A theoretical and empirical study of addiction

Consumption of addictive substances poses a challenge to economic models of rational, forward-looking agents. This dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical examination of consumption of addictive goods.

The theoretical model draws on evidence from psychology and neurobiology to improve on the standard assumptions used in intertemporal consumption studies. I model agents who may misperceive the severity of the future consequences from consuming addictive substances and allow for an agent's environment to shape her preferences in a systematic way suggested by numerous studies that have found craving to be induced by the presence of environmental cues associated with past substance use. The behavior of agents in this behavioral model of addiction can mimic the pattern of quitting and relapsing that is prevalent among addictive substance users.

Chapter 3 presents an empirical analysis of the Becker and Murphy (1988) model of rational addiction using data on grocery store sales of cigarettes. This essay empirically tests the model's predictions concerning consumption responses to future and past price changes as well as the prediction that the response to an anticipated price change differs from the response to an unanticipated price change. In addition, I consider the consumption effects of three institutional changes that occur during the time period 1996 through 1999.

Identifying social determinants of urban low carbon transitions: the case of energy transition in Bilbao, Basque Country

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Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others.

The neural processes underlying empathy are a subject of intense interest within the social neurosciences. However, very little is known about how brain empathic responses are modulated by the affective link between individuals. We show here that empathic responses are modulated by learned preferences, a result consistent with economic models of social preferences. We engaged male and female volunteers in an economic game, in which two confederates played fairly or unfairly, and then measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging while these same volunteers observed the confederates receiving pain. Both sexes exhibited empathy-related activation in pain-related brain areas (fronto-insular and anterior cingulate cortices) towards fair players. However, these empathy-related responses were significantly reduced in males when observing an unfair person receiving pain. This effect was accompanied by increased activation in reward-related areas, correlated with an expressed desire for revenge. We conclude that in men (at least) empathic responses are shaped by valuation of other people's social behaviour, such that they empathize with fair opponents while favouring the physical punishment of unfair opponents, a finding that echoes recent evidence for altruistic punishment.

Compilation and analysis of integrated regional input-output tables for NUTS 2 regions in Ireland

In 1966, Roy Geary, Director of the ESRI, noted “the absence of any kind of import and export statistics for regions is a grave lacuna” and further noted that if regional analyses were to be developed then regional Input-Output Tables must be put on the “regular statistical assembly line”. Forty-five years later, the lacuna lamented by Geary still exists and remains the most significant challenge to the construction of regional Input-Output Tables in Ireland. The continued paucity of sufficient regional data to compile effective regional Supply and Use and Input-Output Tables has retarded the capacity to construct sound regional economic models and provide a robust evidence base with which to formulate and assess regional policy. This study makes a first step towards addressing this gap by presenting the first set of fully integrated, symmetric, Supply and Use and domestic Input-Output Tables compiled for the NUTS 2 regions in Ireland: The Border, Midland and Western region and the Southern & Eastern region. These tables are general purpose in nature and are consistent fully with the official national Supply & Use and Input-Output Tables, and the regional accounts. The tables are constructed using a survey-based or bottom-up approach rather than employing modelling techniques, yielding more robust and credible tables. These tables are used to present a descriptive statistical analysis of the two administrative NUTS 2 regions in Ireland, drawing particular attention to the underlying structural differences of regional trade balances and composition of Gross Value Added in those regions. By deriving regional employment multipliers, Domestic Demand Employment matrices are constructed to quantify and illustrate the supply chain impact on employment. In the final part of the study, the predictive capability of the Input-Output framework is tested over two time periods. For both periods, the static Leontief production function assumptions are relaxed to allow for labour productivity. Comparative results from this experiment are presented.

The Rational Adolescent: Strategic Information Processing during Decision Making Revealed by Eye Tracking.

Adolescence is often viewed as a time of irrational, risky decision-making - despite adolescents' competence in other cognitive domains. In this study, we examined the strategies used by adolescents (N=30) and young adults (N=47) to resolve complex, multi-outcome economic gambles. Compared to adults, adolescents were more likely to make conservative, loss-minimizing choices consistent with economic models. Eye-tracking data showed that prior to decisions, adolescents acquired more information in a more thorough manner; that is, they engaged in a more analytic processing strategy indicative of trade-offs between decision variables. In contrast, young adults' decisions were more consistent with heuristics that simplified the decision problem, at the expense of analytic precision. Collectively, these results demonstrate a counter-intuitive developmental transition in economic decision making: adolescents' decisions are more consistent with rational-choice models, while young adults more readily engage task-appropriate heuristics.

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.

Towards an Acceptable Level of Violence: Institutional Lessons from Northern Ireland

Institutional and economic development has recently returned to the forefront of economic analysis. The use of case studies (both historical and contemporary) has been important in this revival. Likewise, it has been argued recently by economic methodologists that historical context provides a kind of ‘‘laboratory’’ for the researcher interested in real world economic phenomena. Counterterrorism economics, in contrast with much of the rest of the literature on terrorism, has all too rarely drawn upon detailed contextual case studies. This article seeks to help remedy this problem. Archival evidence, including previously unpublished material on the DeLorean case, is an important feature of this article. The article examines how an inter-related strategy, which traded-off economic, security, and political considerations, operated during the Troubles. Economic repercussions of this strategy are discussed. An economic analysis of technical and organizational change within paramilitarism is also presented. A number of institutional lessons are discussed including: the optimal balance between carrot versus stick, centralization relative to decentralization, the economics of intelligence operations, and tit-for-tat violence. While existing economic models are arguably correct in identifying benefits from politico-economic decentralization, they downplay the element highlighted by institutional analysis.

The state and industrial policy in Ireland: a case study of the Irish pharmaceutical sector

There is renewed interest in the state's role in the economic sphere but a lack of research on the viability and employment effects of alternative economic models, in particular from a ‘liberal market economy’ perspective. This article addresses this gap in the human resource management literature by undertaking a detailed case study of industrial policy in the Irish pharmaceutical sector. The proactive and resource-intensive industrial policy adopted by the Irish government and development agencies is found to have underpinned a significant strategic upgrading in this sector of the Irish economy. In turn this has facilitated the growth of high-wage, high-skill jobs. The findings highlight the potential for an active industrial policy to promote employment upgrading in liberal market economies.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Causalités à court et à long terme dans les modèles VAR et ARIMA multivariés.

La causalité au sens de Granger est habituellement définie par la prévisibilité d'un vecteur de variables par un autre une période à l'avance. Récemment, Lutkepohl (1990) a proposé de définir la non-causalité entre deux variables (ou vecteurs) par la non-prévisibilité à tous les délais dans le futur. Lorsqu'on considère plus de deux vecteurs (ie. lorsque l'ensemble d'information contient les variables auxiliaires), ces deux notions ne sont pas équivalentes. Dans ce texte, nous généralisons d'abord les notions antérieures de causalités en considérant la causalité à un horizon donné h arbitraire, fini ou infini. Ensuite, nous dérivons des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de non-causalité entre deux vecteurs de variables (à l'intérieur d'un plus grand vecteur) jusqu'à un horizon donné h. Les modèles considérés incluent les autoregressions vectorielles, possiblement d'ordre infini, et les modèles ARIMA multivariés. En particulier, nous donnons des conditions de séparabilité et de rang pour la non-causalité jusqu'à un horizon h, lesquelles sont relativement simples à vérifier.