El Partido Demócrata de Córdoba ante las elecciones de noviembre de 1931

El trabajo analiza el accionar de los dirigentes del Partido Demócrata de Córdoba (PD) a partir de la orquestación de una salida electoral a la dictadura uriburista, atendiendo al resultado de los comicios; a la estrategia de integrar una coalición nacional antiyrigoyenista (el Partido Demócrata Nacional) y la reacción que ello trajo aparejada al interior de la agrupación. Si bien el PD triunfó cómodamente en las elecciones provinciales y municipales; la victoria del PDN no fue tan pronunciada. El integrar esta coalición le significó al partido provincial la deserción de dirigentes que vieron en ello la pérdida del progresismo que caracterizaba al partido cordobés.

El Partido Demócrata de Córdoba ante las elecciones de noviembre de 1931

El trabajo analiza el accionar de los dirigentes del Partido Demócrata de Córdoba (PD) a partir de la orquestación de una salida electoral a la dictadura uriburista, atendiendo al resultado de los comicios; a la estrategia de integrar una coalición nacional antiyrigoyenista (el Partido Demócrata Nacional) y la reacción que ello trajo aparejada al interior de la agrupación. Si bien el PD triunfó cómodamente en las elecciones provinciales y municipales; la victoria del PDN no fue tan pronunciada. El integrar esta coalición le significó al partido provincial la deserción de dirigentes que vieron en ello la pérdida del progresismo que caracterizaba al partido cordobés.

El Partido Demócrata de Córdoba ante las elecciones de noviembre de 1931

El trabajo analiza el accionar de los dirigentes del Partido Demócrata de Córdoba (PD) a partir de la orquestación de una salida electoral a la dictadura uriburista, atendiendo al resultado de los comicios; a la estrategia de integrar una coalición nacional antiyrigoyenista (el Partido Demócrata Nacional) y la reacción que ello trajo aparejada al interior de la agrupación. Si bien el PD triunfó cómodamente en las elecciones provinciales y municipales; la victoria del PDN no fue tan pronunciada. El integrar esta coalición le significó al partido provincial la deserción de dirigentes que vieron en ello la pérdida del progresismo que caracterizaba al partido cordobés.

El Partido Demócrata de Córdoba ante las elecciones de noviembre de 1931

El trabajo analiza el accionar de los dirigentes del Partido Demócrata de Córdoba (PD) a partir de la orquestación de una salida electoral a la dictadura uriburista, atendiendo al resultado de los comicios; a la estrategia de integrar una coalición nacional antiyrigoyenista (el Partido Demócrata Nacional) y la reacción que ello trajo aparejada al interior de la agrupación. Si bien el PD triunfó cómodamente en las elecciones provinciales y municipales; la victoria del PDN no fue tan pronunciada. El integrar esta coalición le significó al partido provincial la deserción de dirigentes que vieron en ello la pérdida del progresismo que caracterizaba al partido cordobés.

The misconception of political lessons : how UMNO perceives the fall of LDP in Japan

2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. First, emulation of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP launched in 1981. Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to retain power twice in 1993 and 2009. Since 1993, DP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder for UMNO to be in alert mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again ousted from power in 2009, UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the unprecedented setback it suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, although LDP’s reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1999, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogising between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.

Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.

2002 Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: Events, results and consequences; Ukraine's Parliamentary system after the elections. OSW Study 8/2003

2002 elections: On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters. After the election: The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign. In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

An appropriated state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation. OSW COMMENTARY 168, 22.04.2015,

From the Introduction. There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).

A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation. OSW Commentary No. 168, 22 April 2015

There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).

Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony. OSW Commentary Number 208/07.04.2016

Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democratic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahotniuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judiciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat.

Les coalitions politiques et l'orientation du changement économique et politique aux États-Unis : la Grande Dépression et la Grande Récession comparées.

Ce mémoire s’intéresse au concept de crise, économique et politique, comme source de changement idéologique et politique. Au travers de l’étude de l’austérité économique, il sera possible d’identifier des différences majeures entre deux épisodes de troubles économiques importants, la Grande Dépression et la Grande Récession. Alors que la Grande Dépression est caractérisée par une double crise, économique et politique, la Grande Récession, elle, demeure un choc essentiellement économique. L’absence de contagion dans le système politique explique la ténacité d’une idée comme l’austérité, de retour depuis la révolution néolibérale des années 80. L’austérité économique s’est adaptée et s’aligne maintenant aux intérêts d’une frange importante de la coalition démocrate. La persistance de l’allure des coalitions politiques depuis le dernier grand réalignement témoigne de l’absence de transformation majeure du mode d’action étatique, ce qui constitue une différence importante entre les deux crises.

The life and times of John Kelly, tribune of the people /

Kelly, a member of Congress, 1855-1858, was prominent in New York politics.

The socialist movement in Germany,

"Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. (Adopted at the Erfurt Congress, 1891.)": p. 24-26.

Proceedings of the Nob Mountain meeting, held in Columbia County, Pa., on the last three days of August, 1865 : Pub. by subscription.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Tammany times.

Description based on: Vol. 38, no. 14 (Apr. 1, 1911); title from caption.