Green procurement framework for the Malaysian construction industry

Construction projects have a negative impact on the environment. As Malaysia is planning more construction projects to cater for its current and future development needs, practitioners are urged to undertake greener approaches to construction. One of the efforts is the introduction of green procurement, which is promoted under the Malaysian Government’s MyHijau initiative. Construction procurement is recognised as a tool to shift the construction business into a greener industry. However, the implementation of green procurement in Malaysia is still in its infancy and faces a number of challenges, such as the lack of knowledge. A significant gap has been found between policy formulation and actual project delivery as there are no practical guidelines for stakeholders to procure environmental-friendly construction projects. To address this problem, the present research (as part of an ongoing PhD project) aims to develop a green procurement framework that guides stakeholders in procuring green projects in Malaysia. This article highlights the concept of green procurement in Malaysia, the work carried out to date to achieve the research objectives and the preliminary framework that has been established. It is hoped that this research will help academics and practitioners to further explore the potential of green procurement to improve sustainability in the current construction industry practices.

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

Social Procurement and New Public Governance

Taking a critically informed approach, this innovative text examines emerging approaches to social procurement within the context of New Public Government (NPG), and examines the practices of social procurement across Europe, North America and Australia. Considering both the possibilities and limitations of social procurement, and the types of value it can generate, this book also provides empirically driven insights into the practicalities of 'triple bottom line' procurement, the related challenges of measuring social value and the management of both the strategic and operational dimensions of procurement processes. As such it will be invaluable reading for all those interest in social services, public governance and social enterprise.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders’ bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder’s probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Procurement-related critical factors for briefing in public-private partnership projects: Case of Hong Kong

Public private partnerships (PPP) are widely used for construction project procurement. However, the briefing stage of PPP projects has been largely overlooked, although it has a far-reaching influence throughout the project life cycle. In response, we rectify this by exploring the critical factors involved. A set of 15 procurement-related factors are first identified from the existing literature. Then the effects of four background variables on the factors are tested with Hong Kong government data by an exploratory factor analysis extracting four major dimensions. The relationships between these dimensions and background variables indicate the need to take the background variables into account when ranking the factors. The ranking of the factors is then obtained by considering their weighted importance. Finally, the final practical value of the results is discussed.

Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.

Driving whole-of-life efficiencies through BIM and procurement

Building Information Modelling (BIM) is a digital process that encompasses all aspects, disciplines and systems of built assets within a single virtual model. This allows stakeholders to collaborate more accurately and efficiently than with traditional processes. Case study 1 Design: New Generation Rollingstock Maintenance Centre, Queensland. Case Study 2 Construction: Perth Children's Hospital, Western Australia. Case Study 3 Asset Management: Sydney Opera House, New South Wales. This project sought to provide the built environment industry with a framework to measure and maximize benefits from implementing BIM across the life-cycle phases of a built asset.

A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services

Business processes and application functionality are becoming available as internal web services inside enterprise boundaries as well as becoming available as commercial web services from enterprise solution vendors and web services marketplaces. Typically there are multiple web service providers offering services capable of fulfilling a particular functionality, although with different Quality of Service (QoS). Dynamic creation of business processes requires composing an appropriate set of web services that best suit the current need. This paper presents a novel combinatorial auction approach to QoS aware dynamic web services composition. Such an approach would enable not only stand-alone web services but also composite web services to be a part of a business process. The combinatorial auction leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. An important feature of the model is the incorporation of service level agreements. We describe a software tool QWESC for QoS-aware web services composition based on the proposed approach.

Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

The core and shapley value analysis for cooperative formation of procurement networks

Formation of high value procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions, where suppliers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged We model the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a stable and fair manner We first investigate the stability of such networks by examining the conditions under which the core of the game is non-empty. We then present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the core, for forming such networks so that the resulting network is stable. We also mention a key result when the Shapley value is applied as a solution concept.

Wood procurement in the pressure of change.

Linear optimization model was used to calculate seven wood procurement scenarios for years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Productivity and cost functions for seven cutting, five terrain transport, three long distance transport and various work supervision and scaling methods were calculated from available work study reports. All method's base on Nordic cut to length system. Finland was divided in three parts for description of harvesting conditions. Twenty imaginary wood processing points and their wood procurement areas were created for these areas. The procurement systems, which consist of the harvesting conditions and work productivity functions, were described as a simulation model. In the LP-model the wood procurement system has to fulfil the volume and wood assortment requirements of processing points by minimizing the procurement cost. The model consists of 862 variables and 560 restrictions. Results show that it is economical to increase the mechanical work in harvesting. Cost increment alternatives effect only little on profitability of manual work. The areas of later thinnings and seed tree- and shelter wood cuttings increase on cost of first thinnings. In mechanized work one method, 10-tonne one grip harvester and forwarder, is gaining advantage among other methods. Working hours of forwarder are decreasing opposite to the harvester. There is only little need to increase the number of harvesters and trucks or their drivers from today's level. Quite large fluctuations in level of procurement and cost can be handled by constant number of machines, by alternating the number of season workers and by driving machines in two shifts. It is possible, if some environmental problems of large scale summer time harvesting can be solved.

Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers

In a computational grid, the presence of grid resource providers who are rational and intelligent could lead to an overall degradation in the efficiency of the grid. In this paper, we design incentive compatible grid resource procurement mechanisms which ensure that the efficiency of the grid is not affected by the rational behavior of resource providers.In particular, we offer three elegant incentive compatible mechanisms for this purpose: (1) G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism (2) G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism (3) G-OPT(Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian incentive compatibility and (b) individual rationality. We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments.

A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of procurement network formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.