firm financial performance. We confound this assumption, prompting caution when placing too much importance on directly assessing supply management capability using financial performance of the business.

Monitoring and incentives of executives in risky firms : a test of the association with firm performance

This study investigates the relationship between a firm's risk and the effectiveness of the firm's corporate governance practices. Previous research investigating the relationship between corporate controls and firm performance has been mixed and often weak. Therefore, this study sets out to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That is, the study sets out to determine whether risk firms with higher monitoring and levels of incentives are associated with higher firm performance.
The results of this study of 282 firms demonstrate how the relationship between firm risk and performance is associated with the monitoring and incentive contracts used by these firms. In particular, the results of this study showed that the negative association between risk and firm performance is weakened when firms have stronger monitoring and incentive mechanisms. The particular contribution of this study is to show that the role of corporate governance variables infirm performance should be evaluated in the context of the firm's risk.

An analysis of the association between firms' investment opportunities, board composition and firm performance

The purpose of this paper is to identify the variables that influence the board structure adopted by firms and the subsequent relationship to the firm's performance. The results of this study of 229 Australian firms show that firms' investment opportunities are strongly associated with a higher proportion of executive directors ("EDs") on the board. The results also show that the negative relationship between a firm's investment opportunity set ("IDS") and firm performance is weakened at higher levels of non-executive director board domination. These results have implications for policy setters and managers of firms with investment opportunities

Institutional ownership and firm performance: evidence from Finland

This paper investigates the relationship between different classes of institutional investors and firm performance. Using industry level data from Finland, which is characterized by various institutional investors who own multiple ownership stakes in different firms across a broad spectrum of industries, the paper exhibits two novelties. First, unlike previous studies which treated institutional investors as a monolithic group, we segment them in classes. Second, we recognize the joint determination of firm performance and institutional ownership. We account for this issue in the context of a system of equations, using three stage least squares methodology. The empirical results suggest a significant two-way feedback between firm performance and institutional equity ownership. However, this effect is not symmetric. We find that institutional investors with likely investment and business ties with firms have adverse (negative) effect on firm performance and the impact is very significant in comparison to the negative effect of firm performance on institutional ownership.

Leviathan resists : the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance

Using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in Turkey, this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance. It is found that favorable short-run performance, weak market potential, higher employment, lower socio-economic development, concentrated voter preferences, and weaker representation of right-wing parties in the firms’ locality delay the timing of privatization. The paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium-term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology, such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale.

On institutional ownership and firm performance : a disaggregated view

We study the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in Finland. A systems approach is employed to investigate the potential two-way causality between firm performance and ownership structure. Three-stage least squares estimation technique is used to solve for the systems. The evidence suggests an endogeneity problem between firm performance and institutional ownership. However, the magnitude of the problem differs with respect to the concentration of ownership measure used. Our results show that a more equal distribution of the voting power among the largest institutional stakeholder may exert positive effects on firm performance. We also find a significant difference relating to firm performances and equity ownerships between the two classes of institutional investor. Consistent with the ownership structure in Finland, we find that a simple ownership concentration index does not influence firm performance.

Contracting-agency analysis of the association between firm risk, investment opportunity set, corporate governance and firm performance

Tests the efficiency of corporate controls (board monitoring and incentive contracts) for growth or risk firms. By exploring the implications of controls and studying their interactive effects on firm performance, this study demonstrates how and why different firms use corporate governance controls to align managers' and shareholders' interests.