Multistage Transmission Expansion Planning Considering Fixed Series Compensation Allocation

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

An unequivocal normalization-based paradigm to solve dynamic economic and emission active-reactive OPF (optimal power flow)

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Economic Cost of Air Pollution in Cubatao - SP Based on Health Expenses Related to Diseases of the Respiratory and Circulatory Systems

The aim of this research was to evaluate economic costs of respiratory and circulatory diseases in the municipality of Cubatao, in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Data on hospital admissions and on missed working days due to hospitalization (for age group 14 to 70 years old) from the database of Sistema Unico de Sa de (SUS - Brazilian National Health System) were used. Results: Based on these data, it was calculated that R$ 22.1 million were spent in the period 2000 to 2009 due to diseases of the respiratory and circulatory systems. Part of these expenses can be directly related to the emission of atmospheric pollutants in the city. In order to estimate the costs related to air pollution, data on Cubatao were compared to data from two other municipalities that are also located at the coast side (Guaruja and Peru be), but which have little industrial activity in comparison to Cubatao. It was verified that, in both, average per capita costs were lower when compared to Cubatao, but that this difference has been decreasing in recent years.

An economic evaluation of antihypertensive therapies based on clinical trials

OBJECTIVE: Hypertension is a major issue in public health, and the financial costs associated with hypertension continue to increase. Cost-effectiveness studies focusing on antihypertensive drug combinations, however, have been scarce. The cost-effectiveness ratios of the traditional treatment (hydrochlorothiazide and atenolol) and the current treatment (losartan and amlodipine) were evaluated in patients with grade 1 or 2 hypertension (HT1-2). For patients with grade 3 hypertension (HT3), a third drug was added to the treatment combinations: enalapril was added to the traditional treatment, and hydrochlorothiazide was added to the current treatment. METHODS: Hypertension treatment costs were estimated on the basis of the purchase prices of the antihypertensive medications, and effectiveness was measured as the reduction in systolic blood pressure and diastolic blood pressure (in mm Hg) at the end of a 12-month study period. RESULTS: When the purchase price of the brand-name medication was used to calculate the cost, the traditional treatment presented a lower cost-effectiveness ratio [US$/mm Hg] than the current treatment in the HT1-2 group. In the HT3 group, however, there was no difference in cost-effectiveness ratio between the traditional treatment and the current treatment. The cost-effectiveness ratio differences between the treatment regimens maintained the same pattern when the purchase price of the lower-cost medication was used. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that the traditional treatment is more cost-effective (US$/mm Hg) than the current treatment in the HT1-2 group. There was no difference in cost-effectiveness between the traditional treatment and the current treatment for the HT3 group.

Constraint based methods for allocation and scheduling of periodic applications

This work presents exact algorithms for the Resource Allocation and Cyclic Scheduling Problems (RA&CSPs). Cyclic Scheduling Problems arise in a number of application areas, such as in hoist scheduling, mass production, compiler design (implementing scheduling loops on parallel architectures), software pipelining, and in embedded system design. The RA&CS problem concerns time and resource assignment to a set of activities, to be indefinitely repeated, subject to precedence and resource capacity constraints. In this work we present two constraint programming frameworks facing two different types of cyclic problems. In first instance, we consider the disjunctive RA&CSP, where the allocation problem considers unary resources. Instances are described through the Synchronous Data-flow (SDF) Model of Computation. The key problem of finding a maximum-throughput allocation and scheduling of Synchronous Data-Flow graphs onto a multi-core architecture is NP-hard and has been traditionally solved by means of heuristic (incomplete) algorithms. We propose an exact (complete) algorithm for the computation of a maximum-throughput mapping of applications specified as SDFG onto multi-core architectures. Results show that the approach can handle realistic instances in terms of size and complexity. Next, we tackle the Cyclic Resource-Constrained Scheduling Problem (i.e. CRCSP). We propose a Constraint Programming approach based on modular arithmetic: in particular, we introduce a modular precedence constraint and a global cumulative constraint along with their filtering algorithms. Many traditional approaches to cyclic scheduling operate by fixing the period value and then solving a linear problem in a generate-and-test fashion. Conversely, our technique is based on a non-linear model and tackles the problem as a whole: the period value is inferred from the scheduling decisions. The proposed approaches have been tested on a number of non-trivial synthetic instances and on a set of realistic industrial instances achieving good results on practical size problem.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Cost effectiveness of home based population screening for Chlamydia trachomatis in the UK: economic evaluation of chlamydia screening studies (ClaSS) project

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the cost effectiveness of screening for Chlamydia trachomatis compared with a policy of no organised screening in the United Kingdom. DESIGN: Economic evaluation using a transmission dynamic mathematical model. SETTING: Central and southwest England. PARTICIPANTS: Hypothetical population of 50,000 men and women, in which all those aged 16-24 years were invited to be screened each year. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Cost effectiveness based on major outcomes averted, defined as pelvic inflammatory disease, ectopic pregnancy, infertility, or neonatal complications. RESULTS: The incremental cost per major outcome averted for a programme of screening women only (assuming eight years of screening) was 22,300 pounds (33,000 euros; $45,000) compared with no organised screening. For a programme screening both men and women, the incremental cost effectiveness ratio was approximately 28,900 pounds. Pelvic inflammatory disease leading to hospital admission was the most frequently averted major outcome. The model was highly sensitive to the incidence of major outcomes and to uptake of screening. When both were increased the cost effectiveness ratio fell to 6200 pound per major outcome averted for screening women only. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive register based screening for chlamydia is not cost effective if the uptake of screening and incidence of complications are based on contemporary empirical studies, which show lower rates than commonly assumed. These data are relevant to discussions about the cost effectiveness of the opportunistic model of chlamydia screening being introduced in England.

Potential Economic Returns from Selling Beef in a Specified Value-Based Market

Three groups of steers--one theoretical group and two experimental groups—were evaluated for marketing cattle live, as boxed beef, and grade and yield when the live price was $71 to $73/cwt, grade and yield price $125/cwt for Choice yield grade 3 carcasses with $20/cwt discount for Select carcasses, and in a commodity-trim or close-trim boxed beef market. The results show that the value of highyielding steers can be significantly increased if sold in a close-trim boxed beef market. The close-trim premiums ranged from $5.06 per head for Select close-trim yield grade 4 carcasses to $87.18 per head for close-trim Choice yield grade 1 carcasses. A group of experimental steers averaging 82% Choice and 60% yield grades 1 and 2 returned an additional $104 in the close-trim boxed market compared with selling live for $73/cwt. Another group of experimental steers averaging 21% Choice, 18% Standard, and 93% yield grades 1 and 2 had $29 per head greater return than if the steers had been sold live for $71/cwt. These comparisons emphasize the importance of knowing how cattle will potentially grade before selecting an alternative marketing strategy. This prior knowledge is most important when the spread in price between Choice and Select is high. Producers need to learn more about their cattle to predict how the cattle may grade for a specified value-based market.

Age, Growth and Population Structure of Jumbo Flying Squid, Dosidicus Gigas, Based on Statolith Microstructure Off the Exclusive Economic Zone of Chilean Waters

The jumbo flying squid, Dosidicus gigas, support an important squid fishery off the Exclusive Economic Zone of Chilean waters. However, we only have limited information about their biology. In this study, age, growth and population structure of D. gigas were studied using statoliths from 333 specimens (386 females and 147 males) randomly sampled in the Chinese squid jigging surveys from 2007 to 2008 off the Exclusive Economic Zone of Chile. Mantle lengths (MLs) of the sample ranged from 206 to 702 mm, and their ages were estimated from 150 to 307 days for females and from 127 to 302 days for males. At least two spawning groups were identified, the main spawning peak tended to occur between August and November (austral spring group), and the secondary peak appeared during March to June (austral autumn group). The ML-age relationship was best modelled by a linear function for the austral spring group and a power function for the austral autumn group, and the body weight (BW)-age relationship was best described by an exponential function for both the groups. Instantaneous relative growth rates and absolute growth rates for ML and BW did not differ significantly between the two groups. The growth rate of D. gigas tended to be high at young stages, and then decreased after the sub-adult stage (>180 days old). This study suggests large spatial and temporal variability in key life history parameters of D. gigas, calling for the collection of more data with fine spatial and temporal scales to further improve our understanding of the fishery biology of D. gigas.

Predicting State Allocation of Funds: The Case of John Rowland and his Hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut.

This study attempts to analyze the underlying factors and motives influencing the allocation of discretionary state expenditures. The fact that some cities receive more money than other cities begs the question of what accounts for this variation. After framing the provision of state money within the theoretical framework of political patronage, a case study of Governor Rowland’s tenure in office and the accompanying expenditures to Connecticut’s 17 largest cities from 1995 to 2004 was conducted to evaluate whether a disproportionate amount of money was given to Rowland’s hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut. Besides employing a statistical analysis that determined that cities with similar characteristics received different amounts of money, interviewing was conducted to identify reasons for such variation. The results indicate that Waterbury received a greater amount of money than was predicted based on the city’s economic and demographic characteristics, and that non-objective and biased factors such as favoritism, the need to reward political support, or the desire to increase political loyalty sometimes take precedence over more objective factors.

Are Shirking and Leisure Substitutable? An Empirical Test of Efficiency Wages Based on Urban Economic Theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.

Input-Output Based Economic Impact Evaluation System for Small City Development: A Case Study on Saemangeum's Flux City Design

The paper aims to develop a quasi-dynamic interregional input-output model for evaluating the macro-economic impacts of small city development. The features of the model are summarized as follows: (1) the consumption expenditure of households is regarded as an endogenous variable, (2) the technological change is determined by the change of industrial Location Quotient caused by firm's investment activities. (3) a strong feedback function between the city design and the economic analysis is provided. For checking the performance of the model, Saemangeum's Flux City Design Plan is used as the simulation target in our paper.