Transfer across form and modality in implicit and explicit memory

Three experiments examined transfer across form (words/pictures) and modality (visual/ auditory) in written word, auditory word, and pictorial implicit memory tests, as well as on a free recall task. Experiment 1 showed no significant transfer across form on any of the three implicit memory tests,and an asymmetric pattern of transfer across modality. In contrast, the free recall results revealed a very different picture. Experiment 2 further investigated the asymmetric modality effects obtained for the implicit memory measures by employing articulatory suppression and picture naming to control the generation of phonological codes. Finally, Experiment 3 examined the effects of overt word naming and covert picture labelling on transfer between study and test form. The results of the experiments are discussed in relation to Tulving and Schacter's (1990) Perceptual Representation Systems framework and Roediger's (1990) Transfer Appropriate Processing theory.

Negative correlations between control performance and verbalizable knowledge: indicators for implicit learning in process control tasks?

Negative correlations between task performance in dynamic control tasks and verbalizable knowledge, as assessed by a post-task questionnaire, have been interpreted as dissociations that indicate two antagonistic modes of learning, one being “explicit”, the other “implicit”. This paper views the control tasks as finite-state automata and offers an alternative interpretation of these negative correlations. It is argued that “good controllers” observe fewer different state transitions and, consequently, can answer fewer post-task questions about system transitions than can “bad controllers”. Two experiments demonstrate the validity of the argument by showing the predicted negative relationship between control performance and the number of explored state transitions, and the predicted positive relationship between the number of explored state transitions and questionnaire scores. However, the experiments also elucidate important boundary conditions for the critical effects. We discuss the implications of these findings, and of other problems arising from the process control paradigm, for conclusions about implicit versus explicit learning processes.

New strings for old : the role of similarity processing in an incidental learning task

This paper reports three experiments that examine the role of similarity processing in McGeorge and Burton's (1990) incidental learning task. In the experiments subjects performed a distractor task involving four-digit number strings, all of which conformed to a simple hidden rule. They were then given a forced-choice memory test in which they were presented with pairs of strings and were led to believe that one string of each pair had appeared in the prior learning phase. Although this was not the case, one string of each pair did conform to the hidden rule. Experiment 1 showed that, as in the McGeorge and Burton study, subjects were significantly more likely to select test strings that conformed to the hidden rule. However, additional analyses suggested that rather than having implicitly abstracted the rule, subjects may have been selecting strings that were in some way similar to those seen during the learning phase. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to try to separate out effects due to similarity from those due to implicit rule abstraction. It was found that the results were more consistent with a similarity-based model than implicit rule abstraction per se.

Implicit and explicit knowledge bases in artificial grammar learning

Two experiments examined the claim for distinct implicit and explicit learning modes in the artificial grammar-learning task (Reber, 1967, 1989). Subjects initially attempted to memorize strings of letters generated by a finite-state grammar and then classified new grammatical and nongrammatical strings. Experiment 1 showed that subjects' assessment of isolated parts of strings was sufficient to account for their classification performance but that the rules elicited in free report were not sufficient. Experiment 2 showed that performing a concurrent random number generation task under different priorities interfered with free report and classification performance equally. Furthermore, giving different groups of subjects incidental or intentional learning instructions did not affect classification or free report.

Metacognitive experience and transfer of logical reasoning

The experiments examine the influence of metacognitive experience on the transfer of logical processes in a problem solving setting. Subjects were presented with two versions of Wason's (1966) selection task. Although they were able to perform successfully on the concrete tasks (following a minimal explanation of the correct solution on an initial trial), the majority were not able to transfer a successful method to the abstract tasks. Verbalization during, or following, the concrete tasks produced substantial transfer effects however. It is suggested that verbalization may lead to an increased awareness of past behaviour, particularly of those aspects necessary for successful solution.

Fast and frugal framing effects?

Three experiments examine whether simple pair-wise comparison judgments, involving the “recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. Experiments 1 & 2 show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make “larger” judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make “smaller” judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrates that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that, when making pair-wise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small.

Modeling distributions of immediate memory effects: No strategies needed?

Many models of immediate memory predict the presence or absence of various effects, but none have been tested to see whether they predict an appropriate distribution of effect sizes. The authors show that the feature model (J. S. Nairne, 1990) produces appropriate distributions of effect sizes for both the phonological confusion effect and the word-length effect. The model produces the appropriate number of reversals, when participants are more accurate with similar items or long items, and also correctly predicts that participants performing less well overall demonstrate smaller and less reliable phonological similarity and word-length effects and are more likely to show reversals. These patterns appear within the model without the need to assume a change in encoding or rehearsal strategy or the deployment of a different storage buffer. The implications of these results and the wider applicability of the distributionmodeling approach are discussed.

Judgments of path, not heading, guide locomotion

To steer a course through the world, people are almost entirely dependent on visual information, of which a key component is optic flow. In many models of locomotion, heading is described as the fundamental control variable; however, it has also been shown that fixating points along or near one's future path could be the basis of an efficient control solution. Here, the authors aim to establish how well observers can pinpoint instantaneous heading and path, by measuring their accuracy when looking at these features while traveling along straight and curved paths. The results showed that observers could identify both heading and path accurately (similar to 3 degrees) when traveling along straight paths, but on curved paths they were more accurate at identifying a point on their future path (similar to 5 degrees) than indicating their instantaneous heading (similar to 13 degrees). Furthermore, whereas participants could track changes in the tightness of their path, they were unable to accurately track the rate of change of heading. In light of these results, the authors suggest it is unlikely that heading is primarily used by the visual system to support active steering.

The role of visual and nonvisual information in the control of locomotion

During locomotion, retinal flow, gaze angle, and vestibular information can contribute to one's perception of self-motion. Their respective roles were investigated during active steering: Retinal flow and gaze angle were biased by altering the visual information during computer-simulated locomotion, and vestibular information was controlled through use of a motorized chair that rotated the participant around his or her vertical axis. Chair rotation was made appropriate for the steering response of the participant or made inappropriate by rotating a proportion of the veridical amount. Large steering errors resulted from selective manipulation of retinal flow and gaze angle, and the pattern of errors provided strong evidence for an additive model of combination. Vestibular information had little or no effect on steering performance, suggesting that vestibular signals are not integrated with visual information for the control of steering at these speeds.

Controlling steering and judging heading: retinal flow, visual direction, and extraretinal information

The contribution of retinal flow (RF), extraretinal (ER), and egocentric visual direction (VD) information in locomotor control was explored. First, the recovery of heading from RF was examined when ER information was manipulated; results confirmed that ER signals affect heading judgments. Then the task was translated to steering curved paths, and the availability and veracity of VD were manipulated with either degraded or systematically biased RE Large steering errors resulted from selective manipulation of RF and VD, providing strong evidence for the combination of RF, ER, and VD. The relative weighting applied to RF and VD was estimated. A point-attractor model is proposed that combines redundant sources of information for robust locomotor control with flexible trajectory planning through active gaze.

The distinct contributions of age of acquisition and word frequency in auditory word perception

We report two studies of the distinct effects that a word's age of acquisition (AoA) and frequency have on the mental lexicon. In the first study, a purely statistical analysis, we show that AoA and frequency are related in different ways to the phonological form and imageability of different words. In the second study, three groups of participants (34 seven-year-olds, 30 ten-year-olds, and 17 adults) took part in an auditory lexical decision task, with stimuli varying in AoA, frequency, length, neighbourhood density, and imageability. The principal result is that the influence of these different variables changes as a function of AoA: Neighbourhood density effects are apparent for early and late AoA words, but not for intermediate AoA, whereas imageability effects are apparent for intermediate AoA words but not for early or late AoA. These results are discussed from the perspective that AoA affects a word's representation, but frequency affects processing biases.

Reversing the emotional Stroop effect reveals that it is not what it seems: the role of fast and slow components

The relative contributions of slow and fast (online) components in a modified emotional Stroop task were evaluated. The slow component, neglected in previous research, was shown to lead to the prediction of a reversed emotional intrusion effect using pseudorandomly mixed negative and neutral stimuli. This prediction was supported in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiments 3 and 4, a new paradigm was developed that allowed a more direct observation of the nature of disruptive effects from negative stimuli. The results provided a clear demonstration of the presence of the slow component. The fast component, which has generally been assumed to be the source of the interference, was shown, in fact, to have little or no role in the disruption.