A cross-country study on trade credit supply and financial crisis

O objetivo deste trabalho de pesquisa é investigar a oferta de crédito comercial durante períodos de crise financeira em seis países diferentes: Brasil, França, Alemanha, Itália, Espanha e Reino Unido, foram utilizadas informações de empresas de capital aberto entre 2000 e 2011. A literatura internacional documenta que durante o pico de crises financeiras a oferta de crédito comercial aumenta pois as companhias usam o crédito comercial como substituto e/ou complemento ao crédito bancário, apesar de após o momento de pico esta oferta diminui significantemente porque as empresas enfrentam problemas de liquidez causado por escassez de crédito. Mesmo que somente existam evidências pontuais de que a oferta de crédito comercial aumentou durante a crise financeira global de 2008, o efeito pós-crise é perceptível durante a crise Europeia de 2011, pois as empresas europeias diminuíram a oferta de crédito comercial, também evidenciando que estas companhias estavam confrontando problemas de administração de liquidez. Em relação ao uso de crédito comercial como ferramenta de transmissão de capital, nenhuma evidência foi encontrada para provar sua existência em tempo de crise financeira.

Performance contrasts during the financial crisis between publicly traded family and non-family firms in Europe

Neste estudo, analiso o desempenho de empresas familiares e não-familiares na Europa, entre 2001 e 2013, com uma especial atenção ao período da crise financeira de 2008 e 2009. Doze anos de dados foram recolhidos e analisadosusando dois modelos: o modelo de ajustamento do mercado e uma técnica de estimativa de painéis. Ao contrário das expectativas, os resultados mostram que as empresas familiares não têm resultados significativamente superiores às empresas não familiares durante o período em análise, inclusive antes, durante, e depois da crise. No entanto, considerando o valor do beta, existem diferenças significativas. É possível concluir que as empresas familiares são, em geral, menos voláteis e que durante a crise apresentaram uma volatilidade extremamente baixa comparativamente com o mercado.JEL

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.

Korea and Taiwan in the financial crisis

Includes bibliography

From the capital surge to the financial crisis and beyond: the Mexican economy in the 1990s

Includes bibliography

Financial crisis and national policy issues: an overview

Includes bibliography