Avaliação da percepção sobre interdisciplinaridade nas unidades de saúde USF Paranapiacaba, US Vila Helena e CEO Vila Guilherme

É necessário compreender que o indivíduo, no processo saúde-doença, precisa receber atenção completa, que envolva várias disciplinas atuando de forma conjunta, numa visão que envolve integralidade de ações (Saupe et al., 2007; Salvador et al., 2011). Uma das principais características dos serviços de saúde hoje em dia no país é o atendimento feito por equipes multiprofissionais, cujo entrosamento, entendimento e troca de saberes entre seus membros levam à interdisciplinaridade (Salvador et al., 2011), tema central deste trabalho de pesquisa. Atendimento interdisciplinar envolve trabalho recíproco, criando relações sociais horizontais, contrariamente ao que ocorre no modelo de assistência tradicional, hegemônico. Exige que o saber do outro seja ouvido e pensado, inclusive dos indivíduos e das comunidades assistidos (Leite; Veloso, 2008). Este estudo, do tipo quali-quantitativo, tem por objetivo analisar as percepções que trabalhadores e usuários de três unidades de saúde, com estratégias distintas de atendimento, apresentam sobre interdisciplinaridade. Busca-se destacar dificuldades e possíveis meios facilitadores para sua prática diária na perspectiva de profissionais de saúde e usuários dessas três unidades de saúde. Foram aplicados questionários com perguntas fechadas semiestruturadas e abertas, cujos resultados foram submetidos à análise quantitativa, pela técnica descritiva de análise de frequência, e análise qualitativa pela técnica hermenêutica dialética, conforme preconizada por Minayo (2004). À luz dessa modalidade qualitativa de pesquisa aplicada aos profissionais surgiram três categorias: Meios para aumento da interdisciplinaridade; Fatores que afetam a interdisciplinaridade, subdivididos em Incentivadores, Desmotivadores e Ambíguos; e Resultados da interdisciplinaridade. Em relação aos usuários, as categorias emergentes foram: Desinteresse; Visão assistencial individualista e Vantagens da interdisciplinaridade. Os resultados encontrados foram: todas as categorias profissionais sentiram falta de outros profissionais em grupos educativos. A ausência mais sentida foi assistente social (18,75%). A estratégia interdisciplinar mais lembrada foi \"reuniões\" (38,6%). Falta noção de que é necessário trocar informações de forma efetiva, compreensível e satisfatória para todos. Mostrou-se importante aproveitar esses momentos para discutir protocolos e rotinas. Instrumento relevante para aumentar as trocas entre os profissionais foi a capacitação (13,6%) que melhora o relacionamento em equipe ao diminuir inseguranças. Trocas de informações em equipe multidisciplinar podem transformála em interdisciplinar. Pertencimento foi fato importante para a interdisciplinaridade, assim como dialogar, tolerar, respeitar, ouvir, ser flexível e enxergar o que está além de si, com interação social, horizontal. Número reduzido de profissionais, tomar conhecimento dos resultados das decisões em equipe e corresponsabilidade também foram fatores de destaque. Mais de 70% dos usuários relatou não participar de grupos educativos, evidenciando o curativismo. Os usuários valorizaram o atendimento por mais de um profissional. Acolhimento prescinde da ação interdisciplinar. Nenhum modo de atendimento foi sugerido pelos usuários. A interdisciplinaridade favorece a relação entre a equipe e o usuário, diminui espera e aumenta resolução. Na US Vila Helena, a interdisciplinaridade prescindiu de reuniões de equipe para acontecer.

Estrella Dominica novamente descuberta no ceo da Igreja : Historia panegyrica, ornada com todo o genero de erudiça? divina, & humana /

Mode of access: Internet.

Estrella Dominica novamente descuberta no ceo da Igreja : Historia panegyrica, ornada com todo o genero de erudiça? divina, & humana ... /

Mode of access: Internet.

Brados do ceo à insensibilidade dos homens, ou, Casos formidaveis, e horrorosos succedidos em differentes partes do mundo no anno de 1717 : com hum discurso compilativo dos successos mais memoraveis do mesmo anno, que servirà de introduçaõ à historia annual, ou gazetas do presente /

Silva, I.F. da. Diccionário bib. portuguez, IV, 3345

CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

Motives for corporate cash holdings:the CEO optimism effect

We examine the chief executive officer (CEO) optimism effect on managerial motives for cash holdings and find that optimistic and non-optimistic managers have significantly dissimilar purposes for holding more cash. This is consistent with both theory and evidence that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds. Optimistic managers hoard cash for growth opportunities, use relatively more cash for capital expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in adverse conditions. By contrast, they hold fewer inventories and receivables and their precautionary demand for cash holdings is less than that of non-optimistic managers. In addition, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that optimistic managers’ cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively. We also document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic managers do. Our work highlights the crucial role that CEO characteristics play in shaping corporate cash holding policy.

CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors

Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem, because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover, I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.