Niagara Ship Canal : letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting report by Colonel Blunt, on the surveys for a ship canal to connect Lakes Erie and Ontario (1868)

March 3, 1868. -- Referred to the Select Committee on the Niagara Ship Canal.

Letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting a report of the unsettled accounts in the office of the Accountant of the War Department and the Paymaster of the Army, (1814)

13th Congress, 2nd Session, 1813-1814.

Report from the secretary of war, communicating, in compliaance with a resolution of the Senate, of the 21st. february, 1849, a copy of the official journal of Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke, from Santa Fé to San Diego.

UANL

Report of the Secretary of War, communicating; in compliance witha resolution of the Senate, a map showing the operations of the army of the United States in Texas and the adjacent Mexican Stateson the Rio Grande, accompanied by astronomical observations, and descriptive and military memoirs of the country.

UANL

Summary of the art of war, or a new analytical compend of the principal combinations of strategy, of grand tactics and of military policy

UANL

Report of the Secretary of War: being part of the message and documents communicated to two houses of Congress at the beginning of the secondd session of the forty-sixth Congress.

UANL

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

The cultural chaos of war on humanity depicted in modern Hindi literature

Hindi

Corrective Justice vs. Social Justice in the Aftermath of War

How do we justify the practice of corrective justice for losses suffered during armed conflicts? This article seeks to show the force and relevance of this question, and to argue that, in cases of massively destructive wars, social justice should gain priority over corrective justice. Starting from a liberal Rawlsian conception of the relationship between corrective and social justice, it is argued that, paradoxically, the more destructive a war is, the less normative force corrective rights have and the higher priority policies of social justice, which guarantee basic rights to all citizens, should have.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.