Territory and party:explaining public policy variation in the German Länder

This paper discusses in way in which partisan influence upon public policy, and wider historical, political and institutional pressures, can operate on a regional level and can lead to divergent policies existing within a nation-state. It offers an empirical discussion of two policy areas (education and childcare) at the regional Level (the level of the Länder) in Germany, confirming that both the partisan composition of regional government, and also wider institutional and historical pressures, exert a clear influence upon policy, lead to sharply variations in policy within the nation state. Two conclusions can be drawn: that the region cab be an important unit of analysis in Political Science and Public Policy, and that scholars of policy change may find the regional level fertile ground in analysing wider political phenomena.

Democratization of local government in Brazil : decentralisation and people's councils

This research studies two cases of implementation of alternative strategies for municipal government reform in Brazil, decentralisation and People's Councils. The aim is to answer the following general question: `Can decentralisation and People's Councils be a means for democratization of municipal government in Brazil?'. The hypothesis is that initiatives to reform Brazilian municipal governments face problems that are characteristic of the Brazilian political and administrative reality. These problems are considered obstacles for the development of those initiatives and accordingly, for democratization of municipal government in Brazil. After an introduction and outline in Chapter One, Chapter Two discusses four main theories concerning local government. Chapter Three discusses decentralisation and People's Councils are discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five presents a historical, political and economic overview of Brazil. Chapter Six deals with Brazilian Federalism and Municipal Government. The main aspects of the Municipal Government are presented as well as the development of municipal autonomy through the various Federal Constitutions and cases of People's Councils and decentralisation in municipalities in Brazil. Chapter Seven presents the political parties responsible for the initiatives, the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) in the case of decentralisation, and the PT (Workers' Party) in the case of People's Councils. In Chapter Eight the research strategy and the data collection techniques are described. Chapters Nine and Ten present decentralisation implemented by the PSDB in Belo Horizonte, the Minas Gerais state capital and People's Councils introduced by the PT in the town of Ipatinga in the same state. Conclusions are presented in Chapter Eleven and include a comparison and discussion of the two cases. The thesis shows that these experiments with alternative strategies of local government face problems that are generally current in Brazilian political and administrative reality. Those problems are concerned with unwillingness to decentralise power, clientelism, low levels of participation of civil society and the `political' use of the structures implemented.

The career of councillors:gender, party and politics. By Catherine Bochel and Hugh M. Bochel, 2000. Pp.143. £37.50 hb.

Book review

Political performance and leadership persona:the UK Labour Party Conference of 2012

This article is a contribution to an emerging scholarship on the role of rhetoric, persona and celebrity, and the effects of performance on the political process. We analyse party leader Ed Miliband at the UK Labour Party Conference in Manchester in 2012. Our analysis identifies how, through performance of himself and the beginnings of the deployment of an alternative party narrative centred on One Nation, Ed Miliband began to revise his received persona. By using a range of rhetorical and other techniques, Miliband began to adapt the Labour narrative to the personalized political. The article sets out the theoretical framework for the analysis and returns to the implications for the theory of leadership performance in its conclusion.

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied-- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton--are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy--executive orders--redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress. ^

Determinants and effects of electoral party coalitions: The case of Brazil

Since the 1985 return to democracy, Brazilian politicians have resorted to vote-pooling arrangements to elect representatives. A puzzle thus presents itself: What drives parties to join these electoral cartels? The dissertation unraveled the incentives party elites have to participate in coalitions under a presidencialist system of government. I also investigated the effect of electoral coalitions on congressional representation. I applied a model of binary outcomes and relied on standard deviations to assess the ideological homogeneity/heterogeneity of electoral coalitions. I also calculated the Index of Disproportionality to measure the gaps between the proportion of votes and seats received by all parties in Brazil with and without electoral coalitions. Finally, I assessed the effects of the electoral formula on proportionality. An unexpected exogenous factor resulted crucial in explaining proportional electoral coalition building: The district's majoritarian election for governor. In each district, political actors often synchronize coalition partners to maximize winning results while minimizing electoral efforts.

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton-are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy-executive orders redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress.

CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS AND COMBATANTS’ BEHAVIORS: STRATEGY, PERCEPTION, AND REPUTATION

Three projects in my dissertation focus on the termination of internal conflicts based on three critical factors: a combatant’s bargaining strategy, perceptions of relative capabilities, and reputation for toughness. My dissertation aims to provide the relevant theoretical framework to understand war termination beyond the simple two-party bargaining context. The first project focuses on the government’s strategic use of peace agreements. The first project suggests that peace can also be designed strategically to create a better bargain in the near future by changing the current power balance, and thus the timing and nature of peace is not solely a function of overcoming current barriers to successful bargaining. As long as the government has no overwhelming capability to defeat all rebel groups simultaneously, it needs to keep multiple rebel groups as divided as possible. This strategic partial peace helps to deter multiple rebel groups from collaborating in the battlefield and increases the chances of victory against non-signatories. The second project deals with combatants’ perceptions of relative capabilities. While bargaining theories of war suggest that war ends when combatants share a similar perception about their relative capabilities, combatants’ perceptions about relative capabilities are not often homogeneous. While focusing on information problems, this paper examines when a rebel group underestimates the government’s supremacy in relative capabilities and how this heterogeneous perception about the power gap influences negotiated settlements. The third project deals with the tension between different types of reputations in the context of civil wars: 1) a reputation for resolve and 2) a reputation for keeping human rights standards. In the context of civil wars, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government is costly, and as such, it signals the government’s toughness (or resolve) to rebel groups. I argue that the rebels are more likely to accept the government’s offer when the government recently engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the conflict. This effect, however, is conditional on the government’s international human rights reputation; suggesting that rebel groups interpret this violence as a signal particularly when the government does not have a penchant for attacking civilians in general.