927 resultados para Direction of Arrival Estimator


Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The visual stimuli that elicit neural activity differ for different retinal ganglion cells and these cells have been categorized by the visual information that they transmit. If specific visual information is conveyed exclusively or primarily by a particular set of ganglion cells, one might expect the cells to be organized spatially so that their sampling of information from the visual field is complete but not redundant. In other words, the laterally spreading dendrites of the ganglion cells should completely cover the retinal plane without gaps or significant overlap. The first evidence for this sort of arrangement, which has been called a tiling or tessellation, was for the two types of "alpha" ganglion cells in cat retina. Other reports of tiling by ganglion cells have been made subsequently. We have found evidence of a particularly rigorous tiling for the four types of ganglion cells in rabbit retina that convey information about the direction of retinal image motion (the ON-OFF direction-selective cells). Although individual cells in the four groups are morphologically indistinguishable, they are organized as four overlaid tilings, each tiling consisting of like-type cells that respond preferentially to a particular direction of retinal image motion. These observations lend support to the hypothesis that tiling is a general feature of the organization of information outflow from the retina and clearly implicate mechanisms for recognition of like-type cells and establishment of mutually acceptable territories during retinal development.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

No. 1. Total population by departments, municipal districts, cities, and wards.-no. 2. Population by age, sex, race, nativity, conjugal condition, and literacy.-no. 3. Citizenship, literacy, and education.