For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems

We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. tariff data from 1993, and House campaign contribution data from two electoral cycles. We find evidence of a protectionist bias due to majoritarian system politics that is comparable in magnitude to the payoff from being an organized industry.

Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems: The Case of Finland. IHS Political Science Series No. 138, September 2014

Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.

Geographic Information Systems-Based Approaches to Study Congressional Redistricting in the United States

The ability for the citizens of a nation to determine their own representation has long been regarded as one of the most critical objectives of any electoral system. Without having the assurance of equality in representation, the fundamental nature and operation of the political system is severely undermined. Given the centuries of institutional reforms and population changes in the American system, Congressional Redistricting stands as an institution whereby this promise of effective representation can either be fulfilled or denied. The broad set of processes that encapsulate Congres- sional Redistricting have been discussed, experimented, and modified to achieve clear objectives and have long been understood to be important. Questions remain about how the dynamics which link all of these processes operate and what impact the real- ities of Congressional Redistricting hold for representation in the American system. This dissertation examines three aspects of how Congressional Redistricting in the Untied States operates in accordance with the principle of “One Person, One Vote.” By utilizing data and data analysis techniques of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), this dissertation seeks to address how Congressional Redistricting impacts the principle of one person, one vote from the standpoint of legislator accountability, redistricting institutions, and the promise of effective minority representation.

Optimal choice of electoral preference data

Electoral researchers are so much accustomed to analyzing the choice of the single most preferred party as the left-hand side variable of their models of electoral behavior that they often ignore revealed preference data. Drawing on random utility theory, their models predict electoral behavior at the extensive margin of choice. Since the seminal work of Luce and others on individual choice behavior, however, many social science disciplines (consumer research, labor market research, travel demand, etc.) have extended their inventory of observed preference data with, for instance, multiple paired comparisons, complete or incomplete rankings, and multiple ratings. Eliciting (voter) preferences using these procedures and applying appropriate choice models is known to considerably increase the efficiency of estimates of causal factors in models of (electoral) behavior. In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency gain when adding additional preference information to first preferences, up to full ranking data. We do so for multi-party systems of different sizes. We use simulation studies as well as empirical data from the 1972 German election study. Comparing the practical considerations for using ranking and single preference data results in suggestions for choice of measurement instruments in different multi-candidate and multi-party settings.

On the zeros of the Abelian integrals for a class of Liénard systems

A planar polynomial differential system has a finite number of limit cycles. However, finding the upper bound of the number of limit cycles is an open problem for the general nonlinear dynamical systems. In this paper, we investigated a class of Liénard systems of the form x'=y, y'=f(x)+y g(x) with deg f=5 and deg g=4. We proved that the related elliptic integrals of the Liénard systems have at most three zeros including multiple zeros, which implies that the number of limit cycles bifurcated from the periodic orbits of the unperturbed system is less than or equal to 3.