The Politics of Local Autonomy: Measuring Cantonal (De)Centralisation in Switzerland

In Switzerland, there are 26 systems of cantonal decentralisation because regulating municipal autonomy is an exclusively cantonal competency. Existing measures of local autonomy/cantonal decentralisation are confined to measuring the real or perceived distribution of functions. Alternatively, they weigh expenditures (Dafflon 1992) or tax revenues (Dlabac and Schaub forthcoming) of municipalities against those of the canton. Complementing these indices, this paper additionally measures the politics dimension of cantonal decentralisation. Seven aspects are measured: intra-cantonal regionalism, cumuldesmandats (double tenure of cantonal MP and mayoral office), territorial quotas for legislative and executive elections, direct local representation and lobbying, party decentralisation, the number and size of constituencies, and direct democracy (communal referendum and initiative). This results in a ranking of all 26 cantons as regards the politics of local autonomy within their political systems. The measure will help scholars to test assumptions held for decentralisation in general, be it as a dependent (explaining decentralisation) or as an independent variable (decentralisation—so what?), within but also beyond the Swiss context.

Tax convention with Bangladesh : message from the President of the United States transmitting convention between the government of the United States of America and the government of Bangladesh for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income signed at Dhaka on September 26, 2004 (the "Convention"), with an exchange of notes enclosed.

"October 27, 2005."

Sales tax enforcement: An empirical analysis of compliance enforcement methodologies and pathologies

Most research on tax evasion has focused on the income tax. Sales tax evasion has been largely ignored and dismissed as immaterial. This paper explored the differences between income tax and sales tax evasion and demonstrated that sales tax enforcement is deserving of and requires the use of different tools to achieve compliance. Specifically, the major enforcement problem with sales tax is not evasion: it is theft perpetrated by companies that act as collection agents for the state. Companies engage in a principal-agent relationship with the state and many retain funds collected as an agent of the state for private use. As such, the act of sales tax theft bears more resemblance to embezzlement than to income tax evasion. It has long been assumed that the sales tax is nearly evasion free, and state revenue departments report voluntary compliance in a manner that perpetuates this myth. Current sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies are similar in form to income tax compliance enforcement methodologies and are based largely on trust. The primary focus is on delinquent filers with a very small percentage of businesses subject to audit. As a result, there is a very large group of noncompliant businesses who file on time and fly below the radar while stealing millions of taxpayer dollars. ^ The author utilized a variety of statistical methods with actual field data derived from operations of the Southern Region Criminal Investigations Unit of the Florida Department of Revenue to evaluate current and proposed sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies in a quasi-experimental, time series research design and to set forth a typology of sales tax evaders. This study showed that current estimates of voluntary compliance in sales tax systems are seriously and significantly overstated and that current enforcement methodologies are inadequate to identify the majority of violators and enforce compliance. Sales tax evasion is modeled using the theory of planned behavior and Cressey’s fraud triangle and it is demonstrated that proactive enforcement activities, characterized by substantial contact with non-delinquent taxpayers, results in superior ability to identify noncompliance and provides a structure through which noncompliant businesses can be rehabilitated.^

What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural European countries

Objectives. Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, several researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes, defined as tax morale, helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box, without discussing which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Methods. Thus, this article is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using data sets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. Results. The results indicate the tendency that cultural and regional differences affect tax morale. Conclusion. The findings suggest that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher tax morale.

The evolution of tax morale in modern Spain

This paper studies the evolution of tax morale in Spain in the post-France era. In contrast to the previous tax compliance literature, the current paper investigates tax morale as the dependent variable and attempts to answer what actually shapes tax morale. Te analysis uses suevey data from two sources; the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, allowing us to observe tax morale in Spain for the years 1981,1990, 1995 and 1999/2000. The sutudy of evolution of tax morale in Spain over nearly a 20-year span is particularly interesting because the political and fiscal system evolved very rapidly during this period.

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).

Participation and e-democracy how to utilize web 2.0 for policy decision-making

This paper investigates in how to utilize ICT and Web 2.0 technologies and e-democracy software for policy decision-making. It introduces a cutting edge decision-making system that integrates the practice of e-petitions, e-consultation, e-rulemaking, e-voting, and proxy voting. The paper demonstrates how under precondition of direct democracy through the use this system the collective intelligence (CI) of a population would be gathered and used throughout the policy process.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Small business entity tax concessions : through the eyes of the practitioner

Australia’s small business sector has pursued often-competing imperatives of simplicity, equity and efficiency in the income tax regime (particularly focusing on the notion of simplicity) over the last decade. In 2001, there was an attempt to provide such simplification and reduce the compliance burden faced by Australian small businesses through the ‘simplified tax system’ (‘STS’). However, despite amendments over the years, the regime is much criticised. This article explores how the STS (now known as the ‘small business entity’ regime or ‘SBE’) is utilised from the perspective of tax practitioners, by analysing their recommendations to small business clients in respect of the regime. The results indicate that practitioners believe the regime did nothing to simplify the tax system for small businesses or reduce tax compliance costs. Indeed, the practitioners believed that the introduction of small business concessions had actually achieved the opposite result — it had increased tax compliance costs for their small business clients. However, tax practitioners still recommend the regime highly because it minimises their client’s tax liability.

Measuring tax efficiency: A tax optimality index

This paper introduces an index of tax optimality that measures the distance of some current tax structure from the optimal tax structure in the presence of public goods. This index is defined on the [0, 1] interval and measures the proportion of the optimal tax rates that will achieve the same welfare outcome as some arbitrarily given initial tax structure. We call this number the Tax Optimality Index. We also show how the basic methodology can be altered to derive a revenue equivalent uniform tax, which measures the tax burden implied by the public sector. A numerical example is used to illustrate the method developed, and extensions of the analysis to handle models with multiple households and nonlinear taxation structures are undertaken.

A participação do cidadão na formação da tributação brasileira e a busca por espaços de consenso

O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de discutir os fundamentos que possibilitam um novo relacionamento entre Estado e Cidadão em torno da tributação, superando um ambiente de litigiosidade necessária. Para tanto, em uma perspectiva instrumental, se vale da democracia participativa e deliberativa para fundamentar maior participação do cidadão em torno da tributação e criação e reinvenção de novos espaços em que se possa realizar um diálogo entre ambos, antes de se procurar uma via litigiosa. O trabalho se vale, também, da descrição de fenômenos da realidade que possibilitam o relacionamento baseado na cooperação. Finaliza por reconhecer que a participação do cidadão na tributação ainda é incipiente, embora já dê sinais de seu surgimento.

Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non-expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.

Policy competition for foreign direct investment in the Caribbean Basin: Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica

Includes bibliography

Subnational Patterns of Democracy in Austria, Germany and Switzerland

This article investigates the main political institutions in the sub-national democracies of Austria, Germany and Switzerland. It applies Lijphart’s approach to these German-speaking countries in Western Europe and expands it – following recent advances – by direct democracy. The main finding of the sub-national analysis is that, similar to Lijphart, two dimensions of democracy can be distinguished. While the first can be considered as the ‘consensual dimension’ of democracy, the second represents the ‘rules of the game’. Moreover, and in contrast to analyses at the national level, direct democracy does not constitute a dimension on its own, but forms an important element of consensus decision-making in the sub-national units at hand. Finally, based on cluster analysis three homogenous national clusters were found, but also one cluster with sub-national democracies from Germany and Austria that are more similar to one another than to other Länder within their respective federal states.