Protecting encrypted cookies from compression side-channel attacks

Compression is desirable for network applications as it saves bandwidth; however, when data is compressed before being encrypted, the amount of compression leaks information about the amount of redundancy in the plaintext. This side channel has led to successful CRIME and BREACH attacks on web traffic protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The general guidance in light of these attacks has been to disable compression, preserving confidentiality but sacrificing bandwidth. In this paper, we examine two techniques - heuristic separation of secrets and fixed-dictionary compression|for enabling compression while protecting high-value secrets, such as cookies, from attack. We model the security offered by these techniques and report on the amount of compressibility that they can achieve.

Real-time and interactive attacks on DNP3 critical infrastructure using Scapy

The Distributed Network Protocol v3.0 (DNP3) is one of the most widely used protocols, to control national infrastructure. Widely used interactive packet manipulation tools, such as Scapy, have not yet been augmented to parse and create DNP3 frames (Biondi 2014). In this paper we extend Scapy to include DNP3, thus allowing us to perform attacks on DNP3 in real-time. Our contribution builds on East et al. (2009), who proposed a range of possible attacks on DNP3. We implement several of these attacks to validate our DNP3 extension to Scapy, then executed the attacks on real world equipment. We present our results, showing that many of these theoretical attacks would be unsuccessful in an Ethernet-based network.

Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol

Recently Gao et al. proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [3] to resist against intermittent position trace attacks and desynchronization attacks and called it RIPTA-DA. They also verified their protocol’s security by data reduction method with the learning parity with noise (LPN) and also formally verified the functionality of the proposed scheme by Colored Petri Nets. In this paper, we investigate RIPTA-DA’s security. We present an efficient secret disclosure attack against the protocol which can be used to mount both de-synchronization and traceability attacks against the protocol. Thus our attacks show that RIPTA-DA protocol is not a RIPTA-DA.

Forgery attacks on ++AE authenticated encryption mode

In this paper, we analyse a block cipher mode of operation submitted in 2014 to the cryptographic competition for authenticated encryption (CAESAR). This mode is designed by Recacha and called ++AE (plus-plus-ae). We propose a chosen plaintext forgery attack on ++AE that requires only a single chosen message query to allow an attacker to construct multiple forged messages. Our attack is deterministic and guaranteed to pass ++AE integrity check. We demonstrate the forgery attack using 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher. Hence, ++AE is insecure as an authenticated encryption mode of operation.

Nucleophilic attacks of 1,2-diaminoethane on MeCN ligands: synthesis, x-ray structure, and spectral and electrochemical properties of [Ru(.mu.-O)(.mu.-O2CAr)2[NH2CH2CH2NHC(Me)NH]2(PPh3)2](ClO4)2(Ar = C6H4-p-X; X = H, Me, OMe, Cl)

The diruthenium(III) complex [Ru2O(O2CAr)2(MeCN)4(PPh3)2](ClO4)2 (1), on reaction with 1,2-diaminoethane (en) in MeOH at 25-degrees-C, undergoes nucleophilic attacks at the carbon of two facial MeCN ligands to form [(Ru2O)-O-III(O2CAr)2-{NH2CH2CH2NHC(Me)NH}2(PPh3)2](ClO4)2 (2) (Ar = C6H4-p-X, X = H, Me, OMe, Cl) containing two seven-membered amino-amidine chelating ligands. The molecular structure of 2 with Ar = C6H4-p-OMe was determined by X-ray crystallography. Crystal data are as follows: triclinic, P1BAR, a = 13.942 (5) angstrom, b = 14.528 (2) angstrom, c = 21.758 (6) angstrom, alpha = 109.50 (2)-degrees, beta = 92.52 (3)-degrees, gamma = 112.61 (2)-degrees, V = 3759 (2) angstrom 3, and Z = 2. The complex has an {Ru2(mu-O)(mu-O2CAr2)2(2+)} core. The Ru-Ru and average Ru-O(oxo) distances and the Ru-O-Ru angle are 3.280 (2) angstrom, 1.887 [8] angstrom, and 120.7 (4)-degrees, respectively. The amino group of the chelating ligand is trans to the mu-oxo ligand. The nucleophilic attacks take place on the MeCN ligands cis to the mu-oxo ligand. The visible spectra of 2 in CHCl3 display an absorption band at 565 nm. The H-1 NMR spectra of 2 in CDCl3 are indicative of the formation of an amino-amidine ligand. Complex 2 exhibits metal-centered quasireversible one-electron oxidation and reduction processes in the potential ranges +0.9 to +1.0 V and -0.3 to -0.5 V (vs SCE), respectively, involving the Ru(III)2/Ru(III)Ru(IV) and Ru(III)2/Ru(II)Ru(III) redox couples in CH2Cl2 containing 0.1 M TBAP. The mechanistic aspects of the nucleophilic reaction are discussed.

Recovery from DoS Attacks in MIPv6: Modelling and Validation

Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks form a very important category of security threats that are prevalent in MIPv6 (mobile internet protocol version 6) today. Many schemes have been proposed to alleviate such threats, including one of our own [9]. However, reasoning about the correctness of such protocols is not trivial. In addition, new solutions to mitigate attacks may need to be deployed in the network on a frequent basis as and when attacks are detected, as it is practically impossible to anticipate all attacks and provide solutions in advance. This makes it necessary to validate the solutions in a timely manner before deployment in the real network. However, threshold schemes needed in group protocols make analysis complex. Model checking threshold-based group protocols that employ cryptography have not been successful so far. Here, we propose a new simulation based approach for validation using a tool called FRAMOGR that supports executable specification of group protocols that use cryptography. FRAMOGR allows one to specify attackers and track probability distributions of values or paths. We believe that infrastructure such as FRAMOGR would be required in future for validating new group based threshold protocols that may be needed for making MIPv6 more robust.

Fault Attacks on Pairing-Based Protocols Revisited

Several papers have studied fault attacks on computing a pairing value e(P, Q), where P is a public point and Q is a secret point. In this paper, we observe that these attacks are in fact effective only on a small number of pairing-based protocols, and that too only when the protocols are implemented with specific symmetric pairings. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the fault attacks on a public-key encryption scheme, an identity-based encryption scheme, and an oblivious transfer protocol when implemented with a symmetric pairing derived from a supersingular elliptic curve with embedding degree 2.

Range-based attacks on links in random scale-free networks

Range and load play key roles in the problem of attacks on links in random scale-free (RSF) networks. In this paper we obtain the approximate relation between range and load in RSF networks by the generating function theory, and then give an estimation about the impact of attacks on the efficiency of the network. The results show that short-range attacks are more destructive for RSF networks, and are confirmed numerically.

Geographical constraints to range-based attacks on links in complex networks

In this paper, we studied range-based attacks on links in geographically constrained scale-free networks and found that there is a continuous switching of roles of short-and long-range attacks on links when tuning the geographical constraint strength. Our results demonstrate that the geography has a significant impact on the network efficiency and security; thus one can adjust the geographical structure to optimize the robustness and the efficiency of the networks. We introduce a measurement of the impact of links on the efficiency of the network, and an effective attacking strategy is suggested

Exploiting the Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources

In this paper, we expose an unorthodox adversarial attack that exploits the transients of a system's adaptive behavior, as opposed to its limited steady-state capacity. We show that a well orchestrated attack could introduce significant inefficiencies that could potentially deprive a network element from much of its capacity, or significantly reduce its service quality, while evading detection by consuming an unsuspicious, small fraction of that element's hijacked capacity. This type of attack stands in sharp contrast to traditional brute-force, sustained high-rate DoS attacks, as well as recently proposed attacks that exploit specific protocol settings such as TCP timeouts. We exemplify what we term as Reduction of Quality (RoQ) attacks by exposing the vulnerabilities of common adaptation mechanisms. We develop control-theoretic models and associated metrics to quantify these vulnerabilities. We present numerical and simulation results, which we validate with observations from real Internet experiments. Our findings motivate the need for the development of adaptation mechanisms that are resilient to these new forms of attacks.

On the Impact of Low-Rate Attacks

Recent research have exposed new breeds of attacks that are capable of denying service or inflicting significant damage to TCP flows, without sustaining the attack traffic. Such attacks are often referred to as "low-rate" attacks and they stand in sharp contrast against traditional Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that can completely shut off TCP flows by flooding an Internet link. In this paper, we study the impact of these new breeds of attacks and the extent to which defense mechanisms are capable of mitigating the attack's impact. Through adopting a simple discrete-time model with a single TCP flow and a nonoblivious adversary, we were able to expose new variants of these low-rate attacks that could potentially have high attack potency per attack burst. Our analysis is focused towards worst-case scenarios, thus our results should be regarded as upper bounds on the impact of low-rate attacks rather than a real assessment under a specific attack scenario.