Antecedentes e conseqüências da confiança do consumidor final em trocas relacionadas com empresas de serviço : um estudo com o usuário de Internet Banking no Brasil

Este trabalho analisa um dos setores econômicos mais desenvolvidos do Brasil, a indústria financeira. Mais especificamente, as situações de trocas relacionais com os clientes finais (pessoas-físicas), tanto através dos contatos tradicionais (com empregados do banco) quanto através do comércio eletrônico (via internet). São descritos aspectos dos comportamentos dos clientes bancários em seus relacionamentos comerciais, notadamente como a confiança desses clientes em relação à empresa é construída e quais as suas conseqüências para o relacionamento com o Banco. Através de uma survey com 611 clientes usuários de Internet Banking do Banco do Brasil de todo o País, confirmou-se a hipótese de que os clientes realizam avaliações do serviço através de facetas múltiplas: o Web Site, os Empregados de Fronteira e as Políticas e Práticas Gerenciais. De maneira geral, a competência operacional e a benevolência de cada uma das facetas foram confirmadas como antecedentes (ou formadores) da confiança. Ratificou-se, também, que os clientes avaliam os serviços em dois contextos distintos: situações rotineiras e quando ocorrem problemas (a chamada recuperação de serviços). A hipótese central do trabalho de que, em situações de trocas relacionais, a confiança que os clientes têm em cada uma das facetas gera o comportamento de lealdade foi confirmada. A mediação dessa relação pelo valor que o cliente percebe na relação de troca também mostrou-se consistente. A maioria dos resultados obtidos apresentou-se conforme o esperado e de acordo com a revisão de literatura realizada, sendo que muitos deles foram similares, em termos de magnitude e significância estatística, a trabalhos anteriores sobre tema semelhante em outros países. A partir desses resultados, são apresentadas limitações do trabalho e sugestões para pesquisas futuras em relação aos aspectos teóricos, metodológicos e práticos abordados.

Relationship banking: does it lower information asymmetry or increase lender monopoly power?

A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias

Crises bancárias podem implicar uma alta redistribuição de recursos em uma sociedade. O interesse público em manter os bancos em funcionamento demanda o desenho de regimes eficazes de resolução, pois a falência desordenada desses intermediários pode ser uma fonte de risco sistêmico. O Banco Central, autoridade responsável por zelar pela higidez do sistema financeiro, pode se valer de diversos instrumentos para reestruturar ou liquidar um banco em dificuldade financeira. De modo a prevenir a propagação do risco sistêmico, as regras jurídicas conferem ao Banco Central uma ampla margem de discricionariedade no julgamento de quais bancos merecem receber assistência financeira e na escolha dos métodos de resolução bancária. O caráter globalizado das finanças exige uma maior coordenação entre autoridades domésticas na resolução de bancos que operam em múltiplas jurisdições. Algumas iniciativas de órgãos internacionais no período pós-crise de 2007-2008 têm buscado instituir, em nível global, um marco normativo para gerenciamento de crises bancárias, através da harmonização de regimes domésticos de resolução. O histórico de crises do sistema financeiro brasileiro levou ao desenvolvimento de uma rede de proteção bancária em momentos anteriores à crise financeira global de 2007-2008. Assim, o sistema financeiro brasileiro apresentou bom funcionamento mesmo nas fases mais agudas. Não tendo experimentado uma crise sistêmica no período recente, o Brasil não está passando por reformas profundas na estrutura institucional do seu sistema financeiro, a exemplo de países como Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. No entanto, desafios impostos pela crescente globalização das finanças e peculiaridades locais motivam reformas e mudanças discretas nos padrões de governança da rede de proteção brasileira. Através da reconstituição da atuação do Banco Central em três momentos de crise no Brasil, o presente trabalho busca analisar criticamente a rede de proteção bancária brasileira e os mecanismos jurídicos de accountability da autoridade financeira no exercício da supervisão e administração de crises bancárias.

Applying supply chain management models in the banking industry: a brazilian case analysis

The study presents the results and recommendations deriving from the application of two supply chain management analysis models as proposed by the Supply Chain Council (SCOR, version 10.0) and by Lambert (1997, Framework for Supply Chain Management) on the logistics of cash transfers in Brazil. Cash transfers consist of the transportation of notes to and from each node of the complex network formed by the bank branches, ATMs, armored transportation providers, the government custodian, Brazilian Central Bank and financial institutions. Although the logistic to sustain these operations is so wide-ranged (country-size), complex and subject to a lot of financial regulations and security procedures, it has been detected that it was probably not fully integrated. Through the use of a primary and a secondary data research and analysis, using the above mentioned models, the study ends up with propositions to strongly improve the operations efficiency

Banking competition in Mexico

Incluye Bibliografía

Ownership, Multiple Blockholders and Performance: A study of the Indonesian Banking Industry

The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence on how ownership structure and owner’s identity affect performance, in the banking industry by using a panel of Indonesia banks over the period 2000–2009. Firstly, we analysed the impact of the presence of multiple blockholders on bank ownership structure and performance. Building on multiple agency and principal-principal theories, we investigated whether the presence and shares dispersion across blockholders with different identities (i.e. central and regional government; families; foreign banks and financial institutions) affected bank performance, in terms of profitability and efficiency. We found that the number of blockholders has a negative effect on banks’ performance, while blockholders’ concentration has a positive effect. Moreover, we observed that the dispersion of ownership across different types of blockholders has a negative effect on banks’ performance. We interpret such results as evidence that, when heterogeneous blockholders are present, the disadvantage from conflicts of interests between blockholders seems to outweigh the advantage of the increase in additional monitoring by additional blockholder. Secondly, we conducted a joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of different types of ownership on banks’ performance. We found that regional banks and foreign banks have a higher profitability and efficiency as compared to domestic private banks. In the short-run, foreign acquisitions and domestic M&As reduce the level of overhead costs, while in the long-run they increase the Net Interest Margin (NIM). Further, we analysed NIM determinants, to asses the impact of ownership on bank business orientation. Our findings lend support to our prediction that the NIM determinants differs accordingly to the type of bank ownership. We also observed that banks that experienced changes in ownership, such as foreign-acquired banks, manifest different interest margin determinants with respect to domestic or foreign banks that did not experience ownership rearrangements.

From supervision to resolution: next steps on the road to European Banking Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/04, February 2012

The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.

Banking system soundness is the key to more SME financing. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/10, July 2013

The SME access-to-finance problem is not universal in the European Union and there are reasons for the fall in credit aggregates and higher SME lending rates in southern Europe. Possible market failures, high unemployment and externalities justify making greater and easier access to finance for SMEs a top priority. Previous European initiatives were able to support only a tiny fraction of Europe’s SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in a breakthrough. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review before it takes over the single supervisory role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking clean-up, but other options, such as increased European Investment Bank lending and the promotion of securitisation of SME loans, should also be explored.

A realistic bridge towards European banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/09, June 2013

New obstacles to the European banking union have emerged over the last year, but a successful transition remains both necessary and possible. The key next step will be in the second half of 2014, when the European Central Bank (ECB) will gain supervisory authority over most of Europe’s banking system. This needs to be preceded by a rigorous balance sheet assessment that is likely to trigger significant bank restructuring, for which preparation has barely started. It will be much more significant than current discussions about a bank resolution directive and bank recapitalisation by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The 2014 handover, and a subsequent change in the European treaties that will establish the robust legal basis needed for a sustainable banking union, together define the policy sequence as a bridge that can allow Europe to cross the choppy waters that separate it from a steady-state banking policy framework.

A Copernican turn in Banking Union urgently needed. CEPS Policy Brief No. 297, July 2013 [is another Brief with no. 297]

Despite broad agreement among central bankers, policy-makers and economists that creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress in building this union has been painfully slow. This is largely due to the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of bad loans made in the past. Taking a cue from Copernicus, Thomas Mayer suggests in this new CEPS Policy Brief that the impasse may be broken by turning the whole process on its head. So, instead of trying to move from common bank supervision, over to bank resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he proposes reversing the process by starting with deposit insurance, moving from there to resolution and ending with supervision.

Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: passing the point of no return for Europe's banking union. Egmont Paper No. 58, June 2013

From the Executive Summary. Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly interconnected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank (ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crises.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

European Central Bank accountability: how the monetary dialogue could be improved. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/04, March 2014

According to the European Union Treaties, the European Central Bank (ECB) is accountable to the European Parliament. In practice, this accountability takes mainly the form of a quarterly Monetary Dialogue between the president of the ECB and the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs committee. We assess the impact of the Monetary Dialogue. We describe the ECB’s accountability practices, compare them to those of other major central banks and provide an assessment of the dialogue in the last five years. The Monetary Dialogue could be improved and we make recommendations on this. We also consider what role the Monetary Dialogue could play in the current context of the ECB’s evolving role. We discuss in particular forward guidance and quantitative easing. We review the main features and the way in which those policies have been implemented by other central banks. We then suggest the appropriate role for the Monetary Dialogue in relation to each of those policies. We conclude with some observations on the function of the Monetary Dialogue after the establishment of a banking union in Europe.

ECB Banking Supervision and beyond. CEPS Task Force Report, December 2014

With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur. José María Roldán, Presidente, Asociación Española de Banca, served as Chairman of the Task Force.