Fécondation in vitro: intérêt et désavantage du remboursement par l'assurance maladie en Suisse [In-vitro fertilization: advantage and disadvantage of covering the costs of IVF/ICSI by the health insurance in Switzerland]

In-vitro fertilization: advantage and disadvantage of covering the costs of IVF/CSI by the health insurance in Switzerland The reimbursement of certain infertility treatments (stimulation with/without insemination) whereas IVF/ICSI is not leads patients with an indication of IVF to prefer treatments of low efficacy. The costs of multiple pregnancies issued by reimbursed or non-reimbursed fertility treatments are paid by the society. There should be measures to reduce these costs and to take the money used today to pay the complications of infertility treatments to reimburse IVF. The efficacy of such a system (single embryo transfer) has been proven in Belgium since several years. The dangers of complete reimbursement (IVF treatment in cases without any chances of success, only because it is for free) can be avoided by an Efficacy and Safety Board.

Investigation of the State Insurance Division's Oversight of Clinton Memorial Cemetery & Funeral Home, Inc, 1999

Investigative report produced by Iowa Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman

Social and medical vulnerability factors of emergency department frequent users in a universal health insurance system.

OBJECTIVES: The objectives were to identify the social and medical factors associated with emergency department (ED) frequent use and to determine if frequent users were more likely to have a combination of these factors in a universal health insurance system. METHODS: This was a retrospective chart review case-control study comparing randomized samples of frequent users and nonfrequent users at the Lausanne University Hospital, Switzerland. The authors defined frequent users as patients with four or more ED visits within the previous 12 months. Adult patients who visited the ED between April 2008 and March 2009 (study period) were included, and patients leaving the ED without medical discharge were excluded. For each patient, the first ED electronic record within the study period was considered for data extraction. Along with basic demographics, variables of interest included social (employment or housing status) and medical (ED primary diagnosis) characteristics. Significant social and medical factors were used to construct a logistic regression model, to determine factors associated with frequent ED use. In addition, comparison of the combination of social and medical factors was examined. RESULTS: A total of 359 of 1,591 frequent and 360 of 34,263 nonfrequent users were selected. Frequent users accounted for less than a 20th of all ED patients (4.4%), but for 12.1% of all visits (5,813 of 48,117), with a maximum of 73 ED visits. No difference in terms of age or sex occurred, but more frequent users had a nationality other than Swiss or European (n = 117 [32.6%] vs. n = 83 [23.1%], p = 0.003). Adjusted multivariate analysis showed that social and specific medical vulnerability factors most increased the risk of frequent ED use: being under guardianship (adjusted odds ratio [OR] = 15.8; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.7 to 147.3), living closer to the ED (adjusted OR = 4.6; 95% CI = 2.8 to 7.6), being uninsured (adjusted OR = 2.5; 95% CI = 1.1 to 5.8), being unemployed or dependent on government welfare (adjusted OR = 2.1; 95% CI = 1.3 to 3.4), the number of psychiatric hospitalizations (adjusted OR = 4.6; 95% CI = 1.5 to 14.1), and the use of five or more clinical departments over 12 months (adjusted OR = 4.5; 95% CI = 2.5 to 8.1). Having two of four social factors increased the odds of frequent ED use (adjusted = OR 5.4; 95% CI = 2.9 to 9.9), and similar results were found for medical factors (adjusted OR = 7.9; 95% CI = 4.6 to 13.4). A combination of social and medical factors was markedly associated with ED frequent use, as frequent users were 10 times more likely to have three of them (on a total of eight factors; 95% CI = 5.1 to 19.6). CONCLUSIONS: Frequent users accounted for a moderate proportion of visits at the Lausanne ED. Social and medical vulnerability factors were associated with frequent ED use. In addition, frequent users were more likely to have both social and medical vulnerabilities than were other patients. Case management strategies might address the vulnerability factors of frequent users to prevent inequities in health care and related costs.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Report to the Governor and General Assembly on Voluntary Employer-Sponsored Health Care Coverage Demonstration Project-Non-licensed Direct Care Workers, December 2008

Iowa faces a growing crisis in providing an adequate number of direct care workers for its again population. Direct care workers caring for the aging and disabled population are among those in our work force with the lowest wages and lack of access to health insurance. A survey of direct care workers conducted by the Iowa Caregivers Association in June of 2066 indicated that benefits ranked second only to wages in the reasons for job-hoping. A study of the direct care workforce in Vermont healthy insurance, ranked second only to wages, as important to attracting and keeping direct care workers.

Rethinking Health Insurance, Iowa State Planning Guide, September 30, 2005

Iowa has been a HRSA State Planning Grant participant since October 2000. Iowa’s purpose in participating in the program has remained constant: to identify, through research, policies that will help expand access to affordable health insurance coverage for all Iowans. The Iowa State Planning Grant project (Iowa-SPG) has been able to serve as a significant state data resource on the uninsured in Iowa throughout its tenure. Through the use of State Planning Grant resources, policymakers, the media, and interested citizens have been able to access, from one convenient and trusted source, a variety of information on Iowa’s uninsured population. Section 1 of this report presents an update of state-level data on the uninsured with a focus on the data that has been of greatest interest to various Iowa constituencies during the State Planning Grant years, 2001-2005.

A guide to understanding the variation in premiums in rural health insurance marketplaces (RUPRI Center for Rural Health Policy Analysis rural policy brief)

This brief discusses several important factors that should be considered when comparing health insurance plans in the health insurance marketplaces across geographic areas.

Iowa guide to long-term care insurance : the time to explore your insurance options is now, 2014

This is a guide to the Senior Health Insurance Information Program (SHIIP)

Guide to Medicare prescription drug coverage, 2013

A guide for seniors on medicare and prescription drug plans

Financial protection for the poor in Colombia: the effects of a subsidized health insurance scheme

Financial protection is one of the objectives of health systems, which protects poor households from falling into poverty as a result of health care related expenses. Expanding prepayment schemes to the poor is difficult in developing countries because labor is largely informal. Providing health care free-at-point-of-service does not adequately target spending on the poorest, but occupation- or community-based schemes have also inherent limitations to achieve universal coverage. Colombia adopted a government-subsidized health insurance scheme (SHI) strategy. The political debate about increasing SHI enrollment needs evidence about the effectiveness of this scheme regarding financial protection. This study runs a four-part model to estimate the effect of SHI on out-of-pocket expenses by the poor that are currently uninsured, if they were enrolled in the SHI. The results show a 43% and 50% reduction in expenses at Bogotá and national level respectively, which confirms the effectiveness of SHI as a financial protection tool.

Health insurance as a strategy for access : Streamlined facts of the Colombian Health Care Reform

La reforma colombiana al sistema de salud (Ley 100 de 1993) estableció, como estrategia para facilitar el acceso, la universalidad de un seguro de salud que se adquiere mediante la cotización en el régimen contributivo o mediante la afiliación gratuita al régimen subsidiado, con la meta de cubrir a toda la población con un plan de beneficios único que comprende servicios de todos los niveles de atención. En el documento se analizan los principales hechos estilizados de la reforma en cuanto a cobertura del seguro y acceso y, mediante modelos logit, se estiman los determinantes de la afiliación y del acceso, con datos de las encuestas de calidad de vida de 1997 y 2003. Se destaca que la cobertura pasó del 20% de la población en 1993 al 60% en 2004, aunque parece imposible alcanzar la universalidad; la estructura y evolución de la cobertura muestran que los dos regímenes son complementarios, de modo que mientras el contributivo tiene mayor presencia en las ciudades y entre la población con empleo formal, el subsidiado tiene mayor peso entre la población rural y con bajos niveles de ingresos; por otra parte, el seguro tiene ventajas para la población subsidiada, con una mayor probabilidad de utilización de servicios, aunque el plan es inferior al del contributivo y existen barreras para el acceso.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Expanding the coverage of pension systems in Latin America

Includes bibliography