A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága (Supranational centralization of economic policy-making and community economics: some lessons from the theory of tax competition)

Mennyiben képes jelenleg a közösségi gazdaságtan az adópolitikák nemzetek fölötti centralizációjára vonatkozó politikai döntések megalapozására? Válaszunk röviden az lesz, hogy a közösségi gazdaságtan főárama - noha számos releváns gazdasági és politikai tényező hatását sikeresen elemzi - jelenleg nem kínál kielégítőnek tekinthető döntési kritériumokat a döntéshozók számára. Ennek oka, hogy központi szerepet játszik benne egy, a modellek szempontjából exogén és a közgazdasági elmélettől idegen tényező: a kormányzatok jóindulatára, pontosabban annak mértékére vonatkozó premissza. Tanulmányunk az adóverseny fiskális föderalista elméletét vizsgálja, és megpróbál általánosabb szinten is a közszektor gazdaságelméletének jelenlegi állapotára, valamint továbbfejlesztésére vonatkozó tanulságokat levonni. A kiutat az elméleti zsákutcából a kormányzati működés és döntéshozatal, valamint a kívánatos gazdaságpolitikai döntések elméletének összekapcsolása jelentheti. Erre megtörténtek az első kísérletek, de a szisztematikus és átfogó elemzés egyelőre várat magára. / === / How far can community economics provide a basis for political decision-making on supranational centralization of taxation policies? The short answer here will be that although the mainstream of community economics succeeds in analysing many relevant economic and political factors, it fails at present to provide satisfactory criteria for decisionmakers. This is because a central role is played in it by a factor exogenous to the models and alien to economic theory: the premise of the measure of goodwill from governments. The study examines the fiscal federalist theory of tax competition. It tries to draw conclusions, on a more general level, about the present state of the economic theory of the public sector and future development of it. The way out of the theoretical blind alley could be to link the theories of government operation and decision-making and of desirable economic-policy decision-making. The first attempts to do so have been made, but a systematic and comprehensive analysis is still awaited.

Predicting success or failure of tax -base revenue sharing attempts: A comparative analysis

To promote regional or mutual improvement, numerous interjurisdictional efforts to share tax bases have been attempted. Most of these efforts fail to be consummated. Motivations to share revenues include: narrowing fiscal disparities, enhancing regional cooperation and economic development, rationalizing land-use, and minimizing revenue losses caused by competition to attract and keep businesses. Various researchers have developed theories to aid understanding of why interjurisdictional cooperation efforts succeed or fail. Walter Rosenbaum and Gladys Kammerer studied two contemporaneous Florida local-government consolidation attempts. Boyd Messinger subsequently tested their Theory of Successful Consolidation on nine consolidation attempts. Paul Peterson's dual theories on Modern Federalism posit that all governmental levels attempt to further economic development and that politicians act in ways that either further their futures or cement job security. Actions related to the latter theory often interfere with the former. Samuel Nunn and Mark Rosentraub sought to learn how interjurisdictional cooperation evolves. Through multiple case studies they developed a model framing interjurisdictional cooperation in four dimensions. ^ This dissertation investigates the ability of the above theories to help predict success or failure of regional tax-base revenue sharing attempts. A research plan was formed that used five sequenced steps to gather data, analyze it, and conclude if hypotheses concerning the application of these theories were valid. The primary analytical tools were: multiple case studies, cross-case analysis, and pattern matching. Data was gathered from historical records, questionnaires, and interviews. ^ The results of this research indicate that Rosenbaum-Kammerer theory can be a predictor of success or failure in implementing tax-base revenue sharing if it is amended as suggested by Messinger and further modified by a recommendation in this dissertation. Peterson's Functional and Legislative theories considered together were able to predict revenue sharing proposal outcomes. Many of the indicators of interjurisdictional cooperation forwarded in the Nunn-Rosentraub model appeared in the cases studied, but the model was not a reliable forecasting instrument. ^

The Council and the Court: Shared Objectives or Opposing Views on the Crime of Aggression

This paper argues that an important part of ensuring the jurisdictional basis of the crime of aggression is to secure a partnership between the UN Security Council and the ICC. Such a partnership should be conducive towards the reality of holding to account individuals that undertake an illegal use of force. This Paper puts forward guiding principles for a model that would benefit a constructive institutional relationship between the Council and the Court. It is through the application of these five guiding principles that the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute can translate into a constructive relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council for the betterment of international peace and security as well as international justice. I maintain that it would be damaging to both the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of the Security Council and the ICC and detrimental to the overall institutional relationship if the final outcome proves unfavourable to international action against the crime of aggression and nothing more than dead letter law. Essentially the key to a viable cooperation regime between the Court and the Council will hinge on shared objectives regarding the crime of aggression rather than opposing views, namely combating impunity by holding individuals accountable for the illegal use of force.

«A Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção», «Direito Penal § Fundamentos Dogmáticos e Político-Criminais»

Resumo: 1- Introdução: algumas notícias da comunicação social; 2 – O designado «Conselho de Prevenção de Corrupção»; 3 – Procuradoria-Geral da República (P.G.R.) e o Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (D.I.A.P.); 4 – Alguns sítios com relevo; 5 – Alguns dos problemas que podem ser colocados em relação à Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção; 5.1 – Âmbito dos problemas a serem falados; 6 – Qual a noção de «empresas que vamos utilizar»?; 6.1 – A noção de «empresa» em sentido geral objectivo e penal; 7 – Mas que tipo de crimes de corrupção vamos falar?; 8 – O art. 11º do Código Penal e os crimes de corrupção no contexto do ordenamento jurídico português; 8.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «em nome da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «no interesse da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «quando não há interesse colectivo»?; 9 – E haverá diferenças, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.)?; 10 – E como é que a Jurisprudência portuguesa, a que tivemos acesso - dado não haver ainda fartura de decisões neste campo -, estabelece o nexo de imputação de responsabilidade penal a uma pessoa colectiva e/ou organização?; 10.1 – Uma primeira pré-conclusão dentro do objectivo que pretendemos demonstrar na totalidade deste trabalho; 11 – Uma segunda pré-conclusão: será que as diferenças acima assinaladas, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.), são as únicas? Veja-se o caso, v.g., do art. 7º do Regime Geral das Infracções Tributárias (R.G.I.T.); 12 – Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma primeira grande conclusão; 13 – Uma (primeira) hipótese de solução; 14 – Que tipo de «empresa» podemos enquadrar no art. 11º do Código Penal?; 14.1 – De acordo com o referido anteriormente, podemos dizer que todas as «empresas» podem praticar os crimes previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.2 – De acordo com o referido antes, quais são as «empresas» que não podem praticar os crimes de corrupção que estão previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.3 – Uma outra pré-conclusão: 14.4 – Um esboço de um dos possíveis problemas; 14.4.1 – Mas, afinal, o que são Entidades Públicas Empresariais (E.P.E.)?; 14.5 – Outra hipótese de esboço de um outro dos possíveis problemas que aqui podemos encontrar; 14.6 – Nova pré-conclusão; 14.7 – Uma outra importante pergunta a fazer e a responder desde já; 14.7.1 - Alarguemos, pois, um pouco a nossa investigação para além do Código Penal português; 14.7.2 – O problema da responsabilidade penal das organizações e/ou «pessoas colectivas», rectius, neste breve ensaio, empresas, pela prática de crimes de corrupção previstos e punidos na mencionada Lei n.º 20/2008, de 21 de Abril («Responsabilidade penal por crimes de corrupção no comércio internacional e na actividade privada»); 14.7.3 – Mais algumas pré-conclusões; 15 - Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma segunda grande conclusão; 16 - O que também apresenta outras implicações como por exemplo na aplicação do crime de «branqueamento» quando nos fala em «corrupção» como «crime primário»; 17 – Outras interrogações; 18 – Conclusão final, mas não última, como nenhuma o pode ser em ciência; 19 – Hipótese de solução. § Abstract: 1 - Introduction: some news media; 2 - The so-called "Council for the Prevention of Corruption”, 3 – “Attorney General's Office” (PGR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Penal Action (DIAP) 4 - Some sites with relief , 5 - Some of the problems that can be placed in relation to the Corporate Responsibility of the Crime of Corruption; 5.1 - Scope of issues to be spoken, 6 - What is the concept of "companies that we will use"?; 6.1 - The term “business” in a general purpose and criminal matters; 7 - What kind of crimes of corruption we talking about?; 8 - Art. 11 of the Penal Code and the crimes of corruption in the context of the Portuguese legal system; 8.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "in the name of the legal person"?; 8.2 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means “in the interests of the legal person"?; 8.2.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "where there is no collective interest"?; 9 - There will be differences, for example, between the operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Legal Infractions Anti-Economic and Against Public Health (RIAECSP)?; 10 - And how does the case law of Portugal, we had access - as there still plenty of decisions in this field - makes a connection of allocating criminal liability to a legal person and / or organization?; 10.1 - A first pre-completion within the objective that we intend to demonstrate in all of this work; 11 - A second pre-conclusion: that the differences will be noted above, for example, between operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Rules of the Offences Against Anti-Economics and Public Health (RIAECSP) are the only ones? Take the case v.g. of art. 7 of the Legal Framework of Tax Offences (RGIT) 12 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, do it here, in this brief essay, a first major conclusion; 13 - A (first) chance for a solution, 14 - What kind “undertaking” we can frame the art. 11 of the Penal Code?; 14.1 - According to the above, we can say that all "companies" can practice the crimes defined and punished in the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.2 - According to the mentioned before, what are the "business" who cannot practice corruption crimes that are planned and punished the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.3 - Another pre-completion: 14.4 - A sketch of one of the possible problems; 14.4.1 - But after all the entities that are Public Enterprise (EPE)?; 14.5 - Another chance to draft another one of the possible problems that can be found here; 14.6 - New pre-completion; 14.7 - Another important question to ask and answer now; 14.7.1 - Let us expand, then, a little beyond our investigation of the Portuguese Penal Code; 14.7.2 - The problem of criminal liability of organizations and / or "legal persons", rectius, this brief essay, companies, for crimes of corruption provided for and punished mentioned in Law No. 20/2008 of 21 April ("Criminal liability for crimes of corruption in international trade and private activities"); 14.7.3 - Some more pre-conclusions; 15 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, let it be here in this brief essay, a second major conclusion, 16 - Who also has other implications such as the application of the crime of "money laundering" when we talk about “corruption” as “primary crime”, 17 - Other questions; 18 - Bottom line, but not last, as the can be no science; 19 - Hypothesis solution. Abstract como no livro.

A Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção: o Caso Português a partir de uma Perspectiva de Direito Penal, mas também de Criminologia

1- Introdução: algumas notícias da comunicação social; 2 – O designado «Conselho de Prevenção de Corrupção»; 3 – Procuradoria-Geral da República (P.G.R.) e o Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (D.I.A.P.); 4 – Alguns sítios com relevo; 5 – Alguns dos problemas que podem ser colocados em relação à Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção; 5.1 – Âmbito dos problemas a serem falados; 6 – Qual a noção de «empresas que vamos utilizar»?; 6.1 – A noção de «empresa» em sentido geral objectivo e penal; 7 – Mas que tipo de crimes de corrupção vamos falar?; 8 – O art. 11º do Código Penal e os crimes de corrupção no contexto do ordenamento jurídico português; 8.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «em nome da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «no interesse da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «quando não há interesse colectivo»?; 9 – E haverá diferenças, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.)?; 10 – E como é que a Jurisprudência portuguesa, a que tivemos acesso - dado não haver ainda fartura de decisões neste campo -, estabelece o nexo de imputação de responsabilidade penal a uma pessoa colectiva e/ou organização?; 10.1 – Uma primeira pré-conclusão dentro do objectivo que pretendemos demonstrar na totalidade deste trabalho; 11 – Uma segunda pré-conclusão: será que as diferenças acima assinaladas, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.), são as únicas? Veja-se o caso, v.g., do art. 7º do Regime Geral das Infracções Tributárias (R.G.I.T.); 12 – Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma primeira grande conclusão; 13 – Uma (primeira) hipótese de solução; 14 – Que tipo de «empresa» podemos enquadrar no art. 11º do Código Penal?; 14.1 – De acordo com o referido anteriormente, podemos dizer que todas as «empresas» podem praticar os crimes previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.2 – De acordo com o referido antes, quais são as «empresas» que não podem praticar os crimes de corrupção que estão previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.3 – Uma outra pré-conclusão: 14.4 – Um esboço de um dos possíveis problemas; 14.4.1 – Mas, afinal, o que são Entidades Públicas Empresariais (E.P.E.)?; 14.5 – Outra hipótese de esboço de um outro dos possíveis problemas que aqui podemos encontrar; 14.6 – Nova pré-conclusão; 14.7 – Uma outra importante pergunta a fazer e a responder desde já; 14.7.1 - Alarguemos, pois, um pouco a nossa investigação para além do Código Penal português; 14.7.2 – O problema da responsabilidade penal das organizações e/ou «pessoas colectivas», rectius, neste breve ensaio, empresas, pela prática de crimes de corrupção previstos e punidos na mencionada Lei n.º 20/2008, de 21 de Abril («Responsabilidade penal por crimes de corrupção no comércio internacional e na actividade privada»); 14.7.3 – Mais algumas pré-conclusões; 15 - Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma segunda grande conclusão; 16 - O que também apresenta outras implicações como por exemplo na aplicação do crime de «branqueamento» quando nos fala em «corrupção» como «crime primário»; 17 – Outras interrogações; 18 – Conclusão final, mas não última, como nenhuma o pode ser em ciência; 19 – Hipótese de solução; 20 – Novos desenvolvimentos. § 1 - Introduction: some news media; 2 - The so-called "Council for the Prevention of Corruption”, 3 – “Attorney General's Office” (PGR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Penal Action (DIAP) 4 - Some sites with relief , 5 - Some of the problems that can be placed in relation to the Corporate Responsibility of the Crime of Corruption; 5.1 - Scope of issues to be spoken, 6 - What is the concept of "companies that we will use"?; 6.1 - The term “business” in a general purpose and criminal matters; 7 - What kind of crimes of corruption we talking about?; 8 - Art. 11 of the Penal Code and the crimes of corruption in the context of the Portuguese legal system; 8.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "in the name of the legal person"?; 8.2 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means “in the interests of the legal person"?; 8.2.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "where there is no collective interest"?; 9 - There will be differences, for example, between the operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Legal Infractions Anti-Economic and Against Public Health (RIAECSP)?; 10 - And how does the case law of Portugal, we had access - as there still plenty of decisions in this field - makes a connection of allocating criminal liability to a legal person and / or organization?; 10.1 - A first pre-completion within the objective that we intend to demonstrate in all of this work; 11 - A second pre-conclusion: that the differences will be noted above, for example, between operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Rules of the Offences Against Anti-Economics and Public Health (RIAECSP) are the only ones? Take the case v.g. of art. 7 of the Legal Framework of Tax Offences (RGIT) 12 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, do it here, in this brief essay, a first major conclusion; 13 - A (first) chance for a solution, 14 - What kind “undertaking” we can frame the art. 11 of the Penal Code?; 14.1 - According to the above, we can say that all "companies" can practice the crimes defined and punished in the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.2 - According to the mentioned before, what are the "business" who cannot practice corruption crimes that are planned and punished the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.3 - Another pre-completion: 14.4 - A sketch of one of the possible problems; 14.4.1 - But after all the entities that are Public Enterprise (EPE)?; 14.5 - Another chance to draft another one of the possible problems that can be found here; 14.6 - New pre-completion; 14.7 - Another important question to ask and answer now; 14.7.1 - Let us expand, then, a little beyond our investigation of the Portuguese Penal Code; 14.7.2 - The problem of criminal liability of organizations and / or "legal persons", rectius, this brief essay, companies, for crimes of corruption provided for and punished mentioned in Law No. 20/2008 of 21 April ("Criminal liability for crimes of corruption in international trade and private activities"); 14.7.3 - Some more pre-conclusions; 15 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, let it be here in this brief essay, a second major conclusion, 16 - Who also has other implications such as the application of the crime of "money laundering" when we talk about “corruption” as “primary crime”, 17 - Other questions; 18 - Bottom line, but not last, as the can be no science; 19 - Hypothesis solution; 20 - New developments.

Crime Económico Não Esquecendo Crime Clássico

Fala-se hoje em dia muito e bem no crime económico e social. Crime de colarinho branco. Também crime da ocupação, profissional ou amadora. Falamos sobre direito penal económico e social. Fraude fiscal, corrupção, branqueamento de capitais, crimes da bolsa, abuso de posição dominante, etc.. Contudo, isto não podemos esquecer o crime clássico, furtos, roubos, danos, ofensas à integridade física, violação, tortura, ameaças, ofensas à honra, injúria ou difamação, abuso sexual (não apenas de crianças), violação, homicídios domésticos ou entre estranhos, etc.. § There is talk nowadays long and hard in the economic and social crime. White collar crime. Also crime of occupation, professional or amateur. We talk about economic and social criminal law. Tax fraud, corruption, money laundering, stock crimes, abuse of dominant position, etc .. However, this can not forget the classic crime, theft, robbery, damage, bodily harm, rape, torture, threats, insults to honor, slander or defamation, sexual abuse (not just children), rape, domestic or among strangers murders, etc ..

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens is still little known for the decades before World War II. Up to now the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 30s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of four countries, this paper offers therefore a new comparative look on international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: was the Swiss case - already considered as a quintessential tax haven at the time - specific in comparison to other banking centres? This research has two results. On the one hand, the 1920s and 30s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Actually, most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the extremely limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. On the other hand, within this general balance sheet, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the bankers, the British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the English business circles.

The efficiency of direct payments versus tax reductions under uncertainty

This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of farmers in the presence of direct payments and uncertainty. In an empirical analysis for Switzerland, it confirms previously obtained theoretical results and determines the magnitude of the theoretical predicted effects. The results show that direct payments increase agricultural production between 3.7% to 4.8%. Alternatively to direct payments, the production effect of tax reductions is evaluated in order to determine its magnitude. The empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical results of the literature and demonstrates that tax reductions are also distorting, but to a substantially lesser degree if losses are not offset. However, tax reductions, independently whether losses are offset or not, lead to higher government spending than pure direct payments

CREB-2, a cellular CRE-dependent transcription repressor, functions in association with Tax as an activator of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter.

The Tax protein of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) has been implicated in human T-cell immortalization. The primary function of Tax is to transcriptionally activate the HTLV-1 promoter, but Tax is also known to stimulate expression of cellular genes. It has been reported to associate with several transcription factors, as well as proteins not involved in transcription. To better characterize potential cellular targets of Tax present in infected cells, a Saccharomyces cerevisiae two-hybrid screening was performed with a cDNA library constructed from the HTLV-1-infected MT2 cell line. From this study, we found 158 positive clones representing seven different cDNAs. We focused our attention on the cDNA encoding the transcription factor CREB-2. CREB-2 is an unconventional member of the ATF/CREB family in that it lacks a protein kinase A (PKA) phosphorylation site and has been reported to negatively regulate transcription from the cyclic AMP response element of the human enkephalin promoter. In this study, we demonstrate that CREB-2 cooperates with Tax to enhance viral transcription and that its basic-leucine zipper C-terminal domain is required for both in vitro and in vivo interactions with Tax. Our results confirm that the activation of the HTLV-1 promoter through Tax and factors of the ATF/CREB family is PKA independent.

Do agglomeration economies reduce the sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials?

Low corporate taxes can help attract new firms. This is the main mechanism underpinning the standard 'race-to-the-bottom'view of tax competition. A recent theoretical literature has qualified this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces can reduce firms' sensitivity to tax differentials across locations. We test this proposition using data on firm startups across Swiss municipalities. We find that, on average, high corporate income taxes do deter new firms, but that this relationship is significantly weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are estimated to be twice as responsive to a given difference in local corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our analysis confirms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

Do Agglomeration Economies Reduce the Sensitivity of Firm Location to Tax Differentials?

Recent theoretical work in economic geography has shown that agglomeration forces can mitigate 'race-to-the-bottom' tax competition, by partly or fully offsetting firms' sensitivity to tax differentials. We test this proposition using data on firm births across Swiss municipalities. We find that corporate taxes deter firm births less in more spatially concentrated sectors. Firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity in the top quintile are less than half as responsive to differences in corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity in the bottom quintile. Hence, agglomeration economies do appear to attenuate the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

Molecular interactions involved in the transactivation of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter mediated by Tax and CREB-2 (ATF-4).

The human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) Tax protein activates viral transcription through three 21-bp repeats located in the U3 region of the HTLV-1 long terminal repeat and called Tax-responsive elements (TxREs). Each TxRE contains nucleotide sequences corresponding to imperfect cyclic AMP response elements (CRE). In this study, we demonstrate that the bZIP transcriptional factor CREB-2 is able to bind in vitro to the TxREs and that CREB-2 binding to each of the 21-bp motifs is enhanced by Tax. We also demonstrate that Tax can weakly interact with CREB-2 bound to a cellular palindromic CRE motif such as that found in the somatostatin promoter. Mutagenesis of Tax and CREB-2 demonstrates that both N- and C-terminal domains of Tax and the C-terminal region of CREB-2 are required for direct interaction between the two proteins. In addition, the Tax mutant M47, defective for HTLV-1 activation, is unable to form in vitro a ternary complex with CREB-2 and TxRE. In agreement with recent results suggesting that Tax can recruit the coactivator CREB-binding protein (CBP) on the HTLV-1 promoter, we provide evidence that Tax, CREB-2, and CBP are capable of cooperating to stimulate viral transcription. Taken together, our data highlight the major role played by CREB-2 in Tax-mediated transactivation.

Alleged Tax Competition: The Mysterious Death of Inheritance Taxes in Switzerland

Interjurisdictional competition over mobile tax bases is an easily understood mechanism, but actual tax-base elasticities are difficult to estimate. Political pressure for reducing tax rates could therefore be based on erroneous estimates of the mobility of tax bases. We show that tax competition provided the overwhelmingly dominant argument in the policy debates leading to a succession of reforms of bequest taxation by Swiss cantons. Yet, we find only very weak statistical evidence of a relationship between tax burdens on bequests and the concerned tax base of wealthy elderly individuals. Moreover, inheritance tax revenues are found to increase in inheritance tax rates even in the long run, and actual tax rates lie well below the revenue-maximising levels throughout. The alleged pressures of tax competition did not seem in reality to exist.