El "Tijeretazo" en la sanidad catalana: el euro por receta y la exclusión de los inmigrantes irregulares

La crisis económica que afecta actualmente a nuestro país ha hecho que la reducción de gasto y la búsqueda de ingresos sea una de las políticas más comunes en todas las administraciones públicas. Estas medidas se han tomado en todos los sectores de la administración pública, incluso en la sanidad. Debido a que la salud pública es el apartado que consume más recursos de los presupuestos del gobierno, hemos querido estudiar los efectos que han tenido los recortes sanitarios en el presupuesto del gobierno de Cataluña. Con este fin hemos tratado dos de las medidas que se han tomado en este sector para reducir el gasto: el Euro por receta y la exclusión de inmigrantes irregulares en la sanidad pública catalana.

EMU sovereign debt market crisis: Fundamentals-based or pure contagion?

We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Grangercausality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.

EMU sovereign debt market crisis: Fundamentals-based or pure contagion?

We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Grangercausality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.

Sovereigns and banks in the euro area : a tale of two crises

This study attempts to identify and trace inter-linkages between sovereign and banking risk in the euro area. To this end, we use an indicator of banking risk in each country based on the Contingent Claim Analysis literature, and 10-year government yield spreads over Germany as a measure of sovereign risk. We apply a dynamic approach to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in 10 euro area countries, allowing us to check for contagion in the form of a significant and abrupt increase in short-run causal linkages. The empirical results indicate that episodes of contagion vary considerably in both directions over time and within the different EMU countries. Significantly, we find that causal linkages tend to strengthen particularly at the time of major financial crises. The empirical evidence suggests the presence of contagion, mainly from banks to sovereigns.

An update on EMU sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis

We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries.

An update on EMU sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis

We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries.

The determination of EONIA rate: The impact of the financial crisis and the effects of the changes in the monetary policy implementation framework

EONIA is a market based overnight interest rate, whose role as the starting point of the yield curve makes it critical from the perspective of the implementation of European Central Bank´s common monetary policy in the euro area. The financial crisis that started in 2007 had a large impact on the determination mechanism of this interest rate, which is considered as the central bank´s operational target. This thesis examines the monetary policy implementation framework of the European Central Bank and changes made to it. Furthermore, we discuss the development of the recent turmoil in the money market. EONIA rate is modelled by means of a regression equation using variables related to liquidity conditions, refinancing need, auction results and calendar effects. Conditional volatility is captured by an EGARCH model, and autocorrelation is taken into account by employing an autoregressive structure. The results highlight how the tensions in the initial stage of the market turmoil were successfully countered by ECB´s liquidity policy. The subsequent response of EONIA to liquidity conditions under the full allotment liquidity provision procedure adopted after the demise of Lehman Brothers is also established. A clear distinction in the behavior of the interest rate between the sub-periods was evident. In the light of the results obtained, some of the challenges posed by the exit-strategy implementation will be addressed.

Competitividade e restrição externa na Zona do Euro

The recent debt crisis in Greece, Ireland and Portugal has exposed the fragility existing in the Eurozone for promoting development and economic convergence between the countries that have adopted the currency. Way beyond the fear of insolvency, what is observed is a growing disparity of the most-developed countries in comparison to the less-developed ones, with perverse consequences for the last ones. Once the nominal exchange rates are fixed, the divergent movements in relative prices and wages between the countries have led to totally distinct paths for the real exchange rates. Worsening the scenario, one can observe the incompleteness of the political union, the monetarist focus of the ECB and the lack of labor mobility between the countries, what distances from the argument stated by the theory and puts in jeopardize the future of the Monetary Union.

Dinámicas de las relaciones políticas franco-alemanas en el marco de la Unión Europea. Un análisis en el contexto de la crisis griega. Período 8 de diciembre del 2009- 21 de febrero del 2012

La crisis griega no condicionó de manera especial la manera de negociar de Francia y Alemania. Si se comparan las ruedas de negociación para votar los salvavidas económicos y las negociaciones que se dieron para la firma del Tratado de Maastricht, se puede concluir que, en general, negociaron de una manera similar.

La eurozona en crisis: diagnóstico, reformas, perspectivas (Coyuntura)

Desde el año 2008, los países de la zona euro conocen una crisis muy profunda que no tiene visos de concluir. Las recientes decepciones de varios países del sur de Europa (España, Grecia y Chipre) podrían sugerir que esta crisis es el resultado de decisiones políticas no adecuadas o de la crisis financiera mundial. La idea principal de este artículo es que los fundamentos de la crisis actual de la zona euro son mucho más complejos que aquellos expuestos de forma cotidiana por la prensa e incluso por analistas económicos. En el caso del euro, los problemas ocurridos son resultado principalmente de una arquitectura monetaria y financiera incoherente e incompleta. El euro nació como una moneda única con deficiencias estructurales e institucionales que no han sido corregidas desde su creación e implementación.

The creation of euro area financial safety nets. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/09, July 2012

The financial crisis has exposed the need to devise stronger and broader international and regional safety nets in order to deal with economic and financial shocks and allow for countries to adjust. The euro area has developed several such mechanisms over the last couple of years through a process of trial and error and gradual enhancement and expansion. Their overall architecture remains imperfect and leaves areas of vulnerabilities. This paper provides an overview of the recent financial stability mechanisms and their various shortcomings and tries to brush the outline of a more comprehensive safety net architecture that would coherently address the banking, sovereign and external imbalances crises against both transitory and more permanent shocks. It aims to provide a roadmap for further improvements of the current mechanism and the creation of new devices including a banking resolution mechanism and amore powerfulmechanismto provide financial assistance addressing both the sovereign and external dimensions of the shocks thereby reducing the need for the ECB to fill the current void.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

The policy mix and macroeconomic adjustment in the Euro area. CEPS Commentary, 15 October 2012

Against the background of the IMF’s latest global economic forecast, Jørgen Mortensen and Cinzia Alcidi raise questions in a new CEPS Commentary about the timing of the implementation and the effects of the three main categories of economic policy – fiscal, monetary and structural.

Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.