American popular lessons : chiefly selected from the writings of Mrs. Barbauld, Miss Edgeworth, and other approved writers.

Mode of access: Internet.

Mémoires de m. l'abbé Edgeworth de Firmont : dernier confesseur de Louis XVI /

Quérard,

Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth, esq.

Volume 1 dated 1821, v.2 dated 1820.

The novels of Maria Edgeworth.

v.1-2. Belinda.--v.3-4. Leonora. Ennui.--v.5-6. Vivian. The Absentee.--v.7-8. Patronage.--v.9-10. Harrington. Ormond.--v.11-12. Helen.

Richard Lovell Edgeworth, a selection from his memoirs,

Mode of access: Internet.

Polynomial Expansions for Solutions of Higher-Order Bessel Heat Equation in Quantum Calculus

Mathematics Subject Class.: 33C10,33D60,26D15,33D05,33D15,33D90

On the Transformations of Symplectic Expansions and the Respective Bäcklund Transformation for the KDV Equation

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 34B40; secondary: 35Q51, 35Q53

Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

A Two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth Game

In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which during the first stage the firms can select their rationing rule. We will show that under certain conditions the efficient rationing rule is an equilibrium action of the first stage.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok (Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies – a survey of the literature)

Az irodalomban az olyan oligopolmodellek, amelyekben mind az ár, mind a mennyiség döntési változó, Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok néven ismertek. E tanulmányban a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumokkal kapcsolatos érdekesebb eredményeket tekintjük át. Tárgyaljuk a Bertrand-Edgeworth-típusú oligopolmodellek specifikációját, a Nash-egyensúly létezését, a Nash-egyensúly meghatározását és a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok alkalmazásait. / === / Oligopoly models in which both price and quantity are decisive variables are known in the literature as Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies, the most interesting results with which are surveyed in this paper. The author assumes the existence of the Nash equilibrium, as the specification of Bertrand-Edgeworth-type oligopoly models, the determination of the Nash equilibrium, and the application of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies.

Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed-strategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm

We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with only private firms.

The European Parliament, membership expansions, and organizational change

The European Union (EU) is an extraordinary achievement. From a regional economic organization, it grew into a polity within fifty years. The original EU of six members expanded incrementally to 27 over forty years, and it now comprises a population of almost 500 million people. While the five expansions of the European Economic Community/European Community/European Union (EU) have received considerable scholarly attention, surprisingly little attention has been given to their impacts on "Europe's" only legislative body, currently known as the European Parliament (EP). More specifically, little is known about how waves of new members (from widely diverse parties and national backgrounds) affected—and were affected by—the EP's organizational structure and its internal processes. The purpose of this study therefore is to help fill this gap by describing and explaining how the various EEC/EC/EU expansions or "membership shocks" (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, and 2004) affected the EP's organizational structure and its internal Rules of Procedure (RoP). The central research question of this dissertation is the following: What were the major structural and procedural effects of the five membership expansions of what eventually became the European Union on the European Parliament? This dissertation answers this question by using concepts and measures drawn from organizational theory. While other studies have applied concepts and hypotheses from organizational theory to legislatures, such an approach has never been used to analyze the EP, which is conceptualized here as a "membership organization." This study, through an analysis of the EP, demonstrates that organization theory can help us fully understand the effects of membership expansions on any membership organization. That is, understanding how this particular organization responded to change can inform not only how others in this class (legislatures) do so, but how this process unfolds in a variety of times and places. The principal findings of this study are as follows: (1) EP staff growth revealed an interesting pattern: Staff did not increase concurrently with EP membership. That is, it turned out that the rate of membership growth exceeded the rate of staff increase, suggesting professionalization of EP staff and their relative empowerment vis-à-vis MEPs; (2) The number of rules and the precision within them increased; (3) the largest number of EP rule changes focused on increasing EP efficiency; and (4) The authority was centralized in the hands of EP leadership, that is, the EP President, the Conference of Presidents and also two major political groups.