Cross-border transmission capacity development – Experiences from the Nordic electricity markets

The liberalisation of the wholesale electricity markets has been considered an efficient way to organise the markets. In Europe, the target is to liberalise and integrate the common European electricity markets. However, insufficient transmission capacity between the market areas hampers the integration, and therefore, new investments are required. Again, massive transmission capacity investments are not usually easy to carry through. This doctoral dissertation aims at elaborating on critical determinants required to deliver the necessary transmission capacity investments. The Nordic electricity market is used as an illustrative example. This study suggests that changes in the governance structure have affected the delivery of Nordic cross-border investments. In addition, the impacts of not fully delivered investments are studied in this doctoral dissertation. An insufficient transmission network can degrade the market uniformity and may also cause a need to split the market into smaller submarkets. This may have financial impacts on market actors when the targeted efficient sharing of resources is not met and even encourage gaming. The research methods applied in this doctoral dissertation are mainly empirical ranging from a Delphi study to case studies and numerical calculations.

‘Nudging’ energy users: regulatory measures to address the risk of aggregate peak demand in European electricity markets

For decades regulators in the energy sector have focused on facilitating the maximisation of energy supply in order to meet demand through liberalisation and removal of market barriers. The debate on climate change has emphasised a new type of risk in the balance between energy demand and supply: excessively high energy demand brings about significantly negative environmental and economic impacts. This is because if a vast number of users is consuming electricity at the same time, energy suppliers have to activate dirty old power plants with higher greenhouse gas emissions and higher system costs. The creation of a Europe-wide electricity market requires a systematic investigation into the risk of aggregate peak demand. This paper draws on the e-Living Time-Use Survey database to assess the risk of aggregate peak residential electricity demand for European energy markets. Findings highlight in which countries and for what activities the risk of aggregate peak demand is greater. The discussion highlights which approaches energy regulators have started considering to convince users about the risks of consuming too much energy during peak times. These include ‘nudging’ approaches such as the roll-out of smart meters, incentives for shifting the timing of energy consumption, differentiated time-of-use tariffs, regulatory financial incentives and consumption data sharing at the community level.

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Game Theoretic Bidding Strategies for Auctions in Green Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs ["bid cost minimization" (BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments ["payment cost minimization" (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in this paper.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Reforming the Market Design of EU Electricity Markets: Addressing the Challenges of a Low-Carbon Power Sector. CEPS Task Force Report, 27 July 2015

This CEPS Task Force Report focuses on whether there is a need to adapt the EU’s electricity market design and if so, the options for doing so. In a first step, it analyses the current market trends by distinguishing between their causes and their consequences. Then, the current blueprint of EU power market design – the target model – is briefly introduced, followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of the current approach and the challenges in finding suitable solutions. The final chapter offers an inventory of solutions differentiating between recommendations shared among Task Force members and non-consensual options.

Bidding and Optimization Strategies for Wind-PV Systems in Electricity Markets

The variability in non-dispatchable power generation raises important challenges to the integration of renewable energy sources into the electricity power grid. This paper provides the coordinated trading of wind and photovoltaic energy to mitigate risks due to the wind and solar power variability, electricity prices, and financial penalties arising out the generation shortfall and surplus. The problem of wind-photovoltaic coordinated trading is formulated as a linear programming problem. The goal is to obtain the optimal bidding strategy that maximizes the total profit. The wind-photovoltaic coordinated operation is modeled and compared with the uncoordinated operation. A comparison of the models and relevant conclusions are drawn from an illustrative case study of the Iberian day-ahead electricity market.

Bidding and Optimization Strategies for Wind-PV Systems in Electricity Markets Assisted by CPS

The variability in non-dispatchable power generation raises important challenges to the integration of renewable energy sources into the electricity power grid. This paper provides the coordinated trading of wind and photovoltaic energy assisted by a cyber-physical system for supporting management decisions to mitigate risks due to the wind and solar power variability, electricity prices, and financial penalties arising out the generation shortfall and surplus. The problem of wind-photovoltaic coordinated trading is formulated as a stochastic linear programming problem. The goal is to obtain the optimal bidding strategy that maximizes the total profit. The wind-photovoltaic coordinated operation is modelled and compared with the uncoordinated operation. A comparison of the models and relevant conclusions are drawn from an illustrative case study of the Iberian day-ahead electricity market.

Power Producers Trading Electricity in Both Pool and Forward Markets

The electricity industry throughout the world, which has long been dominated by vertically integrated utilities, has experienced major changes. Deregulation, unbundling, wholesale and retail wheeling, and real-time pricing were abstract concepts a few years ago. Today market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. As power markets continue to evolve, there is a growing need for advanced modeling approaches. This article addresses the challenge of maximizing the profit (or return) of power producers through the optimization of their share of customers. Power producers have fixed production marginal costs and decide the quantity of energy to sell in both day-ahead markets and a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving a three-rate tariff. Producers sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients with specific load profiles. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.

A trader portfolio optimization of bilateral contracts in electricity retail markets

Electricity markets are systems for effecting the purchase and sale of electricity using supply and demand to set energy prices. Two major market models are often distinguished: pools and bilateral contracts. Pool prices tend to change quickly and variations are usually highly unpredictable. In this way, market participants often enter into bilateral contracts to hedge against pool price volatility. This article addresses the challenge of optimizing the portfolio of clients managed by trader agents. Typically, traders buy energy in day-ahead markets and sell it to a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving three-rate tariffs. Traders sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.