Paleopharmacology and pollen: theory, method, and application

Parasitism was a universal human condition. Because of this, people developed herbal medicines to treat parasites as part of their pharmacopoeias. We propose that it is possible to recover evidence of medicinal plants from archaeological sites and link their use to specific health conditions. This is a multidisciplinary approach that must involve at least paleoethnobotanists, archaeoparasitologists, paleopathologists, and pharmacologists.

Capital, Wages, and Growth: Theory and Evidence

Returns to scale to capital and the strength of capital externalities play a key role for the empirical predictions and policy implications of different growth theories. We show that both can be identified with individual wage data and implement our approach at the city-level using US Census data on individuals in 173 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Estimation takes into account fixed effects, endogeneity of capital accumulation, and measurement error. We find no evidence for human or physical capital externalities and decreasing aggregate returns to capital. Returns to scale to physical and human capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total employment externalities.

Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory

We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for thepostwar United States economy, before and after Volcker's appointmentas Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differencesin the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest ratepolicy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much moresensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volckerperiod. We then compare some of the implications of the estimated rulesfor the equilibrium properties of inflation and output, using a simplemacroeconomic model, and show that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing.

Capital, wages and growth: Theory and evidence

Returns to scale to capital and the strength of capital externalities play a key role for the empirical predictions and policy implications of different growth theories. We show that both can be identified with individual wage data and implement our approach at the city-level using US Census data on individuals in 173 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Estimation takes into account fixed effects, endogeneity of capital accumulation, and measurement error. We find no evidence for human or physical capital externalities and decreasing aggregate returns to capital. Returns to scale to physical and human capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total employment externalities.

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

The nonlinear relaxation time and quasideterministic-theory approaches to characterize the decay of unestable states

We present the relationship between nonlinear-relaxation-time (NLRT) and quasideterministic approaches to characterize the decay of an unstable state. The universal character of the NLRT is established. The theoretical results are applied to study the dynamical relaxation of the Landau model in one and n variables and also a laser model.

P value and the theory of hypothesis testing: an explanation for new researchers.

In the 1920s, Ronald Fisher developed the theory behind the p value and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson developed the theory of hypothesis testing. These distinct theories have provided researchers important quantitative tools to confirm or refute their hypotheses. The p value is the probability to obtain an effect equal to or more extreme than the one observed presuming the null hypothesis of no effect is true; it gives researchers a measure of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. As commonly used, investigators will select a threshold p value below which they will reject the null hypothesis. The theory of hypothesis testing allows researchers to reject a null hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis of some effect. As commonly used, investigators choose Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) and Type II error (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false) levels and determine some critical region. If the test statistic falls into that critical region, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Despite similarities between the two, the p value and the theory of hypothesis testing are different theories that often are misunderstood and confused, leading researchers to improper conclusions. Perhaps the most common misconception is to consider the p value as the probability that the null hypothesis is true rather than the probability of obtaining the difference observed, or one that is more extreme, considering the null is true. Another concern is the risk that an important proportion of statistically significant results are falsely significant. Researchers should have a minimum understanding of these two theories so that they are better able to plan, conduct, interpret, and report scientific experiments.

Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.