Caucasus, 1854 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Karte der Kaukasus-Länder und der angränzenden Türkischen und Persischen Provinzen Armenien, Kurdistan, und Azerbeidjan, bearbeitet und gezeichnet von H. Kiepert. It was published by Bei Dietrich Reimer in 1854. Scale 1:1,500,000. Covers the Caucasus. Map in German. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to a modified 'Europe Lambert Conformal Conic' projection with a central meridian of 44 degrees East projection. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, roads, railroads, churches, territorial boundaries, shoreline features, and more. Relief shown by hachures and spot heights. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection as part of the Open Collections Program at Harvard University project: Islamic Heritage Project. Maps selected for the project represent a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes. The Islamic Heritage Project consists of over 100,000 digitized pages from Harvard's collections of Islamic manuscripts and published materials. Supported by Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal and developed in association with the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Islamic Studies Program at Harvard University.

Turkey, Middle East, and the South Caucasus, 1771 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Turcia Asiatica : exhibens Natoliam modernam, in suos beglirbegatus divisam, itemque reliquos beglirbegatus, sive gubernationes et Prfecturas generales, in regionibus Georgiæ, Armeniæ, Mespotamiæ, Syriæ et Arabiæ sitos, una cum Mari Nigro, Mari Azowiensi, Mari di Marmora, et Mari Ægeo, atque adiacentibus Insulis : C. P. S. C. M. = Carte de la Turquie asiatique contenant la Natolie moderne divisée en les beglerbeys &c., ex novissimis subsidiis ac relationibus ad normam legitimae proiectionis in usum belli praesentis delineata impensis homannianorum heredum. It was published by Homannianorum Heredum in 1771. Scale [ca. 1:4,800,000]. Covers Turkey and portions of the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Map in Latin with title in French. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the World Miller Cylindrical projection. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, territorial and provincial boundaries, shoreline features, and more. Relief shown pictorially. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection as part of the Open Collections Program at Harvard University project: Islamic Heritage Project. Maps selected for the project represent a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes. The Islamic Heritage Project consists of over 100,000 digitized pages from Harvard's collections of Islamic manuscripts and published materials. Supported by Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal and developed in association with the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Islamic Studies Program at Harvard University.

Charte der Laender am Caucasus nach den besten vorhandenen

Charten, Reisen und astronomischen Orstbestimugen gezeichnet von I. C. M. Reinecke.

General Charte der Laender Zwischen dem Schwarzen und Caspischen Meere: Circassien, Georgien, Armenien, Wüste von Astrachan und Caucasus hauptsoechlich die Grosse und Kleine Kabarda

Nach Russischen und and Handschriften entworsen Strasburg bey Joh. Georg Treuttel ; I. P. Kremer delin ; B. F. Leizelt sc.

Niemiecki sieci na wschodzie. Niemiecki soft power w Europie Wschodniej, Azji Centralnej i na Kaukazie Południowym: polityka – administracja – kultura – nauka – społeczenstwo. OSW Raport, wrzesien 2010. = German networks in the east. German soft power in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and South Caucasus policy - administration - culture - science - the society of. CES Report, September 2010

Do realizacji niemieckich interesów w polityce zagranicznej, bezpieczeństwa i gospodarczej RFN wykorzystuje instrumenty soft power z obszaru dyplomacji publicznej, polityki rozwojowej, kulturalnej i naukowej. Budowanie sieci kontaktów i lobbing polityczny, programy współpracy rozwojowej oraz zagranicznej polityki kulturalnej i naukowej, mają służyć wspieraniu niemieckiej gospodarki uzależnionej od eksportu, uzyskaniu statusu europejskiego ośrodka technologii i innowacji oraz zwiększeniu wpływu RFN na działania zewnętrzne UE. Jednym z priorytetowych obszarów stosowania tych instrumentów są dla Niemiec państwa Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu Południowego i Azji Centralnej. Decydują o tym bliskość geograficzna i otwierające się rynki zbytu, konieczność modernizacji gospodarek tych krajów, zagrożenia dla „miękkiego” bezpieczeństwa RFN oraz rozwój relacji UE z tymi państwami. Niemiecka aktywność jest w tych krajach niezależna od sytuacji politycznej i stanowi długofalową strategię ugruntowującą pozycję RFN jako ich najważniejszego europejskiego partnera gospodarczego i politycznego.

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014

The North Caucasus has been the most unstable region of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Considering the scale of violence, the conflict in the region should be regarded as a local civil war between the Salafi Islamic armed underground and the secular authorities of the North Caucasus republics, supported by the security services. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who has made himself de facto independent from Moscow, holds a particularly strong position in the region and his ambition is to gain control of the neighbouring territories. The Russian leadership, which sees the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi as its top priority, is facing a strategic choice between trying to integrate the North Caucasus with the rest of the federation, or isolating the region and accepting the existence of an informal "internal abroad” within Russia. The cultural processes taking place in the region, including Islamisation, de-modernisation and de-Russification, have been driving the North Caucasus ever further away from the rest of Russia, strengthening a mutual sense of foreignness.

"Creeping" civil war in the North Caucasus. OSW Commentary No. 50, 2011-03-15

Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabilisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federation’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service. Moscow has no idea how to successfully tackle the Caucasus rebellion. Force has proved to be costly and unproductive, while the attempts made since early 2010 to integrate the region with the rest of Russia by implementing development programmes have not brought the desired results, because of widespread corruption and faint interest from businessmen who are afraid to invest in such an unsafe region. A growing problem for Moscow, particularly for the prestige of the state, is attacks by militants on areas near Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics is to take place. It must be assumed that over the next 3 years before the Olympics, Moscow’s priority in the region will be to ensure the safety of Olympic preparations, and then the games themselves. It cannot be ruled out that the North Caucasus Federal District with its ‘troubled republics’ will be surrounded by a kind of cordon sanitaire (Sochi is situated in the neighbouring Southern Federal District). This could in turn strengthen these republics’ isolation, maintain the state of permanent instability, and postpone the prospects of solving the region’s acute economic and social problems.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

The war of nerves with Iran - consequences for the South Caucasus and Russia. OSW Commentary No. 75, 2012-04-25

Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have risen considerably in recent months. This has been visible in numerous threats of – and much speculation about – an imminent Israeli (and US) attack on Iran’s nuclear installations. In this context, the support for the attacks that the countries of the South Caucasus (and Azerbaijan in particular) could provide has been the subject of lively debate, as has been the prospect of a Russian political and military offensive in the Caucasus in response to the attacks on Iran. It seems that the ongoing war campaign in the media has been aimed primarily at putting pressure on Iran and the international community to find a political solution to the Iranian problem. This also applies to the Caucasus’s involvement in the campaign. Given the outcome of the Istanbul round of talks on a political solution to the Iranian issue (14 April), which warrants moderate optimism, the threat of a conflict now appears more distant and this also indirectly proves the effectiveness of the campaign. The war of nerves with Iran, however, is already now actually affecting the stability of the Southern Caucasus. While it seems that Azerbaijan is not Israel’s partner in the preparations to attacks, and that there is no real link between the Iranian problem and the ongoing and planned movements of Russian troops in the Caucasus, the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are indeed high. Moreover, the global image of the Caucasus is deteriorating, the USA’s position in the region is becoming more complicated, and Russia’s room for manoeuvre is expanding.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. OSW Study 23/2006

The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration.

The 'tribal areas' of the Caucasus: The North Caucasus - an enclave of 'alien civilisation' within the Russian Federation. OSW Study 34/2010

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implantation. Natolin Research Paper 03/March 2011

While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region has now gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and beyond, not least because of security considerations. The ENP undoubtedly represents a step forward in the EU’s policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, yet its implementation highlights major differences between the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. The Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which is now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS. The paper highlights five main conclusions and recommendations: • Political, economic, social and diplomatic developments in the South Caucasus in the 2000's highlight both diverging trends and the persistence of tensions between the three countries. They also have different aspirations vis-à-vis the EU and different records in ENP implementation. The EU should therefore mainly rely upon an individual approach towards each country. • While bilateral relations should form the basis of the EU's approach, most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not confined to national borders and require regional solutions. This applies primarily, but not exclusively, to the unresolved conflicts. The EU should promote targeted regional cooperation including, inter alia, confidence-building measures to address indirectly the protracted conflicts and measures supporting drivers of change, which play a critical role in the confidence-building process; • Under the ENP, especially since the opening of negotiations for association agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform have become prominent in the EU's relations with all three Caucasus countries. At the same time, the priorities identified when the ENP was launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. The EU should more clearly prioritise good governance and the rule of law as the basis of both the ENP and successful reforms; • In all partner countries (but even more so in the South Caucasus), ENP implementation has been adversely affected by poor administrative capacities and weak institutional coordination. The EU should increasingly focus on institutional reform/capacity building in its support to partner countries and ensure that the link between the ENP and domestic reform processes is strengthened; • In the South Caucasus the EU has recently concentrated on a few assistance tools such as budget support, Twinning and TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly bring an added value, they should be better combined with tools allowing for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors, e.g. EIDHR/NSA.

On the periphery of global jihad. The North Caucasus: the illusion of stabilisation. OSW Point of View Number 45, November 2014

The situation in the North Caucasus has stabilised, in comparison with previous years, mainly as regards the activity of the Islamic military underground. This is an effect of ideological changes among the militants which have led to a dilution of the Caucasian armed struggle and its marginalisation in global jihad, since top priority has been granted to the Middle Eastern front. The factors which have contributed to this stabilisation are the organisational crisis in the Caucasus Emirate and the outflux of militants to the Middle East, as well the successful ‘carrot and stick’ policy adopted by Moscow. However, the partial stabilisation in the Caucasus is inherently precarious, being a contingent outcome of the situation rather than the result of systemic change. The region’s pressing problems remain unresolved; and these problems are generating chronic instability and cauing the Caucasus to drift away from Russia in civilisational terms. An economic or political crisis in the Russian Federation may result in the conflicts in the Caucasus unfreezing, including a reactivation of the idea of Chechen independence as well as the idea of the Caucasus Emirate, which is a part of global jihad.