Introduction to Discounted Cash Flow Analysis and Financial Functions in Excel

The financial and economic analysis of investment projects is typically carried out using the technique of discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. This module introduces concepts of discounting and DCF analysis for the derivation of project performance criteria such as net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and benefit to cost (B/C) ratios. These concepts and criteria are introduced with respect to a simple example, for which calculations using MicroSoft Excel are demonstrated.

Microscopic origin of non-Gaussian distributions of financial returns

In this paper we study the possible microscopic origin of heavy-tailed probability density distributions for the price variation of financial instruments. We extend the standard log-normal process to include another random component in the so-called stochastic volatility models. We study these models under an assumption, akin to the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, in which the volatility has already relaxed to its equilibrium distribution and acts as a background to the evolution of the price process. In this approximation, we show that all models of stochastic volatility should exhibit a scaling relation in the time lag of zero-drift modified log-returns. We verify that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average index indeed follows this scaling. We then focus on two popular stochastic volatility models, the Heston and Hull-White models. In particular, we show that in the Hull-White model the resulting probability distribution of log-returns in this approximation corresponds to the Tsallis (t-Student) distribution. The Tsallis parameters are given in terms of the microscopic stochastic volatility model. Finally, we show that the log-returns for 30 years Dow Jones index data is well fitted by a Tsallis distribution, obtaining the relevant parameters. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The structure of middle management remuneration packages: An application to Australian mine managers

This paper investigates the composition of remuneration packages for middle managers and relates the structure of remuneration contracts to firm-specific attributes. A statutorily defined position in a single industry is studied as an example of middle management. This allows us to control for differences in task complexity across managers and industry-induced factors that could determine differences in remuneration contracts. Higher-risk firms are expected to pay their mine managers a greater proportion of variable salaries and market and/or accounting-based compensation than low-risk firms. Results indicate that high-risk firms pay a higher proportion of variable salaries and more compensation based on market and/or accounting performance.